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Contrast effects on sequence assessments 
 
Abstract 
 
Loewenstein and his colleagues found divergent preferences for outcomes assessed in 
isolation versus those embedded in a sequence, i.e. discounting isolated future outcomes 
versus preferences for increasing and constant sequences. They also found long intervals (i.e. 
the difference between time delays) rather than long time delays (i.e. the temporal distance 
from the present) had a detrimental effect on preference for improvement. This thesis 
proposes a descriptive model of sequence preferences, namely the contrasts model, which 
acknowledges the difference between interval and delay. The idea is that delay and interval 
are two different kinds of variables. Delay is non-relational and describes characteristics of 
individual outcomes, whereas interval is relational and describes characteristics of outcomes 
in relation to one another. Built on this idea, the contrasts model assumes that the value of a 
sequence consists of a non-relational part (the endowment value), which is a function of delay 
and nominal value of the component outcomes and a relational part (the contrast value), 
which is a function of the signed value difference between the outcomes, their interval and 
domain relatedness (i.e. whether or not the outcomes share the same domain). Delay and 
interval influence the endowment and the contrast respectively. Empirical investigations 
provide evidence for the contrasts model. Decision makers are capable of distinguishing 
between influences of delay and interval even when the two coincide and exert conflicting 
influences. Experiments using both money and non-monetary outcomes also show that 
preferences for improvement can be made more pronounced by shortening intervals and/or 
enhancing relatedness between the outcomes.   
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
A sequence is a series of outcomes spaced over time (Loewenstein & Prelec, 
1993). Sequences are ubiquitous. Almost all decisions have costs and benefits 
extended into the future. These include important life-time decisions, e.g. schooling 
and marriage, as well as seemingly trivial ones, e.g. whether to snack on an apple or a 
chocolate bar. Chocolate bars may bring higher immediate pleasure; apples however 
offer greater long-term benefits to health. 
Sequence preferences, i.e. how people would like to experience multiple 
outcomes, are central to our well-being. In economic analysis, sequence preferences 
are traditionally handled within the framework of normative discounting models, e.g. 
the discounted utility model (or DU; Koopmans, 1960; Samuelson, 1937). These 
models assume “outcome independence”, or that the value assessments of outcomes 
are independent of each other. Thus the value of a sequence can be expressed as an 
additive combination of the values of its component outcomes. The impact of time 
delay, i.e. the time distance of an outcome to the present, is embodied in discount 
parameters, e.g. discount rate, which is the percentage by which the value is reduced 
for each time period or discount factor, which is the remaining proportion of value 
after one period of delay.  For single outcomes, delayed outcomes are valued less than 
immediate ones. That is, discount rates are mostly positive; so we say that positive 
time preference prevails (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002). Treating a 
sequence as a collection of isolated outcomes leads to the prediction that a falling 
series of utility levels (a decreasing sequence) is more attractive than a rising series 
(an increasing sequence) because the former allows the more desirable (or less 
undesirable) outcomes to be experienced sooner rather than later. 
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Such predictions contradict a large body of empirical evidence. While it is true 
that people prefer gains earlier rather than later, they also prefer increasing sequences 
to decreasing ones. The so-called preference for improvement has been observed in a 
variety of domains for both positive and negative outcomes, monetary and non-
monetary outcomes (Chapman, 1996; Guyse, Keller, & Eppel, 2002; Hsee & Abelson, 
1991; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991, 1993; Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991; Read & 
Powell, 2002; Ross & Simonson, 1991; Stevenson, 1993); it even applies to 
retrospective assessments of aversive experiences, such as pains and discomfort 
(Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993; Varey & Kahneman, 1992). 
In addition to this, people sometime prefer to spread outcomes evenly across time. 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) called these two kinds of preferences, i.e. preference 
for improvement and preference for spreading, the two modal sequence preferences. 
Modal sequence preferences imply time preferences that are non-positive. 
The divergent time preferences result in part from how one makes decisions, 
or the level of choice bracketing (Read, Loewenstein & Rabin, 1999). Under narrow 
bracketing, the decisions are made in isolation, whereas under broad bracketing, the 
decisions are made at the same time, taking into account effects of one decision exerts 
on other decisions. Outcomes presented in isolation versus in a sequence foster 
narrow and broad bracketing respectively. That people tend to bracket choices 
narrowly exacerbates positive time preference for isolated outcomes. 
The co-existence of positive and negative time preferences does not represent 
the only challenge faced by DU. A more fundamental problem is that features 
important for sequence assessments do not exist for isolated outcomes. These include 
the so-called “Gestalt characteristics” or sequence-level characteristics such as the 
trend (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991), the velocity of the trend (Hsee & Abelson, 1991; 
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Hsee, Salovey, & Abelson, 1994), the peak and end values (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 
1993; Kahneman, et al., 1993; Ross & Simonson, 1991). Also important are factors 
that operate on people‟s perceptions about sequences, which include the length of 
interval (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991, 1993), i.e. the difference between the two 
delays, as well as the ways in which sequences are partitioned (Ariely & Zauberman, 
2000, 2003). Notably, influences of interval and delay diverge systematically. Interval 
rather than delay determines outcome integrity, or the degree to which outcomes are 
perceived as a whole (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993), which in turn affects preference 
for improvement.  
As an alternative to DU, Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) proposed a model 
(henceforth LP) that described sequence preferences based on the idea that people 
derive utility not only from direct experiences, but also from memory and anticipation 
(Loewenstein, 1987; Loewenstein & Elster, 1992). A desirable event, once 
experienced, no longer provides a source for anticipatory utility. Worse, it may serve 
as a comparison standard and in so doing, decrease the perceived attractiveness of 
later, related experiences. The opposite holds for negative experiences. This kind of 
“triple-counting” of utility, i.e. before, during and after the actual experience, explains 
why people may choose to delay a positive experience while at the same time 
expedite a negative one.  
Compared to DU, Loewenstein and Prelec‟s model achieves great 
improvement in descriptive validity. However, their model has no place for interval, 
as it does not differentiate between interval and delay. In this thesis, I propose a 
model, namely “the contrasts mode”, which acknowledges this difference. To do so, I 
define two types of variables. I assume delay is a non-relational variable and interval 
is a relational variable, so called because interval rather than delay captures the 
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relationship between the outcomes. Delay measures psychological distance of an 
isolated outcome and determines outcome representation and assessments. I discuss 
impact of delay using Trope and Liberman‟s (2000, 2003) Construal Level Theory. 
By contrast, interval reflects how similar outcomes are perceived in terms of time. 
Similarity determines grouping and categorization (Higgins & Brendl, 1995; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Tversky, 1977). This provides an account for the 
interval effect on outcome integrity (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), with implications 
for how people perceive a set of outcomes, how these outcomes interact with each 
other (Schwarz & Bless, 1992) as well as the strength of such interactions (Higgins & 
Brendl, 1995). None of these are applicable to delay. 
To incorporate these ideas into describing sequence preferences, I elaborate on 
Tversky and Griffin‟s (1991) endowment and contrast effects framework (or TG). It 
assumes that the way temporal outcomes interact with each other conforms to the so-
called context effects, i.e. influences of the decision context on judgments. The idea is 
that each sequence outcome, except for the very last, exerts dual influences on the 
assessment of the entire sequence – a direct endowment effect that reflects its true 
worth and an indirect contrast effect that affects the assessment of later, related 
outcomes. The difference between endowments and contrasts parallel the one between 
delay and interval. Endowments are specific to individual outcomes whereas contrasts 
arise between outcomes. In other words, endowments and contrasts are non-relational 
and relational effects respectively. It is therefore logical to assume that delay affects 
the endowment but not the contrast and interval affects the contrast but not the 
endowment. The “contrasts model” of sequence preferences thus distinguishes 
between the influences of the two temporal variables. The same logic predicts that 
domain relatedness, a relational variable that captures the degree to which outcomes 
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are perceived as of the same kind, exerts similar influences as interval rather than 
delay.  
Exactly how interval and relatedness affect contrast effects can be understood 
from research on context effects. Based on this research, contrast effects are more 
pronounced between more related outcomes and/or outcomes with shorter time 
intervals. Delay, on the other hand, fosters discounting; the longer the delay, the 
greater the discounting, the smaller the endowment value will be.  A sequence is more 
attractive if it has a large endowment and/or a large contrast. Intervals exert dual 
influences on sequence preferences because for a series of future outcomes, shorter 
intervals imply shorter time delays. Thus shorter intervals not only enhance contrast 
effect but also entail less discounting.  
The rest of the thesis illustrates these ideas. The first four chapters, from 
Chapter 2 to 5, lay the theoretical foundation of the contrasts model. Chapter 2 
reviews empirical findings of time preferences, i.e. preferences for isolated outcomes 
and preferences for sequences, highlights the difference between the two, and 
examines psychological mechanisms underlying sequence preferences. Chapter 3 
explores the difference between interval and delay, derived from the Construal Level 
Theory and research on similarity. Chapter 4 discusses context effects and show 
influences of interval and delay. Chapter 5 discusses influences of choice bracketing 
on perceptions and assessments of sequences. 
Chapter 6 consolidates these ideas and presents the contrasts model in formal 
terms. The main hypothesis is that sequence preferences depend on both the 
endowment effects and the contrast effects. The endowment effects in turn depend on 
the nominal values of the outcomes and their respective time delays; the contrast 
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effects depend on the signed value difference between the (adjacent) outcomes, their 
lengths of interval and degree of relatedness.  
Chapter 7 to 10 report experiments that test these predictions. The ranking task 
in Chapter 7 tests trend effect, i.e. the magnitude of improvement (deterioration) as 
captured in the signed value difference. The sequence judgment task in Chapter 8 
examines the influences of relatedness and interval on contrast effects. That is, as the 
outcomes become related or temporally nearer, whether the value discrepancy 
between increasing and decreasing sequences (endowment) would become larger. 
One implication of the contrast effects is that interpersonal contrasts (i.e. contrasts 
between outcomes received by different individuals) parallel intrapersonal ones (i.e. 
contrasts between outcomes embedded in a sequence). The interpersonal judgment 
task, also reported in Chapter 8, adopts the same design as the sequence (intrapersonal) 
judgment task. The difference is that the “context” is now a gain received by another 
individual rather than by the same individual at a different time. Comparing and 
contrasting the results of these two studies provide insights into contrast effects in the 
two different types of judgment tasks. A parallel between the two, if found, would 
provide support for the approach of describing sequence preferences by borrowing 
insights from research into context effects.  
The experiments so far assume delay has no impact on sequence assessments. 
Chapter 9 tests whether this assumption holds empirically. The scheduling task re-
examines the classic “abrasive aunt” experiment (see Example 2.3), under six 
different combinations of interval and delay (two levels of delay x three levels of 
interval). The results provide a base for answering two questions: 1) how outcomes 
embedded in a sequence are discounted and 2) whether and how discounting (which 
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depends on delays) interferes with preference for improvement (which depends on 
intervals).  
Finally, Chapter 10 reports the happiness task that explores the notion of dual 
influences. The assessment of sequences occurs when multiple variables as 
hypothesized in the contrasts model vary, thus affecting simultaneously the 
endowment values and the contrast values of a sequences. By presenting sequences 
with different nominal values (endowment), this study also tests the robustness of the 
contrast model and obtains further evidence that the value of a sequence depends on 
comparisons between the outcomes rather than the value of one single outcome, e.g. 
the last or the first outcome in the sequence. I conclude in Chapter 11 by summarizing 
findings, discussing implications, and identifying areas for future research.  
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Chapter 2  SEQUENCE PREFERENCES 
2.0 Introduction 
Over the years the question of how value changes over time has stimulated 
fruitful research in a wide range of disciplines, including psychology (Read & 
Loewenstein, 2000), behavioural economics (Thaler, 1981), political sciences 
(Schelling, 1984), and neuroeconomics (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005). This 
investigation employed a diverse range of methods and techniques, including real 
choices, laboratory experiments, econometrics and even medical test such as 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. Loewenstein, Read and Baumeister‟s book 
(2003) surveys recent developments in the field. This body of research lends insight 
into people‟s divergent time preferences for isolated outcomes versus for sequences, 
as well as the difference between interval and delay. This chapter examines this topic.  
My plan is this. I start by discussing the Discounted Utility model (DU, 
Koopmans, 1960; Samuelson, 1937), which remains the framework of choice for 
predicting preferences for future outcomes. I show how preferences for isolated 
outcomes differ systematically from preferences for sequences. Differences between 
interval and delay emerge. I then examine psychological mechanisms underlying the 
two modal sequence preferences, i.e. preferences for improvement and spreading. In 
the end of the chapter, I introduce the notion of choice bracketing to show how the 
way people make choices affects decisions.  
2.1 The discounted utility model (DU) 
The discounted utility model (DU) is the traditional approach and remains the 
framework of choice for handling time preferences. In a general form, the value of a 
 20 
stream of future consequences is a function of utility pertaining to individual 
outcomes. That is, V=f(u0, u1, …ut), where tu  denotes the consumption utility at time 
t. As a particular instantiation of this general model, DU assumes outcome 
independence, meaning that the value of an outcome is independent of other outcomes 
in the same sequence. This assumption, in combination with a series of technical 
axioms collectively known as “completeness”, implies the General Additively 
Separable representation (Loewenstein, 1992):  
V= ∑d(t)ut,     ---  (2.1) 
In Eq.2.1, d(t) is a discount function that reflects the impact of time delay t on the 
value of an outcome received at time t. Two common representations of discount 
function are discount factor, denoted as δt, and discount rate, denoted as rt.  Discount 
factor captures the proportion of value remained after an outcome has been delayed 
by a standard time unit (t), e.g. a year; discount rate is the percentage by which the 
value is reduced for each time period. The relationship between the two discount 
parameters is straightforward, i.e. δt=1-rt. For instance, a yearly discount factor of 0.9 
implies that £100 to be received a year from now is worth £90 now; and a yearly 
discount rate of 10% implies that in a year‟s time £100 now will be worth 90% (=1-
10%) of its original worth, or £90. An individual is said to have positive (negative) 
time preference if her discount rates are positive (negative), or if her discount factors 
are less (greater) than 1. For such individuals, we say that value decays (accrues) over 
time. 
DU has a distinctive feature. Time preferences are condensed into one single 
parameter. The task of finding the right one is however far from straightforward – 
with the exception of money.  Fisher (1930) showed early on that the choice of 
discount rates should be equal to the prevailing market interest rate (x) irrespective of 
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an individual‟s idiosyncratic time preferences. The idea is that the existence of capital 
markets allows individuals to make intertemporal trade-offs – one can speed up a 
future consumption or delay an immediate one to the extent that his or her marginal 
rate of time preference would always equal the interest rate for money (Loewenstein 
& Thaler, 1989). This implies a fixed relationship between discount factor and market 
interest rates, i.e. δt=1/(1+x), where x is the prevailing market interest rate. Inserting 
this into Eq.2.1 produces 
 

n
t
tx
u
V
t
0 )1(
, which is the well-known expression for 
computing the net present value (NPV) of a sequence of future incomes.  
2.1.1 Preferences for isolated outcomes 
Theoretically, the NPV expression is applicable to monetary outcomes or non-
monetary outcomes measurable by money. It makes two predictions: people discount 
future outcomes and have consistent time preferences. Discounting is based on the 
fact that market interest rates are almost universally positive. Since any unspent 
money can be saved or invested to earn interests, future money should be valued less 
than immediate money. Time consistency means one‟s later preferences “confirm” 
rather than contradict his earlier preferences (Frederick, et al., 2002). This stems from 
the use of a constant discount parameter regardless of time delay. In the NPV 
formulation, this discount rate is the prevailing market interest rate for all time periods, 
no matter how distant or near the outcomes are.  
Empirical investigations provide strong support for positive time preference 
(Benzion, Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989; Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002; 
Read & Loewenstein, 2000; Thaler, 1981) but not for time consistency. For instance, 
Thaler (1981) showed that when the acquisition of money or consumer commodities 
was delayed, people demanded a premium to offset the disutility caused by the delay. 
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Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) showed that 82% of their participants who enjoyed 
French food preferred to have a French dinner in one month rather than in two months. 
On the other hand, “inconsistent” behaviours are abundant in real life – we 
plan to work on a paper/go on a diet/start exercising only change our mind in the 
presence of more tempting alternatives, e.g. surfing internet/having desserts/dozing 
off. Hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie, 1992) refers to the empirical finding that 
discounting is slower (i.e. a larger discount factor or a smaller discount rate) when the 
delay is longer. For instance, Thaler (1981) asked people to state the future value of 
amounts of money available now, if they were delayed by times varying from 3 
months to 10 years. Given a present amount of $15, people‟s implicit discount rate 
decreased from 277% when the delay was three months to 19% when the delay was 
ten years. Dozens of follow-up studies found similar results (Read, 2004). Hyperbolic 
discounting predicts time inconsistency, i.e. preference reversals between a smaller 
sooner option (SS), e.g. having desserts, and a larger later option (LL), e.g. exercising, 
when both options are delayed. The idea is that the shorter the delay, the faster the 
discounting.  Thus, compared to LL, SS loses value at a faster rate when both options 
are delayed. People who prefer SS to LL when both options are near may prefer LL to 
SS instead when both are distant (Ainslie, 1992; but see Read, 2001b).  
Unlike DU, hyperbolic discounting relaxes the assumption of time consistency. 
In so doing, it provides a more accurate account of how people actually assess future 
outcomes. As DU, however, hyperbolic discounting assumes positive time preference. 
This assumption works for isolated outcomes but becomes problematic for outcomes 
embedded in sequences, as we see next.  
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2.2 Sequence preferences 
In sharp contrast to the “impatience” people exhibit towards isolated outcomes 
is their patience when facing a set of temporally distributed outcomes – people 
sometimes want to save the best till last, rather than to have them as soon as possible, 
or they want to spread outcomes evenly across time. Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) 
refer to preference for improvement and preference for spreading as the two modal 
sequence preferences. In what follows, I review each in turn and examine their 
underlying mechanisms. 
2.2.1 Improvement 
Preference for improvement is illustrated in Example 2.1 (Loewenstein & 
Prelec, 1991). All the respondents to Choice 1 and Choice 2 preferred French food to 
Greek food. The response pattern to Choice 1 reveals positive time preference – an 
overwhelming majority (80%) preferred to have the French dinner this month rather 
than next month. But when the French dinner was presented along with the less 
preferred Greek dinner, only 43% chose to do so. Loewenstein and Prelec replicated 
the results by replacing the Greek dinner with a dinner at home (Example 5.2, 
Chapter 5).  
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Example 2.1 (n=82) 
Choice 1  Choice 
A. French dinner in this month [80%] 
B. French dinner in next month [20%] 
   
Choice 2 This month Next month Choice 
C. French dinner Greek dinner [43%] 
D. Greek dinner French dinner [57%] 
 
Ross and Simonson (1991) reported similar findings. Their participants 
strongly preferred sequences of gambles that ended with a gain (lose $15, then win 
$85) to those that ended with a loss (e.g. win $85, then lose $15), despite the same 
expected payoffs of the gambles. They subsequently referred to this finding as a 
preference for “happy endings”. Hsee and Abelson (1991) further showed that their 
undergraduate participants preferred a fast rise in salary and academic performance to 
a slow rise, as well as a slow fall to a fast fall. That is, preference for improvement is 
moderated by the velocity in which the value changes over time (Hsee & Abelson, 
1991). Later investigation by Hsee, Salovey and Abelson (1994) found that the impact 
of velocity was particularly salient towards the end of a sequence. That is, satisfaction 
was higher if the rate of change increased for increasing sequences and decreased for 
decreasing sequences.  
Preference for improvement receives strong support from literature – it has 
been observed in a diverse range of domains, including monetary incomes 
(Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991), weekend activities (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993), 
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dinners (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991), gambling (Ross & Simonson, 1991), academic 
performances (Hsee & Abelson, 1991), health states (Chapman, 1996; Read & Powell, 
2002), environmental goods (Guyse, et al., 2002). It holds even when people search 
for an ordered set (Diehl & Zauberman, 2005) and make retrospective assessments of 
aversive experiences, such as pains and discomfort (Kahneman, et al., 1993; Varey & 
Kahneman, 1992).  
Why is preference for improvement so prevalent? It seems that this preference 
is overdetermined, motivated by multiple psychological mechanisms including 
savouring and dread (Loewenstein, 1987; Loewenstein & Elster, 1992), adaptation 
(Helson, 1964), loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and the closely related 
contrast effects (Loewenstein & Elster, 1992; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000; Schwarz & 
Bless, 1992a; Tversky & Griffin, 1991).  
First, Loewenstein (1987) argued that people derive utility from anticipatory 
savouring and dread. His participants preferred to delay a kiss from their favourite 
movie star for a few days while to receive unpleasant electric shocks as soon as 
possible. Loewenstein (1987) explained that these actions enhanced one‟s satisfaction 
by permitting the accumulation of utility and avoiding that of disutility. This implies 
that people will perceive the improving sequence of events (immediate shock, delayed 
kiss)
1
 to be more attractive than the deteriorating sequence of events (immediate kiss, 
delayed shock). 
Second, adaptation-level theory posits that people tend to adapt to on-going 
stimuli over time and to evaluate new stimuli relative to their adaptation-level. 
Kahneman and Tversky‟s (1979) notion of loss-aversion refers to the observation that 
a loss is more painful than a gain of the same magnitude. For sequences, if people 
                                                 
1
 In this thesis, I denote a sequence composed of n outcomes as (Outcome 1, … Outcome n) in the order 
of their occurrence. 
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adapt to the most recent level of stimuli they experience, then sequences that strictly 
improve afford a continuous series of upward shift, perceived as gains. By contrast, 
decreasing sequences provide a series of losses. Since losses loom larger than gains, 
increasing sequences are particularly attractive compared to decreasing sequences.  
Third, Tversky and Griffin (1991) argue that a hedonic event may contrast 
with a later event and change its perceived attractiveness. The direction of these 
contrasts is predominantly backward (Bruine de Bruin & Keren, 2003; Loewenstein 
& Elster, 1992; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991); that is, an earlier event serves as a 
comparison standard for a later event, rather than forward, or the other way around. 
Backward contrast effects predict that having inferior experiences earlier enhances the 
attractiveness of later, superior experiences (Heyman, Mellers, Tishcenko, & 
Schwartz, 2004), and consequently the attractiveness of the entire sequence. I review 
contrast effects and their implications in Chapter 4, to provide a basis for extending 
the idea into the contrasts model that describes sequence preferences.  
Notably, savouring and dread is unique among these accounts in that it does 
not require decision makers to make comparisons between the outcomes – people 
preferred immediate shocks and delayed kisses even when they encountered each 
outcome in isolation
2
. Nevertheless, the response pattern in Example 2.1 shows that 
presenting outcomes in pairs may exacerbate this preference by means of other 
mechanisms reviewed in this section, for which comparisons between temporally 
distributed outcomes are instrumental. 
 
                                                 
2
 In making this claim, I assume that people do not contrast shocks and kisses with events that are not 
directly presented to them, such as events retrieved from memory. This assumption is holds due to a 
strong tendency of narrow bracketing (Read et al 1999). However, it could be that shocks and kisses 
are contrasted with “mundane” life events retrieved from memory. This thesis only considers contrasts 
between outcomes presented to a decision maker. 
 27 
2.2.2 Spreading 
In addition to improvement, people sometimes prefer to spread outcomes 
evenly across time. This is illustrated in Example 2.2 (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991). 
Example 2.2 (n=37) 
Choice 1 This weekend Next weekend 
Two weekends 
 from now Choice 
A. Fancy French Eat at home Eat at home [14%] 
B. Eat at home Fancy French Eat at home [86%] 
     
Choice 2 This weekend Next weekend 
Two weekends 
 from now Choice 
C. Fancy French Eat at home Fancy lobster [54%] 
D. Eat at home Fancy French Fancy lobster [46%] 
 
Among the three outcomes that constituted the four sequences in Example 2.2, 
the fancy lobster is the most desirable while eating at home the least, relatively 
speaking. The preference for Option B over A and the indifference between Option C 
and D each violates positive time preference, which would predict a preference for A 
over B, and one for C over D; the response pattern in Choice 2 did not conform to 
improvement either – despite having a consistent increasing trend over three weeks, D 
is not more desirable than C. What makes Option B and C more attractive than 
implied by improvement alone is the spreading of the global satisfaction. In 
comparison, Option A exposes the decision maker to the least desirable outcome for 
two weeks in a row and Option D concentrates the two desirable outcomes together. 
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Stevenson (1993) also reported a preference for spreading when her undergraduate 
participants assessed college loans and work-study scenarios. 
What makes spreading desirable? One explanation is that spreading offers 
decision makers “convenience” in resource allocation. Read and Powell (2002) 
collected verbal protocols from participants before asking them to make choices of 
health and income sequences that increased, remained constant and decreased over 
time. Their participants who preferred constant sequences argued that constant 
sequences made “managing [one‟s] budget so much easier”.  
Spreading also allows people to replenish their “limited coping capacities” in 
time (Linville & Fisher, 1991), and therefore avoid the prospect of being 
overwhelmed by positive or negative hedonic experiences. Since losses loom larger 
than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), this account would predict a stronger 
tendency for spreading losses than gains. Consistent with this, Linville and Fisher 
found that while people preferred to spread large gains ($250 or $200) but not small 
gains ($5), they preferred to spread both large and small losses of the same amount. 
A concave value function may contribute to spreading as well (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). If we assume that decision makers form 
global assessments by first assessing each individual outcome and then combining 
these assessments, then they can maximize the global satisfaction by spreading, such 
as by splitting a lump sum gain of 200 pounds into two gains of 100 pounds. Note that 
this account cannot explain the preference for spreading losses because the value 
function for losses is convex rather than concave.  
It is worth noting that preference for spreading is not restricted to time. Just as 
college students choose to distribute loans over four academic years (Stevenson, 
1993), employees choose to invest the same share of their retirement funds in equities 
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and bonds, or however many investment options (e.g. n) they are provided, a finding 
known as “1/n heuristic” in resource allocation (Benartzi & Thaler, 1998, 2001). 
Linville and Fisher (1991) found that people were less inclined to spread across time 
outcomes of different kinds (e.g. a large monetary refund and an excellent academic 
grade) than outcomes of the same kind (e.g. two excellent academic grades). This 
might happen because outcomes of different kinds were less likely to be assessed as a 
whole, and therefore less likely to pose a threat to one‟s limited coping capacities.  
These examples show that spreading takes place across time periods as well as 
across domains. Underlying both is the idea that similar outcomes tend to be grouped 
together and assessed together and the similarity depends on the interval between the 
outcomes and/or their contents, i.e. what the outcomes are. Preference for spreading is 
manifested as the desire to distribute outcomes across groups, regardless of on which 
attribute(s) these groups are defined.  
The parallel between temporal and non-temporal attributes in spreading 
highlights a difference between the two modal sequence preferences. Temporal 
grouping is not inherent in any of the factors underlying preference for improvement. 
This provides an explanation that preference for spreading is pronounced when the 
task is to allocate a fixed sum (e.g. Stevenson, 1993). Another implication is that each 
of the two modal sequence preferences can arise on its own. On the other hand, it is 
possible that preference for spreading reflects a compromise between the conflicting 
positive and negative time preferences, when decision makers discount the future but 
at the same time want to experience improvement over time. Consistent with this, 
outcomes embedded in sequences might also be discounted, as we see next. 
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2.3 Perceptions of sequences 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) presented Example 2.3 to forty-eight museum-
visitors.  
Example 2.3 (n=48)  
Imagine you must schedule two weekend outings to a city where you once 
lived. You must spend one weekend with an irritating, abrasive aunt who is a 
horrendous cook and the other weekend with former work associates whom 
you like a lot. Which of the following two outings do you prefer? 
 
1. Option This weekend Next weekend Choices 
 A. Friends abrasive aunt [10%] 
 B. abrasive aunt Friends [90%] 
     
2. Option This weekend 26
th
 weekend Choices 
 A. Friends abrasive aunt [48%] 
 B. abrasive aunt Friends [52%] 
     
3. Option 26
th
 weekend 27
th
 weekend Choices 
 A. Friends Abrasive aunt [17%] 
 B. abrasive aunt Friends [83%] 
  
Visiting friends was presented as a pleasant event, and visiting aunt an 
unpleasant one; Schedule A was therefore a decreasing sequence whereas Schedule B 
an increasing one. The three choices differed in either the delay of the first visit or the 
interval between the visits. Using the response to Choice 1 as the benchmark, 
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discounting (positive time preference) became slightly more pronounced when the 
sequences were delayed by 26 weeks (7% more choosing Sequence A in Choice 3 
than in Choice 1), and much more pronounced when the interval increased by the 
same magnitude (38% more choosing A in Choice 2).  
Loewenstein and Prelec argued that their results provide evidence for the 
detrimental effect a long interval exerts on outcome integrity, or the degree to which 
outcomes are perceived as an integral whole. Without integrity, outcomes are 
perceived as isolated, bearing no relationships. As a result, these outcomes will be 
evaluated independently of each other. Since positive time preference dominates the 
assessment of isolated outcomes, long intervals enhance positive time preference at 
the cost of preference for improvement typical for sequences. 
This “interval effect” is even observed in assessments of continuous, 
unpleasant experiences. Ariely and Zauberman (2000, Experiment 1) exposed 
participants to episodes of noise, either continuous or segmented by intervals. They 
found preference for improvement in both conditions, i.e. decreasing levels of 
intensity were rated higher than increasing ones. Importantly, this preference was 
more extreme, i.e. the rating difference between the noises of an increasing and 
decreasing magnitude was larger, in the continuous condition than in the segmented 
condition, providing evidence for an interval effect that mediates the preference for 
improvement.  The authors found similar results with assessment mode: the 
preference for improvement was more extreme when people made a single 
retrospective assessment at the end of each episode than when they made on-line 
assessments as well as the retrospective assessment. Ariely and Zauberman (also see 
2003) explained that both interval and on-line assessments disrupted the cohesiveness 
of the experience, and therefore undermined preference for improvement. 
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The notion of cohesiveness is essentially the same as integrity, except that 
while integrity is used for discrete outcomes, cohesiveness is specific to continuous 
experiences. Under the guise of “sequence preferences”, two types of sequence, i.e. 
discrete and continuous, are often discussed at the same time due to their shared 
findings of preference for improvement, the peak-end rule and the interval effect. In 
what follows, I first take a closer look at continuous experiences and then examine the 
relationship between the two.  
2.3.1 Continuous sequences 
Different from discrete sequences, continuous sequences are extended 
experiences or episodes (Dhar & Simonson, 1999) that consist of outcomes that do 
not have clearly defined time boundaries that segregate one another. Continuous 
sequences are important because they characterize how people store autobiography 
memories, i.e. memory about things that occur in place and time. According to 
Barsalou (1988), people do not store in memory a stream of isolated events; rather 
they store temporal-causal sequences, such as a trip, a stay in the hospital or working 
at a job. Retrospective assessments of such experiences provide a basis for people to 
make future decisions.  
Kahneman and his co-workers pioneered the research into the correspondence 
between patterns of extended experiences and their global assessments. The afore-
mentioned finding of the “peak-end” rule of sequence assessments was first reported 
in Frederickson and Kahneman (1993), who showed participants either short or long 
film clips that contain either pleasant (e.g. puppy playing) or unpleasant images (e.g. 
an amputation) and elicited respondents‟ real-time ratings of their affective states and 
also an overall retrospective rating that summarized the entire experience at the end of 
the film. They found that the summary assessment was well-predicted by a weighted 
 33 
average of the most extreme state (peak) and the final state (end), whereas film 
duration had almost no influence. 
The “peak-end” rule and consequently the “duration neglect” receive support 
from a large body of experiments (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993; Kahneman, 
Fredrickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993; Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996; 
Schreiber & Kahneman, 2000; Varey & Kahneman, 1992). In a non-experimental 
study, Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996) asked real patients who underwent 
colonoscopy to report the momentary pain they experienced every 60 seconds, as well 
as the total pain after the procedure was over. The procedure lasted from 4 to 69 
minutes. They found a significant correlation between the total pain and a weighted 
average of the most intense pain and the pains recorded during the last three minutes 
of the procedure. The variations of duration had virtually no effect on the total pain. 
For a series of gains, the peak-end rule predicts preference for improvement because 
the latest gain is also the gain that has the highest or peak intensity.  
Consistent with Barsalou (1988), Frederickson and Kahneman (2003) attribute 
the peak-end rule to the way experiences are stored in memories. Rather than 
recording all the details, memories take “snapshots”, composed of the defining 
moments of an experience – these typically include its peak and its end, but not its 
duration. The disparity between the memory of an experience and the “real” 
experience highlights the difference between retrospective (remembered) utility and 
experienced utility. Since people rely on memory of past decisions to assess predicted 
utility of outcomes for making future decisions (Kahneman & Snell, 1990; Kahneman 
& Varey, 1991; Kahneman, Wakker, & Sarin, 1997), it is not surprising that 
preference for improvement, as implied by the peak-end rule, prevails in predicted as 
well as retrospective assessments, but not in real-time assessments (Novemsky & 
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Ratner, 2003). In other words, the perceived hedonic advantage of improvement over 
deterioration may never be experienced.  
For instance, in one of Novemsky and Ratner‟s experiments, each of their 
participants selected three jelly beans from a list of eight that were respectively one 
they liked a lot (flavour 1), one they liked less (flavour 2) and one they liked less than 
the other two (flavour 3). The task was to rate the satisfaction from consuming flavour 
2 when it was embedded in two sequences, either following the consumption of 
flavour 1 or that of flavour 3. Participants made the assessments in one of three 
conditions, when they predicted how much they would enjoy flavour 2 in each 
sequence, when they rated how much they enjoyed flavour 2 while tasting it in each 
sequence, or when they retrospectively rated how much they had enjoyed flavour 2, 
after having tasted it in the two sequences. Contrast effects would predict higher 
ratings assigned to flavour 2 when its tasting occurred after the tasting of the less 
desirable flavour 3 than after the tasting of the more desirable flavour 1. Novemsky 
and Ratner found evidence for contrast effects only in the predictive condition where 
the participants forecasted their satisfaction before the consumption, but not in the 
concurrent or the retrospective conditions. 
2.3.2 Continuous versus discrete sequences 
The difference between continuous experiences and discrete sequences is 
likely to be quantitative rather than qualitative, reflecting different degrees of 
cohesiveness (integrity), which might be the result of different levels of observation 
adopted by the decision maker. For instance, a restaurant meal is a discrete event 
viewed from distance but it becomes a continuous sequence of acts including ordering, 
waiting, drinking, eating, paying and leaving when one is having the meal. On the 
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other hand, a biographical life
3
 is continuous from birth to death, which however 
contains many discrete landmark events, such as entering puberty, going to university, 
starting one‟s first job, retirement, etc. That is, depending on one‟s perspective and 
level of abstraction, a discrete outcome can become continuous at a “micro-level”, 
when the details of the outcomes are “unpacked”, whereas a continuous outcome may 
in fact be an overview of a series of discrete outcomes.  
Even at a given level, a continuous experience can still be converted to a 
discrete sequence. Sequence partitioning occurs when intervals are inserted within, or 
when we make on-line assessments instead of one overall assessment at the end of the 
sequence. Ariely and Zauberman‟s (2000) research demonstrates that partitioning 
decreases the impact of global characteristics (e.g. the overall pattern) but enhances 
the impact of local characteristics (e.g. value of individual outcomes). That is, 
partitioning decreases the value gap between the improving experience and the 
deteriorating experience. This parallels the interval effect on preference for 
improvement (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993).  
Since outcome cohesiveness (integrity) exerts impact on the desirability of an 
experience, this discussion suggests the possibility of maximizing one‟s satisfaction 
by assessing discrete experiences as continuous ones or vice versa. For instance, if a 
meeting is getting increasingly boring, we might focus on individual speakers or 
topics to mentally segment the downward pattern. On the other hand, if a movie is 
becoming increasingly more interesting, we might switch off our mobile phones to 
avoid unwanted interruptions. Why don‟t these manipulations happen often enough? 
It seems we tend to make decisions and assess outcomes the way they come. The idea 
                                                 
3
 This example was suggested by Peter Ayton. 
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is captured by Read, Loewenstein and Rabin‟s (1999) notion of choice bracketing, as 
we see next. 
2.4 Influences of choice bracketing 
Choices bracketed together are made together. The brackets can be narrow or 
broad. Under narrow bracketing, people make few decisions at a time; under broad 
bracketing, they make many decisions at the same time, relatively speaking. Choice 
bracketing has implications for time preferences. This happens because multiple 
outcomes are more like to be considered together under broad bracketing than under 
narrow bracketing. Since positive time preference prevails for isolated outcomes, 
narrow bracketing fosters positive time preference. 
Levels of bracketing itself may depend on completely arbitrary factors. This is 
illustrated in Example 2.4, which Read et al presented to two groups of visitors to an 
International Airport in the US: 
Example 2.4 
 
You are attending a conference at a hotel for a week (Monday morning 
through Monday morning). You eat all your meals at the conference 
hotel. The specialty of the hotel dining room is New Orleans Bread 
Pudding, which is delicious, but heavy on the fat and calories. However, 
you can have the bread pudding with dinner at no extra cost. 
 
One group (broad bracketing) was asked to think of the entire week as a whole. 
They were asked: “On which day(s), if any, would you like to eat a bread pudding?” 
The other group (narrow bracketing) was asked the same question, only this time they 
had to think about their choices separately for weekends and weekdays. Both groups 
then checked off their decision for each day. Read et al found that the narrow 
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bracketing group chose to eat significantly more puddings (.57 per day) than the broad 
bracketing group does (.35 per day). In this case, narrow and broad bracketing directly 
follows from the way in which the outcomes are presented. Chapter 5 illustrates 
choice bracketing in detail and explains why this happens. 
2.5 Summary 
Chapter 2 presents findings of time preferences and highlights the difference 
between preferences for isolated outcomes versus those for sequences. While positive 
time preference prevails for isolated outcomes, preferences for improvement and 
spreading are the two modal sequence preferences. This difference highlights the need 
of considering alternatives to DU in order to capture sequence preferences. Preference 
for improvement and spreading are motivated by different factors and each may arise 
on its own. Sequences can be discrete or continuous, reflecting different degrees of 
cohesiveness or integrity between the outcomes. Choice bracketing influences time 
preferences because a narrow or broad decision perspective determines whether 
outcomes are assessed in isolation or as a whole. Difference between delay and 
interval emerges: long intervals but not long delays disrupt outcome integrity and 
undermine preference for improvement. In Chapter 3, we take a closer look at this 
difference. 
 38 
 
Chapter 3  DELAY AND INTERVAL 
3.0 Introduction 
Despite that interval is the simple difference between time delays, Chapter 2 
demonstrates a difference in terms of their impact on time preferences. Outcome 
integrity depends on interval rather than on delay. Discounting is a function of delay 
rather than interval. Generally speaking, regardless of how distant outcomes are, an 
outcome will only be discounted if it is removed from the present, the extent of which 
is measured by time delay. I define relational and non-relational variables to capture 
the difference between delay and interval. Delay is non-relational as it is specific to 
individual outcomes, independent of the relationship between the outcomes. In other 
words, delay reflects the psychological distance of an outcome, i.e. how distant it is 
perceived by the decision maker. By contrast, interval is relational as it captures the 
temporal similarity between outcomes.  
To gain further insights into the difference between these two types of 
variables, in what follows, I examine properties of delay and interval respectively 
within the framework of the Construal Level Theory (CLT) and similarity. I show 
how time preferences can be informed by the findings in these two lines of research. 
3.1 Delay as psychological distance 
Ebbinghaus proposed the notion of psychological distance, which he used to 
explain observed individual differences in their ways of handling a task (Ebbinghaus, 
1885/1914). Sigel later used the term to capture individuals‟ emerging ability to 
understand that an object can be represented by something other than the concrete 
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object itself (Sigel, 1970, 1982). Mischel and his colleagues were among the first who 
associated psychological distance with time preferences (Mischel, Shoda, & 
Rodriguez, 1989), by associating it with the immediacy of the moment, in which the 
stimulus in the here and now dominates. Recently, Trope and Liberman (2000, 2003) 
define time as a dimension of psychological distance, and time delay as a 
measurement of this distance. That is, the longer the delay, the more distant the 
outcome is from the decision maker. Their Construal Level Theory (CLT) posits that 
psychological distance determines representation of the outcome. A long delay fosters 
a high-level construal, when representation consists of a few abstract features that 
convey the essence of the outcome whereas a short delay fosters a low-level construal 
when representation consists of more concrete and incidental details. That is, 
high/low-level features, or features that are compatible with high/low-level construals, 
gain more weight in judgments of outcomes that are distant/near. This has direct 
implications for time preferences. 
For instance, one of their experiments elicited monetary bids for gambles 
under two conditions: either played immediately or two months later (Sagristano, 
Trope, & Liberman, 2002). A set of 20 bets varied in probability of winning (.1, .3, .5, 
.7, and .9) within each of four levels of expected value ($4, $6, $8, and $10). 
Participants provided the amount of money they were willing to bid to play each 
gamble. The researchers found that for immediate gambles, the highest bids were for 
bets with high probability and low payoff, whereas for distant future gambles, the 
highest bids were for bets with low probability and high payoff. The researchers 
explained that the respondents based their decisions on different attributes of the 
gambles depending on time delays. Probabilities of winning were more important for 
immediate gambles but winning amount was more important for distant gambles. 
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Consistent with CLT, as delay increased, the effect of payoffs increased and, 
independently, the effect of probabilities decreased with temporal distance. This 
account assumes that winning amount is a high-level feature that is more central to 
playing the gambles whereas probability is a low-level feature that is more peripheral. 
When the choice is between a smaller sooner option (SS) and a larger later 
option (LL), CLT predicts a preference reversal when both options are delayed. This 
is because SS is more desirable in terms of the low-level feature (i.e. the shorter time 
delay), whereas LL is more desirable in terms of the high-level feature (i.e. the larger 
amount).  Recall in Chapter 2 this reversal is predicted by hyperbolic discounting that 
posits slower discounting for longer time delays. CLT therefore offers an alternative 
account in terms of the change in the representation of the outcomes. 
It is worth noting that time is synonymous to delay within CLT. The reason is 
that the representation of an outcome depends on how it is perceived by the decision 
maker, as a function of how distant the outcomes is from his/her, who is often at the 
present. This representation does not directly depend upon how distant an outcome is 
from other outcomes in the same decision. Perceived length of interval however 
measures the latter kind of between-outcome distance, which I capture by the notion 
of similarity. The perceived length of interval is equivalent to the perceived temporal 
similarity between the outcomes. To gain insights into influences of interval, I discuss 
properties of similarity next. 
3.2 Similarity 
Similarity is arguably the most important theoretical construct in cognitive 
psychology – it underlies critical mental processes including inference, categorization, 
and generalization concerning learning, memory and transfer (Medin, Goldstone, & 
Gentner, 1993). Its properties that are most relevant to our discussion include its role 
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in grouping and categorization, the context-dependent nature of its judgments and its 
influences on the perceived importance of attributes. 
3.2.1 Grouping 
Similarity determines grouping and categorization (Goldstone, 1994; 
Nosofsky, 1986) – similar objects are grouped together whereas dissimilar ones are 
not. Modern models of categorization offer different explanations for this. An object 
is categorized as an A and not a B because it is more similar to A‟s best representation 
than it is to B‟s (prototype theories), or because it is more similar to the individual 
items that belong in A than it is to those that belong in B (exemplar theories). Despite 
the difference, both theories assume that categorization depends on the similarity 
between the item to be categorized and the categories‟ representations. 
The similarity judgment may however go beyond apparent resemblance. For 
instance, people judge snake and raccoon to be similar when the context of pets is 
provided (Barsalou, 1982). This happens presumably because their common features 
such as providing the owner with pleasure and companionship become salient in such 
a context. Barsolou (1982) define ad hoc categories (e.g. things in a room) as those 
categories that collect apparently dissimilar members together in response to 
situational goals, as different from natural categories (e.g. birds).  
3.2.2 Context-dependency 
The existence of ad hoc categories is evidence that similarity judgments are 
not fixed but flexible and context-dependent (Medin, Goldstone, & Markman, 1995; 
Tversky, 1977). In addition to goals, Parducci‟s range-frequency theory (1965, 1995) 
shows how rating scales per se influence similarity judgments. His range principle 
asserts that numerical ratings are linearly related to the underlying psychological 
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impressions. A judge assigns the lowest (highest) category rating to the lowest 
(highest) stimulus and differences among the ratings of the remaining stimuli are 
proportional to the differences between their respective psychological impressions. 
His frequency principle holds that the rating is proportional to the ordinal position (i.e. 
the rank) of a stimulus in the set of psychological impressions. The higher this 
position, the higher the frequency value and vice versa. Similarity is captured by the 
difference in subjective values, the smaller this difference, the higher the similarity 
and vice versa (Parducci, 1995; Dhar & Glazer, 1996; Medin et al. 1995). 
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Figure 3.1. Judgments of similarity vary with the “range” 
Vertically aligned figures in the two contexts have the same height. The number 
underneath each figure indicates the predicted rating (subjective value) based on a 
simple average of the range value and the frequency value. Source: Parducci, 1995. 
 
Fig.3.1 illustrates the range principle. The task is to assess the heights of a 
short person (S) and a tall person (T), when they are embedded in either a wide 
context or a narrow context. The wide context has a more extensive range of heights 
compared to the narrow context. The two “end-persons” are assigned fixed ratings of 
0 and 100. S (T) has a higher (lower) range value in the wide context than in the 
narrow context. This is because S is proportionally more different from the shortest 
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person with respect to the entire range (positioned at 2/6 in the wide-context with a 
range value of 33.33=2/6×100 versus positioned at 1/4 in the narrow-context with a 
range value of 25=1/4×100); the reverse however holds for T (positioned at 4/6 in the 
wide-context with a range value of 66.67=4/6×100 versus positioned at 3/4 in the 
narrow-context with a range value of 75=3/4×100). The frequency values of both S 
and T however remain constant across the contexts as T always ranks the 2
nd
 tallest 
and S the 4
th
. 
 
Figure 3.2.  
Judgments of similarity vary with the “frequency” (ordinal position). 
Vertically aligned figures in the two contexts have the same height. The number 
underneath each figure indicates the predicted rating (subjective value) based on a 
simple average of the range value and the frequency value. Source: Parducci, 1995. 
 
What happens when the range remains constant but the ordinal position varies 
across the contexts? Fig.3.2 illustrates such a case. The target (shaded) is embedded in 
the centre of the three contexts, FU, FP and FN, and therefore has the same range 
value across the contexts (50=1/2×100). Its ordinal position however varies, from the 
highest in FP (the 2
nd
 tallest with a frequency value of 75=3/4×100), to the middle in 
FU (a frequency value of 50), to the lowest in FN (the 4
th
 tallest with a frequency 
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value of 25=1/4×100). The higher the ordinal position, the larger the size of the 
frequency value and vice versa.  
Parducci posits that judgments depend on both range and frequency. The 
subjective value is a weighted sum of the range value and the frequency value. In our 
example, an equal weighting (0.5) is assumed, implying that range and frequency are 
equally important. The dimension of interest is height; thus a higher subjective value 
corresponds to a greater perceived height and vice versa. The predictions appear 
underneath the “figuremen” in Fig.3.1 and 3.2. For instance, Fig.3.1 shows that S has 
a higher value in the wide context than in the narrow context (29 versus 25), 
indicating that S is perceived as taller in the wide context. The reverse holds for T, 
which scores 71 and 75 in the wide and narrow context respectively. 
What do these tell us about similarity judgments? The hypothesis is the less 
similar the stimuli, the larger the difference between their subjective values, and vice 
versa. For instance, in Fig.3.1, the value difference between S and T is smaller in the 
wide context than in the narrow context (42 versus 50), indicating that the two have 
more similar heights in the wide context. This illustrates the range effect on similarity. 
That is, the more extensive the range, the higher the similarity and vice versa. 
The frequency effect can be shown likewise. The target person in Fig. 3.2 has 
a larger subjective value in FP than in FN, suggesting that the target is less similar to 
the shortest person (always rated 0) in FP than in FN but more similar to the tallest 
person (always rated 100) in FP than in FN. That is, the larger the subjective value, 
the more similar the target is to the high-end person and the less similar it is to the 
low-end person and vice versa. Subsequent investigations provide support for both the 
range effect and the frequency effect (Mellers & Cooke, 1994; Wedell, 1998).  
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The range effect is consistent with the finding known as the extension effect 
(Tversky, 1977). Tversky found that participants judged Italy and Switzerland to be 
more similar in a context that contained both European and non-European countries, 
e.g. China and the U.S., than in a context that contained exclusively European 
countries. This is because the attribute of being a European country became more 
diagnostic, i.e. more useful in grouping the countries, when the decision context was 
extended to include non-European countries (Medin et al., 1995). Diagnosticity is 
embodied in decision weights. Tversky‟s featural model of similarity therefore 
predicts that Italy and Switzerland, both being European countries, are more similar in 
the extended context.  
3.2.3 Decision weights 
While the extensiveness of the decision context changes the salience of the 
attributes and thereby the perceived similarity, how similar multi-attribute options are 
on a given attribute affects how important that attribute is and consequently the 
preference for the options. An attribute is weighted more heavily if the options have 
more divergent, i.e. less similar, levels on that attribute (Payne, 1982; Tversky, 1977). 
This idea has made its way into decision analysis under the guise of swing weights 
(Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986). A swing refers to the difference in the most and the 
least desirable levels on that attribute. The idea is that decision weights should be 
proportional to the swings, rather than to the absolute importance of the attributes. For 
instance, the number of lives saved is crucial to the assessment of any medical 
treatment regime. However, this attribute is useless if we are selecting from a set of 
alternatives that save more or less the same number of lives. 
Wedell (1998) provided empirical evidence for the relationship between range 
and weights. As shown in Table 3.1, his participants assessed two hypothetical 
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persons, A and B, on two attributes, X and Y (Wedell, 1998). He manipulated the 
ranges of the values along X and Y in two different ways. In the “wide-narrow” case, 
dimension X had a wide range of values and dimension Y had a narrow range; in the 
“narrow-wide” case, the opposite was true. Wedell measured the decision weights by 
subjective ratings of importance. He showed that these ratings were always greater for 
the dimension with the wider range, i.e. X in the wide-narrow condition and Y in the 
narrow-wide condition.  
 
Table 3.1. A choice between two non-dominant options in two range conditions. 
 Wide Narrow  Narrow  Wide 
Options Attribute  
X 
Attribute 
Y 
 Attribute  
X 
Attribute 
Y 
A 3 4  3 4 
B 4 3  4 3 
 
Evidence that assessments depend on both dimensional similarity (which 
determines the subjective values of A and B on each attribute) and range similarity 
(which determines the decision weights of the attributes) comes from the observation 
that the global assessments were consistent with the prediction of the dimensional 
similarity but contradicted those of the range similarity. That is, in both narrow-wide 
and wide-narrow contexts, participants preferred the options that performed worse on 
the attribute they had rated as more important, i.e. A in the wide-range context and B 
in the narrow-wide context; also see Mellers & Cooke, 1994). Consistent with the 
range effect, the wider range enhanced the similarity between the options, which in 
this case translated into the smaller perceived disadvantages of the preferred options 
(Option A on dimension X and Option B on dimension Y).  
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3.3 Implications for time preferences 
Viewing interval as reflecting perceived temporal similarity between the 
outcomes provides insights into findings including the interval effect on outcome 
integrity, the notion of time contraction, and the “similarity effect” on time 
preferences, as we see next. 
3.3.1 Integrity 
Chapter 2 introduces the notion of integrity, which refers to the degree to 
which (discrete) outcomes are perceived as a whole (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993)
4
. 
Example 2.3 shows that as the interval increases from one week to 26 weeks, the 
fraction of participants preferring the increasing (Aunt, Friends) is reduced by 38% 
(from 90% to 52%). That is, long intervals undermine integrity. From the current 
perspective, integrity implies the grouping of outcomes. Integrity is therefore a 
function of the perceived similarity between the outcomes. Long intervals signal lack 
of similarity and foster a shift in one‟s perceptions of the outcomes from being part of 
a group (sequence) to being isolated. Positive time preference dominates the 
assessments of isolated outcomes. Therefore, long intervals undermine preference for 
improvement. 
While the visits are of the same kind, similar findings exist for outcomes that, 
on the face value, share little in common. For instance, Dhar and Simonson‟s (1999) 
consumption episode effects refer to the finding that decision makers apply specific 
decision strategies to diverse outcomes, e.g. watching an opera and having a meal, 
that is, as long as these outcomes are perceived as constituting a consumption episode, 
e.g. an evening out. For instance, consumers facing tradeoffs between goal attributes 
                                                 
4
 This discussion applies to both integrity (for discrete sequences) and cohesiveness (for continuous 
experiences). 
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and mean attributes would choose to highlight goal achievements by sacrificing 
means. In one of their experiments, participants preferred an expensive meal to a 
moderately priced one when the meal took place immediately after an opera but not 
after a relatively cheap movie. They did this presumably to maximize the pleasure of 
the evening out. However, the highlighting strategy was not observed when the meal 
took place one week after the opera. From the current perspective, despite that 
watching an opera and having a meal shares little in common, they form an ad hoc 
category that is specific to the decision context and the goals. Similar to what happens 
in natural categories, however, long intervals disrupt integrity in ad hoc categories as 
well.  
Since delay does not reflect temporal similarity, it is no surprise that delay has 
little impact on outcome integrity. In Example 2.3, as the schedules were delayed by 
26 weeks, the percentage of participants preferring (Aunt, Friends) was reduced only 
by 7% (from 90% to 83%). However, why did sequence preferences change with 
delay at all? Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) explained that longer delay fostered 
greater discounting, which reduced the attractiveness of the improving schedule that 
placed the more desirable event (visiting friends) later rather than earlier.  
An alternative account is that delay actually enhances integrity and as a result, 
outcomes are more likely viewed and assessed as one single composite outcome. 
Trend becomes meaningless when the outcomes are merged, such as when receiving 
£10 in the morning and £20 in the afternoon are assessed as “receiving £30” on the 
same day. There are two reasons this merge could actually have taken place. First, 
delay fosters high-level construals (Trope & Liberman, 2003), which makes time, a 
peripheral attribute, less salient. Second, a long delay entails a wider range of time, 
thus fostering time contraction (see below), meaning that the interval is perceived 
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shorter than it actually is (Parducci, 1965, 1995). In either case, the role of intervals in 
separating outcomes from each other might be suspended.  
A non-linear relationship between integrity and the perception of sequences, as 
well as between integrity and preference for improvement, emerges from this 
discussion. Outcomes that form a sequence need to be perceived as a whole and also 
as individuals. That is, they can neither be too integral nor too separate. Preference for 
improvement is undermined whether the integrity is too high or too low.  
3.3.2 Time contraction 
Time contraction means decision makers compress time and treat long 
intervals as if they were short  (Read & Loewenstein, 1995). The range effect 
(Parducci, 1965, 1995) predicts that delay fosters time contraction. This is because 
delaying outcomes entails a larger range of time. This enhances perceived similarity 
in terms of time and decreases the perceived length of interval. 
Read and Loewenstein argue that time contraction underlies the diversification 
bias, or the tendency for people to choose more variety when making combined 
choices of quantities of goods for future consumption than making separate choices 
immediately preceding the consumption. Participants who choose simultaneously for 
a series of future consumption are exposed to a larger range of delays than 
participants who choose sequentially one at a time. Diversity is made more appealing 
by time contraction because shorter interval between the consumption exacerbates the 
perceived satiation by repeated consumption (Kahneman & Snell, 1990, 1992).  
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3.3.3 The “similarity effect” 
Rubinstein obtained a finding, the similarity effect, which illustrates how time 
preferences depend on the range of attributes under consideration. Rubinstein (2003, 
Experiment III) showed participants the following two options:  
A. In 60 days you are supposed to receive a new stereo system. 
Upon receipt of the system, you must pay $960. Are you willing to delay 
the transaction by one day for a discount of $2? 
B. Tomorrow you are supposed to receive a new stereo system. 
Upon receipt of the system, you must pay $1,080. Are you willing to 
delay the delivery and the payment by 60 days for a discount of $120? 
 
Hyperbolic discounting entails a discount rate that decreases with delay length. 
It predicts a preference for Option A over Option B because outcomes that offer a 
fixed rate of trade-off between money and time (i.e. $2 per day) are more attractive if 
the trade-off is more distant. In reality, most participants responded positively to B 
but not to A. One reason might be that the $2 saving in A was made trivial by the 
wider range of money ($120) in B (Parducci, 1965, 1995).  However if $2 was 
perceived trivial even without the extended range (Gourville, 1998), then as 
Rubinstein argued, it was the similarity between the two payments in A that made the 
waiting of an additional day less worthwhile, a finding he called the similarity effect 
(2003). This second account is consistent with the impact of similarity on decision 
weights. The small dollar difference in Option A compared to the one in Option B (a 
saving of $2 versus no saving versus a saving of $120 versus no saving) makes the 
monetary attribute less important in A than it is in B. By contrast, the range of time is 
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the same, i.e. 60 days, in both options. Time may also be normalized to provide the 
basis for assessments (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2000).  
 
3.3.4 Assessment mode 
Given a set of outcomes, the global attractiveness can be derived from two 
modes of assessment or outcome editing (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1985). 
Under the integrated mode, the outcomes are combined first and then assessed, 
whereas under the segregated mode, the outcomes are assessed first and these 
individual assessments are then combined. As discussed earlier, delay fosters time 
contraction and thereby the chance that outcomes are assessed as one single 
composite outcome. This follows from the hypothesis that the more integral the 
outcomes, the more likely the integrated mode of assessments and vice versa (Thaler, 
1999). People routinely use calendar day, week, month, etc. to determine editing 
mode (cf. Bradburn, 2000) or the level of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985, 1999). For 
instance, we balance our household accounts monthly and real life gamblers track 
gains and losses on a daily basis (Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Decision makers 
intuitively distribute gains and losses over different days, especially when the 
magnitude of these outcomes is large (Linville & Fischer, 1991). Consumers 
sometime choose to pay well in advance, using the interval to decouple the “painful” 
payment and the consumption, thus deriving greater satisfaction from the 
consumption (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998). Similarly, experiencing gains and losses 
close in time allows the gains to cushion the negative impact of the losses. One 
explanation for the relationship between integrity and assessment mode is that high 
integrity enhances evaluability (Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999), 
making global assessments of related and temporally close outcomes easier. 
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It is worth noting that the integrated and segregated modes represent two 
extreme ways of assessment. They can be viewed as defining the end-points of a 
continuous scale of assessment modes – the higher the integrity, the more likely the 
integrated mode, whereas the lower the integrity, the more likely the segregated mode. 
Sequence assessments represent an intermediate case, where both the values of the 
individual outcomes and their interactions exert influences. This is consistent with the 
view that sequence outcomes are both integral as a group and separate as individuals. 
 
3.4 Relatedness 
Apart from time delay, temporally distributed outcomes may also differ in 
what they are. I use domain relatedness to capture the similarity in kind – higher 
domain relatedness signals higher similarity and vice versa. Since interval and 
relatedness both signal similarity, they have similar influences on sequence 
assessments. First of all, relatedness affects integrity, the more related the outcomes, 
the higher their integrity and vice versa. To illustrate, consider two sequences: 
(receiving 10 pounds today, receiving 20 pounds tomorrow) versus (cleaning the flat 
today, reading one‟s favourite novel tomorrow). The first pair of outcomes have a 
higher relatedness than the second pair. Preference for improvement, a modal 
sequence preference, is therefore more likely to emerge in the first sequence than in 
the second. Supporting this view, Ariely and Zauberman (2000) commented that the 
“cohesiveness can be based on segments proximity in time, their contextual 
relationship, or the mere fact that they are evaluated together” (p.230). This comment 
is in response to their observation that the influence of sequence-level features 
persisted even in the most segmented condition, as opposed to segment-level features. 
Similarly in Example 2.3, the fraction of participants preferring (Aunt, Friends) 
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remained over half (54%) even when the interval was as long as 26 weeks (or 6 
months). Without relatedness, this result would have seemed odd as the interval is so 
long that the participants should have exhibited an overwhelming preference for the 
decreasing (Friends, Aunt). From the current perspective, the integrity is retained 
because the outcomes happen in the same domain and assessed at the same time  
This highlights the malleability of relatedness judgments. That is, as similarity, 
relatedness could arise naturally or in response to the decision context. It follows that 
two apparently unrelated outcomes can become related given appropriate contexts. 
For instance, making plans for “things to do during the weekends” encompasses both 
“cleaning the flat” and “reading one‟s favourite novel”. As a result, decision makers 
are more likely to choose to read the novel after the cleaning than the other way 
around. Likewise, an opera and a meal seem unrelated. However, endowed with 
episode-specific relatedness, one‟s decisions about the two are bounded by the desire 
to maximize the enjoyment of the episode (Dhar & Simonson, 1999).  
That integrity depends on interval as well as relatedness provides another 
reason why delay might enhance integrity, especially for outcomes that are dissimilar 
at the face value. Compared to interval, judgments of relatedness take place on more 
central and therefore higher-level attributes, which become more salient as a result 
delay. Consistent with this, (Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002) asked individuals 
to imagine a set of scenarios (e.g., a camping trip, a friend‟s visit) to occur in either 
the near or distant future. For each scenario, participants grouped related objects (e.g., 
tent, ball, snorkel) into as many groups as they deemed appropriate. They observed 
that fewer groups were created for the distant future scenarios than for the near future 
scenarios. 
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3.5 Summary 
 In Chapter 3, I distinguish between relational and non-relational variables and 
discuss delay and interval respectively within the frameworks of the Construal level 
theory and similarity. The non-relational delay reflects psychological distance of an 
outcome and determines level of construals. Delay fosters time contraction and 
influences how attractive individual outcomes are. By contrast, the relational interval 
reflects temporal similarity between the outcomes. Properties of similarity provide an 
account for findings such as time contraction, the interval effect on integrity and the 
similarity effect on time preferences. Domain relatedness also reflects similarity, and 
exerts similar influences as time interval. Delay may undermine preference for 
improvement because of enhanced discounting or because the outcomes become more 
integral. Chapter 4 explains this from the perspective of contrast effects.  
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Chapter 4  CONTEXT EFFECTS 
4.0 Introduction 
Tversky and Griffin (1991) posit that a past event exerts dual influences on 
one‟s present well-being – an endowment effect that represents its direct contribution 
to one‟s happiness and a contrast effect that represents its indirect contribution, 
through which it changes the attractiveness of a later related event. Two things are 
worth noting. First, if the assessment is about a sequence, then the global satisfaction 
reflects the attractiveness of the sequence. Second, the difference between endowment 
and contrast effects parallels the one between interval and delay. Endowments are non-
relational because it depends only on individual outcomes; contrasts are relational 
because it depends on how outcomes relate to each other. Contrast effects lead to 
preference for improvement because having inferior events earlier makes later superior 
events more desirable and thereby enhances the global satisfaction. Thus, Tversky and 
Griffin‟s framework can be modified to capture sequence preferences as a function of 
delay and interval. 
Endowment and contrast effects are two different kinds of context effects, or 
the influence of the decision context on judgments. The decision context in this case 
narrowly refers to the outcomes under consideration. The judgment refers to the global 
assessment of the outcomes. To understand sequence preferences, and the influence of 
delay and interval, I discuss the topic of context effects in this chapter. In what follows, 
I first present the accessibility-applicability hypothesis that explains how the 
magnitude of context effects depends on relatedness and interval between the context 
and the target. I then present the Inclusion/Exclusion model that predicts how the 
valence of context effects depends on interval and relatedness. That is, whether 
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context effects take the form of assimilations or contrasts. I discuss influences of 
interval in further detail. I then demonstrate applications of context effects to sequence 
assessments using two intertemporal judgment models, namely Tversky and Griffin‟s 
(1991) endowment and contrasts model and Loewenstein and Elster‟s (1992) 
consumption and contrasts model.  
4.1 Context effects 
It is well known that judgments depend on decision contexts. Three empirical 
findings illustrate this: (a) a heavy context weight leads to underestimation of the 
target weight, whereas a light context weight leads to overestimation of the same 
target weight (D. R. Brown, 1953); (b) reminding people of a scandal-ridden politician 
decreases the credibility of his party while enhances the credibility of other politicians 
in the same party (Schwarz & Bless, 1992b); and (c) making sequential choices 
between non-dominant options, people‟s preferences in the second choice are shaped 
by the options they encounter in the first (Simonson & Tversky, 1992), a concept 
known as the “trade-off contrasts”. That is, the more important an attribute is 
perceived in the first choice (e.g. Attribute Y when the trade-off is between one unit of 
Attribute Y and three units of Attribute X), the less important it is in the subsequent 
choice, and vice versa. Consequently, the alternative superior on this attribute (Y) is 
less likely to be chosen in the second choice than in the first. 
These examples show that context effects can take two opposing forms, known 
as assimilation effects and contrast effects, which reflect respectively a positive and 
negative (inverse) relationship between judgments and implications of contextual 
information. Context effects are ubiquitous – the three examples are in the domains of 
psychophysics, social judgments and consumer choice. Contrast effects influence the 
assessment of weight, the reputation of individual politicians, as well as the 
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attractiveness of consumer goods, whereas an assimilation effect influences the 
assessment of the reputation of a political party. 
Example (c) also illustrates how context effects can take the form of temporal 
effects – people‟s preferences in a later choice depended on the options they 
encountered earlier. Thus, the questions of when context effects arise, how 
pronounced they are, and which form they take are important for our understanding of 
sequence preferences. While the accessibility-applicability hypothesis provides an 
answer to the first two questions, the Inclusion/Exclusion model (or IEM) sheds light 
on the third, as we see next. 
4.1.1 Accessibility-applicability 
The accessibility-applicability hypothesis (Higgins & Brendl, 1995) states that 
only accessible and applicable information influence judgments; the more applicable 
the information, the greater its influences are and vice versa.  
Contextual information is accessible by definition. According to the 
accessibility principle (Higgins & King, 1981), this is the fundamental reason 
underlying context effects, as it means that instead of retrieving all the knowledge that 
may potentially be relevant, people rely on a subset of information that comes to mind 
most easily at the time of the judgment (Higgins & Bargh, 1987). As a result, the 
temporary representation of a target stimulus, as well as the construction of a standard, 
includes not only information that is chronically accessible and context-invariant, but 
also information that is only temporarily accessible due to the salience of decision 
context. 
Applicability, on the other hand, depends on similarity between contextual 
information and judgment targets – the more similar the two, the more applicable the 
information, the greater its influences will be and vice versa. For information to exert 
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influences at all, it has to be related to the target on the dimension of interest (Strack & 
Mussweiler, 1997). For instance, the assessment of my current badminton skills 
depends on the knowledge of my past badminton skills but not on the knowledge of 
my cooking skills, even when both pieces of information are equally accessible at the 
time of the judgment (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000).  
Interval between the target and the context also influences applicability 
(Mussweiler & Strack, 2000), the shorter it is, the greater the applicability, and the 
more pronounced the context effects become. For instance, in terms of my present 
badminton skills, the knowledge of my badminton skills a month ago is more 
applicable than that of a year ago. Taken together, the more relevant the information, 
the more recent it is, the greater its influences and vice versa.  
4.1.2 The Inclusion/Exclusion Model (IEM) 
Given a piece of information that is both accessible and applicable, what 
determines whether its influence is positive (assimilation) or negative (contrast)? 
Schwarz and Bless‟s (1992) Inclusion/Exclusion model (or IEM) posits that this 
depends on how the contextual information is categorized at the representation stage 
of the target. If the information is included in the representation, it is assimilated into 
the judgment, but if the information is excluded from the representation, it is 
contrasted with the judgment. Two things are worth noting. First, the same piece of 
information cannot be simultaneously excluded from and included in the 
representation of the same target. That is, assimilation and contrast effects do not co-
exist. Second, for the contextual information to serve as a judgment standard, it has to 
be first excluded from the representation and then used to construct the standard, or, in 
Kahneman and Miller‟s (1986) words, an “alternative state of reality”. An implication 
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is that assimilation effects arise more readily than contrast effects (Schwarz & Bless, 
1992; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000).  
Example (b) illustrates how IEM works. The information of the scandal-ridden 
politician provides the context for the assessment of the reputation of both the party 
and other politicians in the same party. Since the party is superordinate to its members, 
the logic of including the information in the representation of the party is compelling. 
By contrast, two individual politicians are at the same level of abstraction. IEM thus 
predicts an assimilation effect in the assessment of the party but a contrast effect in the 
assessment of individual politicians, which is what Schwarz and Bless (1992b) found. 
Note that in this case, the same context fosters both an assimilation effect and a 
contrast effect. This however does not contradict IEM because the two effects have 
different targets, i.e. the party versus individual politicians. As we see later, the same 
logic underlies the dual influences of a past outcome on one‟s assessments of present 
well-being (Tversky & Griffin, 1991).  
In addition to the hierarchical relationship between the target and the context, 
or the lack of, inclusion and exclusion also depend on their interval and relatedness, 
when applicable. Mussweiler and Strack (2000) commented: “To the extent that 
accessible knowledge is similar to the judgmental target or pertains to the same overall 
category or time period, it is likely to be seen as representative for the judgment” 
(p.256). This idea is embodied in Strack‟s (1992) notion of representativeness-check. 
Decision makers check how representative information is in order to determine 
whether it is appropriate for reaching an accurate judgment. Representative 
information is assimilated whereas non-representative information is contrasted 
(Strack, 1992). This logically follows from our postulate in Chapter 3 that relatedness 
and interval reflect perceived similarity between the target and context, and this 
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similarity also determines how representative the contextual information is perceived 
with respect to the target (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). 
In what follows, I discuss influences of interval in detail. 
4.1.3 Interval 
As we see in Chapter 3, time contraction demonstrates how the perceived 
length of interval may differ from its actual length. It is however the perception and 
the resulting grouping of the outcomes that determines whether the contextual 
influences are assimilations or contrasts. For instance, Strack (1992) asked first-year 
college students to recall a positive or negative past event before assessing their 
current life satisfaction. The first group was asked to “think about a life event that 
occurred about two years ago”, while the second group was asked to “think about a 
life event that occurred about two years ago, that is, before you entered the college”. 
An assimilation effect was observed in the first group – participants reported higher or 
lower life satisfaction following a recall of a positive or negative past event; a contrast 
effect was observed in the second group – participants reported higher satisfaction 
after recalling a negative past event but lower satisfaction after recalling a positive one.  
Strack attributed his findings to extendures, or periods of life stored in memory 
(N. R. Brown, Shevell, & Rips, 1986). We may view each extendure as an ad hoc 
category, defined by landmark events such as “entering the college”. Events within the 
same extendure are perceived as representative of each other, which fosters inclusion 
and assimilations. The opposite can be said of events occurring in different extendures. 
The lack of representativeness fosters exclusion and contrasts between them. Strack‟s 
example therefore demonstrates how sensitive outcome grouping is to the presence or 
absence of landmark events. On the other hand, it is conceivable that grouping may 
arise spontaneously, such as when the decision maker recalls landmark events on their 
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own, which is more likely to happen when the interval is long than short. This 
provides an account for the finding that recalled past events were contrasted with the 
assessment of one‟s current well-being whereas recalled present events were 
assimilated (Strack, Schwarz & Geschneidinger, 1985).  
This interval effect may contribute to the disparity between sequential and 
simultaneous judgments, when options are assessed one at a time or several at the 
same time. In Example (c), consumers contrast a later trade-off with an earlier one. 
Wedell, Parducci and Geiselman (1987) found that their participants assigned higher 
(lower) ratings to the same faces in the sequential condition when the context 
contained less (more) attractive faces; the opposite occurred in the simultaneous 
condition. Martin and Seta (1983) found evidence for a contrast effect when 
participants made the assessment after seeing information of each individual, but 
assimilation effects when participants assessed the attractiveness of two individuals 
after seeing information of both individuals.  
In these experiments, the valence of the context effects depends on whether or 
not an interval exists between the presentations of the contextual information or 
between the assessments of the target. Which is more important in terms of context 
effects, the presentation of the outcomes or their assessments? Bruine de Bruin and 
Keren‟s (2003) experiments provide a clue. Their participants assessed the 
attractiveness of dorm rooms and blind dates. Each option was described by nine 
features, among which five were common and four were unique. Common and unique 
features always had opposite valences. For instance, two dorm rooms in the “unique 
negative” condition both offered own phone-line, were close to supermarket, student-
recommended, had safe neighbourhood and shared balcony but one were difficult to 
park bike, had old carpet, high security deposit, and dirty kitchen, whereas the other 
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was thin-walled, overdue in maintenance, required two months‟ notice, and had 
unfriendly landlord.  
They posited that if participants contrasted a later assessment with an earlier 
one, the ratings should exhibit a trend that was dictated by the valence of the unique 
features, rather than by the valence of the common features. That is, an improving 
sequence of ratings would characterize the assessments of the unique positive 
condition whereas a deteriorating sequence would characterize that of the unique 
negative condition. They investigated the so-called “order effects” in five experiments 
– four of these were the factorial combinations of simultaneous and sequential 
presentation and assessment modes; the fifth condition entailed rating an option after 
viewing the descriptions of both this option and the one(s) that had already been rated. 
They observed that the order effects were the weakest, that is, the improvement or the 
deterioration in ratings was the least obvious, when judgments and presentation were 
both simultaneous (Experiment 5).  Overall, the effect was most pronounced in tasks 
that promoted sequential judgment. These results suggest that while both presentation 
and judgments are important, the judgment mode is perhaps more influential.  
4.2 Implications for time preferences 
I use context effects to conceptualize interactions between temporal outcomes 
and to gain insights into sequence preferences. The idea is that facing a set of 
outcomes, decision makers assess one outcome at a time, with the rest of the outcomes 
serving as the “decision context”. They form the global assessment by combining the 
assessments of individual outcomes. With this assumption, research on context effects 
provides an account for the non-linear relationship between integrity and preference 
for improvement hypothesized in Chapter 3. The reason is that higher relatedness and 
shorter intervals between the outcomes exert multiple influences. First, they imply 
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greater integrity; second, they signal greater applicability and therefore more 
pronounced context effects and third, they imply greater representativeness of the 
contextual information. Since preference for improvement is motivated by contrast 
effects, higher integrity only accompanies more pronounced preference for 
improvement if contrast effects arise. This happens when the contextual (non-focal) 
outcome is perceived as non-representative and therefore excluded from the 
representation of the target (the focal) outcome.  
Research on intertemporal choice explicitly or implicitly incorporates the idea 
of context effects and with it, the influences of interval and relatedness. For instance, 
Hsee and Ableson (1991) show that the faster the improvement/ deterioration, the 
more/less satisfactory a sequence becomes (see Chapter 2). Tversky and Griffin (1991) 
proposed the endowment and contrast effects model to describe one‟s global wellbeing 
after a past and a present related experience. Loewenstein and Elster‟s (1992) 
consumption and contrast effects model is a similar model that also addresses 
influences of both past and future events.  
Although not a model of sequence preferences per se, I show in Chapter 6 how 
Tversky and Griffin‟s idea can be generalized and developed towards this end. 
Loewenstein and Elster‟s model has exerted profound influences on time preferences. 
In what follows, I discuss these two in detail. 
4.2.1 The endowment-contrast effects model 
In their work on assessment of global wellbeing, Tversky and Griffin 
(1991) hypothesize that a past event exerts dual influences on one‟s present well-being 
– an endowment effect that represents its direct contribution to one‟s happiness or 
satisfaction, and a contrast effect that represents its indirect contribution. That is, “[a] 
positive experience makes us happy, but it also renders similar experiences less 
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exciting. A negative event makes us unhappy, but it also helps us appreciate 
experiences that are less negative” (p.709). To test their idea, Tversky and Griffin 
devised hypothetical scenarios about high-school students, who encountered two 
events, one past and the other “present”; the events were either related (e.g. two term 
papers or two parties) or unrelated (one term paper followed by a party or vice versa). 
The earlier event was either positive or negative; the later event was always neutral. 
This arrangement gave rise to a 2x2 between-subjects design in which a neutral event 
was preceded by either a positive or a negative event, which could be either related or 
unrelated. Their participants (college students) viewed these scripts and rated the 
satisfaction of the high-school students on a “1-10” scale, with higher ratings 
indicating higher satisfaction. 
Tversky and Griffin made the following predictions. First, consistent with the 
endowment (assimilation) effect, satisfaction ratings reflected the quality of the first 
event, regardless of the relatedness, i.e. greater satisfaction when the first event was 
positive than negative. Second, consistent with the applicability principle, the contrasts 
occurred between the related events. Since the second event was neutral, a positive 
(negative) first event entailed a negative (positive) impact on the satisfaction.  In other 
words, the contrast effects and endowment effects always worked against each other.  
Their results supported these predictions. As shown in Figure 4.1, satisfaction 
ratings were significantly higher in the positive condition (the solid line) than the 
negative condition (the dashed line), for both the related events (mean rating: 6.8 
versus 5.5) and the unrelated events (7.1 versus 4.9). However, the difference was 
much smaller for the related events (1.3=6.8-5.5) than for the unrelated (2.2=7.1-4.9). 
Tversky and Griffin obtained further support for their framework from an experiment 
in which participants played computer games for real money. 
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Figure 4.1. The mean satisfaction ratings observed in Tversky & Griffin (1991).  
 
4.2.2 The consumption-contrast effects model 
Loewenstein and Elster (1992) posit that memory and anticipation turn 
judgments of one‟s present well-being into a type of “triple counting”. Instead of one 
direct impact, individual events influence utility before as well as after the experience 
– first through anticipation, then through direct experience and finally through 
memory. Loewenstein and Elster labelled the effects attributable to past events as 
backward effects and those attributable to future ones as forward effects. They 
referred to the positive and negative effects as consumption effects and contrast effects 
respectively. 
One insight of this framework is the asymmetry between the influences exerted 
by past and future events. Consumption effects are predominantly forward, whereas 
contrast effects are predominantly backward (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991) – an 
assumption implicitly incorporated in Tversky and Griffin (1991). This explains why 
we rejoice at an improvement over our past consumption but lament the same 
improvement over our future. In the latter case, “contrast effect is completely eclipsed 
by the consumption effect” (Loewenstein & Elster, 1992, p.233). 
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Loewenstein‟s (1987) notion of anticipatory savouring and dread are two 
representative forward consumption effects. The idea is that anticipating a future 
positive/negative event yields positive/negative utility. Pronounced anticipatory effects 
explain why people who are otherwise impatient with isolated outcomes would prefer 
to delay a kiss from their favourite movie star for a few days but at the same time 
choose to receive non-lethal electronic shocks as soon as possible – both violate the 
notion of positive time preference. Loewenstein and Elster attributed discounting to 
forward effects, commenting that “were it not for the forward contrast effect that 
makes us envy our future selves, perhaps people may not discount future satisfaction 
at all” (1992, p.233). 
4.2.3 Discussion 
Two things are worth noting from the two models presented in this section. 
First, they both embody the notion of applicability. Applicability implies relatedness. 
While Tversky and Griffin posited and found more pronounced contrast effects for 
events of the same domain than for those of different domains, Loewenstein and Elster 
argued that information must be similar to judgment target in “some relevant respect” 
to exert intertemporal effects.  
Second, the dual or triple influences as hypothesized in the models are 
consistent with the prediction of IEM. The value of an event is assimilated into the 
assessment of one‟s global well-being, a superordinate target, as well as contrasted 
with the assessment of other, related events that are on the same level of abstraction. In 
addition to these two, Loewenstein and Elster‟s notion of triple-counting of utility also 
takes into account the satisfaction derived from direct experience, in addition to the 
one derived from memory or anticipation.  
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Since IEM is a general framework of context effects, we would expect the 
endowment-contrast model to explain intertemporal as well as non-intertemporal 
judgments. For instance, recalled present/past events were assimilated into/contrasted 
with the assessment of current satisfaction (Strack, et al., 1985). And the experience of 
an extremely pleasant (unpleasant) room was assimilated into the assessment of life 
satisfaction but contrasted with the assessment of own living conditions (Schwarz, 
Strack, Kommer, & Wagner, 1987). It is not surprising these findings are compatible 
with the endowment-contrast model. It is however important to note that how the two 
context effects arise diverges depending on the context. While Strack et al 
demonstrated the influence of the interval between the context and target, Schwarz et 
al, as Tversky and Griffin, demonstrated the influence of the level of abstraction, i.e. 
whether or not the target was superordinate to the context.  
Does a similar parallel between intertemporal and interpersonal judgments 
exist? Just as assessments of present events depend on attractiveness of related past 
events, assessments of one‟s own experiences depend on attractiveness of experiences 
of related others. As Hume (1739/1969) observed almost three centuries ago, “a direct 
survey of another‟s pleasure … gives us pleasure and … produces pain when 
compared with our own”. Taken together, our present well-being depends not only on 
our own experiences, whether these experiences take place in the past, present or 
future, but also on experiences of related others. 
That people tend to consume rather than contrast future events and the reverse 
holds for past events illustrates one unique aspect of intertemporal judgments – the 
influence of our asymmetric time orientations. An explanation for this, as offered by 
Loewenstein and Elster, relies on the parallel between intertemporal and interpersonal 
judgments. They note that our future is in the hands of our present selves, and 
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therefore in a sense “disadvantaged” compared to the present. Forward contrasts are 
almost as rare as making comparisons against the disabled.  
4.3 Summary 
Chapter 4 shows two things. First, why and how context effects can be used to 
model sequence preferences and second, how relatedness and interval might influence 
time (sequence) preferences. According to the applicability principle, the contextual 
information has to be related to the target to exert any influence. If the outcomes are 
temporally distributed, then the higher the relatedness, the shorter the interval, the 
more pronounced the influences one outcome exerts on another are and vice versa. 
Such influences can take two forms, a positive assimilation (endowment or 
consumption) and a negative (inverse) contrast. IEM predicts that the valence of the 
context effect depends on how the information is categorized with respect to the target. 
Higher domain relatedness and shorter intervals signal higher representativeness, 
which entails a higher chance of assimilation. IEM thus predicts the dual influences of 
an outcome on the assessment of global satisfaction – the information of this outcome 
is assimilated into the superordinate target but contrasted with the assessment of 
another related outcome that is probably later in time. The idea is embodied in 
Tversky and Griffin‟s endowment and contrast effects framework and Loewenstein 
and Elster‟s consumption and contrast effects framework. In Chapter 6, I consolidate 
these ideas into a model that describes sequence preferences as a function of interval, 
delay and relatedness. Before that, I deal with the topic of choice bracketing in 
Chapter 5. That is, how decision perspectives may affect time preferences. 
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Chapter 5  CHOICE BRACKETING 
5.0 Introduction 
Read, Loewenstein and Rabin (1999) propose the notion of choice bracketing. 
Choices bracketed together are made together, by taking into account effects that one 
choice exerts on other choices in the same bracket. A bracket can be narrow or broad, 
depending on whether it contains a few or many choices. The more choices a bracket 
contains, the broader it is. Example 2.4 (Chapter 2) demonstrate how bracketing 
depends on arbitrary factors and how people‟s preferences vary with the level of 
bracketing. If this happens, we say that bracketing effects emerge. Levels of 
bracketing affect time preferences in at least two ways. First, narrow bracketing 
exacerbates the perception that outcomes are in isolation and therefore fosters positive 
time preference. Second, modal sequence preferences depend on level of bracketing. 
In what follows, I discuss the topic of choice bracketing in detail.  
After introducing the idea, I discuss the prevalence of narrow bracketing, and 
examine the reason behind this. I then demonstrate the importance of decision 
heuristics – how they facilitate broad bracketing and how they may lead to biases such 
as in the case of the so-called overbracketing.  In conclusion, I discuss the influence 
bracketing on sequence judgments, including when people perceive a sequence and 
what makes a sequence attractive. 
5.1 Bracketing 
Denoting a bracket by “{}” allows us to represent the decisions in Example 
2.4 as follows. The group who chose bread puddings separately for weekends and 
weekdays encountered {bread puddings for weekends} and {bread puddings for 
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weekdays}; the group who made one combined choice encountered {bread puddings 
for this week}, which is essentially {bread puddings for weekends, bread puddings for 
weekdays}. In the latter case, the bracket contains two choices and is therefore 
broader than in the former case where each of the two brackets contains just one 
choice. The bracketing effect is expressed as people choosing fewer bread puddings 
under broad bracketing than under narrow bracketing. 
Making many decisions at the same time, or simultaneous choice (Simonson, 
1990) allows the decision maker to detect interactions among the outcomes that are 
not possible when the decisions are made in isolation, i.e. under narrow bracketing, or 
sequential choice. It follows that broad bracketing facilitates the maximization of 
global satisfaction. Despite this, narrow bracketing prevails. One implication of this is 
the tendency for decision makers to adopt a narrow frame when assessing outcomes, 
known as the minimal account (Kahneman & Tversky 1984; Thaler, 1985, 1999; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Under this account, decision makers assess only the 
differences between the alternatives and disregarding all their common features. By 
contrast, under the broadest comprehensive account, the decision maker takes into 
account all other factors including current wealth, future earnings, possible outcomes 
of other probabilistic holdings, and so on. The comprehensive account is the gold-
standard of economic analysis but is rarely used. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) offer several reasons for this. Compared to a 
broad decision frame, a narrow one alleviates cognitive strain, facilitates evaluation 
and justification, and offers a better match with the properties of hedonic experiences. 
These advantages of a narrow frame can be attributed to decision makers‟ cognitive 
limitations, i.e. cognitive inertia and limited cognitive capacities. For the same reason, 
narrow bracketing prevails, as we see next. 
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5.1.1 Narrow bracketing prevails 
Cognitive inertia means people use information the way it comes (Read et al, 
1999; Slovic, 1972). The reason might be that doing anything otherwise will consume 
more cognitive resources, which are however limited (Simon, 1955). Cognitive inertia 
exacerbates narrow bracketing because we perceive most decisions to come one at a 
time in isolation rather than many at the same time. Example 2.4 illustrates its 
influences. Participants made separate choices of bread pudding for weekends and 
weekdays or one combined choice for the entire week, depending on whether the 
choices were presented that way.  
Cognitive inertia is also observed in decisions with uncertain outcomes. An 
example is Samuelson‟s gamble. Paul Samuelson offered one of his colleagues an 
equal chance to win $200 and to lose $100 (Samuelson, 1937). This colleague turned 
down the offer, but volunteered to play 100 such bets. Aggregating risky prospects 
with positive expected values leads to an upward shift in the distribution of payoffs, 
making the risk more attractive. In this case, while a player stands a 50% chance of 
losing money by playing one single bet, this chance is quickly diminished as he plays 
more bets – a fact that most people seem to know intuitively. For instance, most of 
Redelmeier and Tversky‟s (1992) participants took on the offer of six identical bets 
but turned down the offer of a single-bet. Strikingly, the single bet was rejected even 
when it was presented immediately after an offer of five identical bets, which most of 
the participants willingly accepted. Cognitive inertia prevents decision makers from 
thinking beyond the way the choices are presented.  
On the other hand, not all simultaneously presented decisions are made 
together, suggesting other factors at play. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) presented 
the “twin-gamble problem” to two separate groups of participants.  
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Problem 1 (n=150):  
Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions. First 
examine both decisions, then indicate the options you prefer. 
Decision (i). Choose between: 
A. A sure gain of $240 [84%] 
B. 25% chance to gain $1000 and 75% chance to gain nothing [16%] 
Decision (ii). Choose between: 
C. A sure loss of $750 [13%] 
D. 75% chance to lose $1000 and 25% chance to lose nothing [87%] 
 
Problem 2 (n=86):  
Choose between: 
A & D  25% chance to win $240 and 75% chance to lose $760 [0%] 
B & C   25% chance to win $250 and 75% chance to lose $750 [100%] 
 
People‟s responses to Problem 1 and 2 diverged. The options A and D were 
preferred in Problem 1 but the combination B&C, as the dominant option, was chosen 
by all participants in Problem 2. This dominance however only became obvious in 
Problem 2, when the outcomes had already been combined in terms of probability and 
monetary value. By contrast, the response pattern in Problem 1 demonstrated an 
isolation effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), which is the tendency of making 
decisions in isolation, i.e. narrowly bracketing one‟s choices. Consequently, people 
were risk-averse for gains in Decision (i), preferring the sure thing to the gamble, and 
at the same time, risk-seeking for losses in Decision (ii), preferring the gamble to the 
sure thing (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
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This response pattern is inconsistent with the prediction of cognitive inertia. 
Respondents to Problem 1 were presented with both decisions and instructed to 
consider their joint consequences. The failure of broad bracketing occurred at the 
stage of outcome editing (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), when outcomes had to be 
combined on each attribute for assessment. This is an effortful task, whereas people 
have only limited cognitive capacities (Simon, 1955). This makes narrow bracketing 
more attractive and sometimes more realistic than broad bracketing (Payne, Bettman, 
& Johnson, 1992). Generally speaking, as the number of decisions increases, the task 
of constructing the composite options and choosing among these options becomes 
increasingly complex. To illustrate, consider two hypothetical binary choices, e.g. {a, 
b} and {c, d}. Under narrow bracketing, the decision maker makes two independent 
binary comparisons, one within each set. Under broad bracketing, there are four 
composite outcomes, i.e. {ac, ad, bc, bd}, and as many as six (=Combination (2,6)) 
binary comparisons.  
If broad bracketing is more effortful than narrow bracketing, why does broad 
bracketing arise spontaneously in the choices of bread puddings and Samuelson‟s 
gambles? This is because in these cases the so-called pre-existing heuristics (Read et 
al., 1999) exist, which allow us to make simultaneous decisions without the effortful 
and often lengthy acts of outcome editing or comparisons. As another example, 
suppose at lunch we are offered a choice between two side dishes, e.g., chips and 
mixed vegetables, and one between three main dishes, e.g., fried fish, Shepherd‟s pie 
and pasta. The heuristic of “choose the complements” immediately identifies “fish 
and chips” as the best option. We do not need to list all the six possible combinations 
and go through the pair-wise comparisons to make the choice. From this perspective, 
the twin-gamble example demonstrates what happens when decisions are not 
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facilitated by heuristics – participants underbracketed their choices; that is, they 
adopted narrow bracketing even when they were presented with multiple choices and 
were capable of broad racketing. 
Despite great savings in time and mental effort, heuristics are mental shortcuts 
that lead to satisficing rather than optimal decisions. Decisions made using heuristics 
can be fraught with biases. Mixed vegetables and Shepherd‟s pie might actually be 
more satisfactory than fish and chips under careful consideration (Gigerenzer & 
Selten, 2001; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 
1993). Another type of decision error, as opposed to underbracketing, is the so-called 
overbracketing, which happens when broad bracketing is adopted by mistake, as we 
see next.  
5.1.2 Overbracketing 
Daniel Read and I presented Example 5.1 to forty-seven students at the 
London School of Economics:  
Example 5.1 
Imagine that you are offered a choice between the following two options 
based on the toss of a coin: (N=47) 
A 
36, 77% 
heads: the left shoe (boot) of a pair of shoes (boots) 
tails:  the right shoe (boot) of a pair of shoes (boots) 
B 
11, 23% 
heads: the left shoe (boot) of a pair of shoes (boots) 
tails:  the left boot (shoe) of a pair of boots (shoes) 
Each option is a gamble that offers either a pair of complements (A) or a pair 
of substitutes (B). There is no reason to prefer A to B or vice versa because a decision 
maker can only receive one of the four outcomes by making the decision only once. 
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Nevertheless, after counterbalancing the goods, we observed a preference for Gamble 
A to Gamble B, χ2(1)=14.696, p<.001, suggesting a preference for the gamble with 
complementary outcomes. We obtained similar results when participants encountered 
restaurant meals and books, as well as when they were asked to choose between two 
choices that offer either complementary or substitutable alternatives.  
At face value the response pattern is consistent with the prediction of broad 
bracketing, suggestion that participants assumed they would encounter the decision 
more than once. By consistently choosing Gamble A, they would eventually receive 
the complements (a pair of shoes or boots), and therefore derive greater global 
satisfaction. The tendency of narrow bracketing however suggests a different account. 
It is more likely that participants had overbracketed their choices, as a result of the 
joint influences of cognitive inertia and pre-existing heuristics. Due to cognitive 
inertia, the outcomes were assessed together, for which the heuristic of “choosing 
complements over substitutes” was falsely applied to outcomes that cannot be 
received at the same time.  
Another example of overbracketing is the finding of diversification effect 
(Read & Loewenstein, 1995; Simonson, 1990), or that people choose more varieties 
when making simultaneous choices for future consumption than making sequential 
choices at the time of the consumption. In a real life experiment, Read and 
Loewenstein (1995) presented young trick-or-treaters two trays of Halloween candies. 
One group of children (the simultaneous group) were asked to pick two candies at the 
same time; a different group (the sequential group) was asked to pick two candies in 
two different houses, one at a time. Cognitive inertia dictates that the simultaneous 
group encountered one decision as {(Candy 1, Candy 2), (Candy 1, Candy 2)}, 
whereas the sequential group encountered two decisions as {(Candy 1, Candy 2)} and 
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{(Candy 1, Candy 2)}. The simultaneous group picked many more varieties than the 
sequential group. This happened despite the fact that all the candies were deposited in 
the same bag. The desirability of diversification might be misleading. Read, 
Antonides, van den Ouden, and Trienekens (2001) found that office workers were 
actually less satisfied with their snaking decisions made from the simultaneous choice 
than from a series of sequential ones at the time of the consumption. 
5.1.3 Decision versus experienced utility  
The examples of overbracketing provide evidence for the disparity between 
perceived and experienced bracketing effects. Due to cognitive inertia, people may 
perceive bracketing effects from outcomes that are presented together, which however 
do not exist when the experiences unfold. This applies to both the perceived 
advantage of choosing more varieties of candies and the perceived complementarity 
between the outcomes that cannot take place at the same time.  
This demonstrates the disparity between decision utility and experienced 
utility (Kahneman & Snell, 1990, 1992; Kahneman & Varey, 1991; Kahneman, et al., 
1997), or the utility people perceive at the time of the decision versus the utility 
people receive from the actual experience of the same outcome. Time interval 
between the decisions and the experiences exacerbates this disparity. People have 
difficulty forecasting preferences even for familiar goods (e.g. ice cream), let alone 
preferences for novel experiences (Kahneman & Snell, 1990, 1992); their decisions 
are also biased towards how they feel at the time of decision making, which can be 
quite different from how they actually feel at the time of the experiences (Kahneman 
& Snell, 1990; Loewenstein, 2005; Read & van Leeuwen, 1998).  
It is important to note that this discussion shows how easily overbracketing 
may arise; it however does not provide evidence for the superiority of narrow 
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bracketing over broad bracketing. The reason is that only by adopting a broad 
decision frame can the decision maker have the freedom of comparing decisions made 
under different levels of brackets and of course select the best, narrow or broad, to 
maximize his/her global satisfaction. 
5.2 Bracketing influences sequence judgments 
Levels of bracketing affect time preferences in at least two ways. First, the 
prevalence of narrow bracketing exacerbates the perception that outcomes are isolated, 
fostering positive time preference. Second, modal sequence preferences depend on 
level of bracketing. Example 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate this idea. Example 5.2 is a slightly 
revised version of Example 2.1 (Chapter 2) – the Greek dinner is replaced by a dinner 
at home. This change however has little effect on people‟s preferences. Most 
respondents to Choice 1 preferred to have the French dinner this month, whereas most 
respondents to Choice 2 became much more patient, preferring to delay the French 
dinner till next month.  
Example 5.2 
Choice 1  
A. French dinner in this month 
B. French dinner in next month 
Choice 2 This month Next month 
C. French dinner Dinner at home 
D. Dinner at home French dinner 
 
From the perspective of choice bracketing, this preference reversal is a 
bracketing effect. Choice 1 is between two isolated outcomes; Choice 2 is between 
two sequences or composite outcomes derived from two separate choices – one 
 78 
between whether to have the French dinner this or next month (Choice 1) and one 
between whether to have dinner at home this or next month. Participants adopted 
narrow and broad bracketing in Choice 1 and Choice 2, respectively. A preference for 
improvement was only observed in Choice 2, that is, when the sequences emerge 
under broad bracketing.  
While Example 5.2 illustrates the impact of bracketing on the perception of 
sequences, Example 5.3 demonstrates its impact on the preference for sequences. 
Read et al. (1999) presented the problem to two groups of respondents. One group 
(narrow bracketing) made the two choices separately and the other group (broad 
bracketing) made one combined decision for both. 
 
Example 5.3 
Choice 1   
 This Saturday Next Saturday 
A Cleaning the garden Planting flower bulbs 
B Planting flower bulbs Cleaning the garden 
Choice 2   
 This Saturday Next Saturday 
A Reading the driving manual Reading a novel 
B Reading a novel Reading the driving manual 
 
Each choice was between two alternative sequences. Cleaning the garden and 
reading the manual were relatively boring compared to planting flower bulbs and 
reading a novel. Option A (B) was therefore increasing (decreasing). The first group 
adopted narrow bracketing and made separate decisions in each choice. Preference for 
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improvement dominated the responses. That is, most participants preferred the 
increasing sequence (Option A) in both Choice 1 and 2 and ended up having an 
extremely boring weekend followed by an extremely enjoyable weekend. The second, 
broad bracketing group behaved differently. Most participants now exhibited a 
preference for spreading; they paired sequences with different trends together, i.e. A 
(B) in Choice 1 and then B (A) in Choice 2.  
5.2.1 Discussion 
The results obtained in Example 5.2 and 5.3 are consistent with cognitive 
inertia. The decision frame participants adopted was always consistent with the way 
in which the choices were presented: narrow when outcomes/choices came one at a 
time, broad when many came at the same time, relatively speaking. Improvement and 
spreading are bracketing effects that emerge under broad bracketing. The strategies of 
“choosing improving or constant sequences” are decision heuristics that facilitate 
simultaneous decisions. Just as those consumers who choose diversity are not more 
satisfied with their choices at the time of the consumption, improvement might be an 
overrated property that people believe in as well as recall its desirability but never 
experience (Novemsky & Ratner, 2003; also see Chapter 2). In both cases, the interval 
between the outcomes might be so long that people fail to detect either the 
improvement over time or the diversity of the consumption, which were made salient 
by the fact that these outcomes were presented together at the time of the decision. 
That is, people may have overbracketed their choices by preferring sequences with an 
increasing trend. 
The two modal sequence preferences parallel the two consumption episode 
effects (Dhar & Simonson, 1999), which, broadly speaking, are bracketing effects 
well, i.e. when the choices within the same episode form a broad bracketing and are 
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made together. Chapter 3 presented the so-called highlighting strategy. Consumers 
sacrifice means to achieve goals when facing a trade-off between the two. For 
example, they chose to eat at an expensive restaurant rather than a moderate one after 
having enjoyed an opera. Another consumption episode effect is called balancing, 
which consumers adopt when facing conflicting goals, e.g. to eat healthy as well as 
tasty food. Dhar and Simonson showed that restaurant-goers more likely went for a 
dessert that was delicious but high in fat (e.g. chocolate cake) rather than one that was 
low in fat but less-tasty (e.g. fruit salad), after they had chosen a main dish that was 
healthy but less tasty.  
Preference for spreading is in effect a balancing strategy between the near 
future and the distant future – decision makers distribute utility evenly across time 
and in so doing, they achieve a compromise between the consumption in different 
time periods. From this perspective, spreading implies that each time period is 
considered to be of equal importance. By contrast, decision makers who exhibit a 
preference for improvement highlight more distant consumption by sacrificing more 
recent consumption, implying that the more distant period is considered to be more 
important. The same perception is embodied in the notion of backward contrast 
effects (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991), where earlier experiences serve as an 
assessment standard for later experiences. Compared to the assessment of outcomes 
embedded in a sequence, the assessment of isolated outcomes presents a decision 
situation that requires no obvious intertemporal tradeoffs, either between two goals or 
between one goal and one means.  
One thing worth noting about Example 5.2 is that for most of us, having 
dinner at home is the most likely alternative to the French dinner. It follows that 
Choice 1 and Choice 2 are in fact identical and one should always consider the 
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implications for dinner at home even if it is not presented as an alternative. Example 
5.2 therefore illustrates the power of cognitive inertia, and the extent to which our 
preferences depend on the way outcomes are presented to us. 
5.3 Summary 
This chapter discusses the topic of choice bracketing and its implications. Due 
to cognitive inertia and limited cognitive capacities, we typically perceive decisions to 
come one at a time; making isolated decisions is also less effortful than making many 
decisions at the same time. As a result, narrow bracketing prevails despite the 
normative appeal of broad bracketing.  The exception to this is when decision 
heuristics exist to facilitate simultaneous decisions. In terms of time preferences, the 
tendency of narrow bracketing and cognitive inertia provide an account for the 
dominant positive time preference for isolated outcomes, in contrast to preferences for 
improvement and spreading for outcomes embedded in a sequence. Preferring 
increasing versus constant sequence can be viewed as decision heuristics that 
“highlight” future consumption at the cost of present one versus “balance” between 
earlier and later consumption. Improvement and balancing are more likely under 
broad than narrow bracketing, when outcomes (sequences) are considered together. 
However, as illustrated in the case of overbracketing, heuristics-based decisions are 
satisficing rather than maximizing. The desirability of improvement may never be 
experienced.  
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Chapter 6  THE CONTRASTS MODEL 
6.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, I develop a descriptive model of sequence preferences based 
on the idea presented so far. I refer to this model as “the contrasts model”, as it is an 
extension of Tversky and Griffin‟s (1991) endowment and contrast effects framework. 
The idea is that the value of a sequence comes from two sources, non-relational, 
which includes the value derived from endowment effects and influences of delay, 
and relational, which includes the value derived from contrast effects and influences 
of interval. 
In what follows, I start by presenting Tversky and Griffin‟s (1991) endowment 
and contrast effects framework (TG), followed by a discussion on Loewenstein and 
Prelec‟s (1993) model (LP). I then present the contrasts model, which adopts the 
structure of LP but the individual components of TG. I then discuss conceptual 
differences between the contrasts model and TG and LP, before presenting an 
example that examines the predictive validity of the contrasts model, using data 
reported in Loewenstein and Prelec (2003, Study 1).  I concluded by discussing 
assumptions that are important for the empirical investigation in the second half of 
this thesis. 
6.1 Tversky and Griffin (1991) 
Tversky and Griffin (1991) posits that the global satisfaction after having 
received two temporally distributed outcomes (e.g. a past outcome e1 and a present 
outcome e2) is the additive sum of the values derived from the endowment of each 
outcome and the contrast between the two. The endowment effects capture the 
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inherent worth of the outcomes as in v(e1)+v(e2); the contrast effects capture the 
influence of the earlier outcome on the assessment of the later present outcome as in 
v(e2-e1). Since the earlier and the later outcomes constitute a sequence, the global 
satisfaction at the present is also the desirability of the sequence (e1, e2). Therefore,  
  SV = EV+CV=v(e1)+v(e2)+ v(e2-e1)    --- (6.1) 
, where SV, EV and CV denote respectively the value of a sequence, its endowment 
value, or the value derived from the endowment effects, and its contrast value, or the 
value derived from the contrast effects. The difference between EV and NV will 
emerge later in this chapter when we consider time discounting. As for now, the two 
are identical. 
This model, or TG, predicts that the more attractive the outcomes per se, the 
more attractive the later outcome compared to the earlier one, the more attractive the 
sequence is and vice versa. Eq. 6.1 incorporates the idea of backward contrast effects 
and predicts preference for improvement. The model however does not describe 
preference for spreading. This is because increasing, decreasing and constant 
sequences have positive, negative and zero CVs. It follows that holding EV constant, 
constant sequences will always be less attractive than increasing sequences. However, 
preference for spreading is an independent term in the model proposed by 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1993), as we see next. 
6.2 Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) describe negative time preferences by 
assuming that people assess sequences by comparing cumulative anticipatory utility 
they are going to receive in the future periods with cumulative recollected utility they 
have received in the past periods. Holding constant the total nominal value 
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(endowment) of a sequence, the more one receives in the past, the less one can expect 
to receive in the future. This gives rise to the idea of capturing sequence preferences 
by the so-called deviation index, expressed as 
 
, where dt is the deviation index at period t, is the difference between the utility 
accumulated till t in the hypothetical constant sequence that has the same total 
nominal value as the target sequence and the same utility in the target sequence.  
This deviation index is negative (positive) when the utility accumulates faster 
(more slowly) in the target sequence than in the constant sequence, which occurs 
when the target sequence is declining (improving). That is, the more positive the 
deviation indices, the more “improving” the sequences are and vice versa. Preference 
for spreading, on the other hand, is captured by the absolute value of the deviation 
index – they are zero when the target sequence is constant itself and the smaller the 
indices, the more “spread” the sequence, regardless of whether the values are 
improving or declining. For instance, deviation indices d1 and d2 for (1,2) are 
respectively 0.5 (=1.5-1) and 0 (=3-3), whereas these for (2,1) are -0.5 (=1.5-2) and 0 
(3-3). While the sums of dis are 0.5 and -0.5 for (1,2) and (2,1), the sums of their 
absolute values are 0.5 in both the increasing and the decreasing sequences.  
Loewenstein and Prelec express the value of a sequence as a weighted average 
of three values that capture respectively the nominal value (NV) of a sequence, the 
magnitude of improvement and the magnitude of spreading: 
 
 
--- (6.2) 
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Bounded between 1 and -1, the improvement and spreading parameters,  and , 
reflect the direction as well as the importance of improvement and spreading in 
sequence assessments. While a positive  implies a preference for improvement, a 
negative  implies a preference for spreading. That is, the modal sequence 
preferences are embodied in positive s and negative s.  
6.2.1 An example 
Consider two sequences: A (1,0,2,0,1) and B (2,1,1,0,0), where the numbers 
indicate the amount of satisfaction derived from five continuous weekends. These 
numbers conform to interval scales
5
, meaning that preferences are captured by the 
difference between two measurements with an arbitrary zero. According to the 
discounted utility model, A is less attractive than B because more desirable outcomes 
are experienced later in A than in B. However, the two modal sequence preferences, 
i.e. preferences for improvement and spreading, both predict the opposite.  
Table 6.1 shows how LP makes such a prediction. The global nominal values 
of A and B are both 4 as we are only concerned with the order of the activities rather 
than what they are. The hypothetical constant sequence therefore has values of 0.8 in 
all periods. As shown, A outperforms B in improvement, because it has a more 
positive ∑di (0 versus -5); A also outperforms B in spreading, because it has a smaller 
∑|di| (1.6 versus 5.0). Under the assumption of modal sequence preferences, i.e. 
positive  and negative , schedule (1,0,2,0,1) is more appealing than schedule 
(2,1,1,0,0). 
                                                 
5
 Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) showed their model (Eq.6.2) conforms to an interval scale.  
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  Table 6.1.  Computations of LP for Schedule A and B (Eq. 6.2). 
  t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 Sum 
The constant sequence 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 4 
∑ui 0.8 1.6 2.4 3.2 4  
       
Schedule A 1 0 2 0 1  
∑ui 1 1 3 3 4  
di -0.2 0.6 -0.6 0.2 0 0 
|di| 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.2 0 1.6 
       
Schedule B 2 1 1 0 0  
∑ui 2 3 4 4 4  
di -1.2 -1.4 -1.6 -0.8 0 -5.0 
|di| 1.2 1.4 1.6 0.8 0 5.0 
 
Consistent with this, participants in Loewenstein and Prelec (1993, Study 1) 
rated the two schedules, among a total of 30 schedules, which were all permutations 
of the same set of events (for full results see Appendix A).  The mean ratings assigned 
to A and B were 3.79 and 1.95 respectively. The overall predictive validity of LP was 
high (Pearson correlation coefficient = .835). Loewenstein and Prelec also derived 
parameter values for each participant.  The modal pattern was consistent with modal 
sequence preferences, i.e. positive s and negative s, with the mean values of =.28 
and =-.13.  These results provide support for LP. In what follows, I present the 
contrasts model, which combines insights from LP and TG. 
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6.3 The contrasts model 
One aim of the contrasts model is to distinguish between influences exerted by 
the two temporal variables, i.e. delay (d) and interval (I). As discussed in the previous 
chapters, contrast effects, interval and relatedness (R) all contribute to the relational 
value of a sequence, whereas nominal values and time delays both contribute to the 
non-relational value of a sequence. As Tversky and Griffin (Eq.6.1b), I express 
sequence preferences as an additive sum of the non-relational value (EV) and the 
relational value (CV). Relatedness and interval both reflect perceived similarity 
between the outcomes, and therefore affecting CV rather than EV. Since the more 
related the outcomes, shorter the interval, the more pronounced the contrast effects, 
CV depends on the relatedness-interval ratio, or R/I. I rewrite Eq.6.1 as: 
 
---  (6.3a) 
 
Eq.6.3a describes preferences for sequences containing just two outcomes, e1 
and e2. To generalize to sequences containing n outcomes, I assume that contrasts 
always happen between an earlier outcome and its immediate successor, which has the 
shortest interval with the earlier outcome and therefore enjoys the highest 
applicability of the contrast with the earlier outcome. With this assumption, in a 
sequence (e1, e2, e3), the global contrast consists of two between-event contrasts, one 
between e3 and e2 and one between e2 and e1.  That is, 
 
---  (6.3b). 
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As Eq.6.1b, Eq.6.3a predicts improvement but not spreading –contrast effects 
do not exist between outcomes of the same value. A solution inspired by LP is to 
employ the absolute value of CV, or |CV|, which is only zero when the target sequence 
is constant and the larger it is, the more the values vary from one period to the next. 
Eq.6.3b becomes:  
 
---  (6.3c) 
 
Note that Eq.6.3c has an identical structure as LP (Eq.6.2). The reason I denote the 
spreading parameter by ’ rather than by , as in LP, is due to a difference in how the 
two models handle preference for spreading. I discuss this in the next section.  
In application, we often encounter situations in which the outcomes have the 
same level of relatedness (i.e. a constant R) and are evenly spaced across time (i.e. 
constant I). When this happens, Eq.6.3c can be simplified as: 
 
--- (6.4) 
Sequence preferences now become a function of the ratio of between-event 
value differences and intervals. This ratio is in fact the velocity in which the value 
changes over time within a sequence. In other words, Eq.6.4 formalizes and 
generalizes Hsee and Abelson‟s (1991) velocity hypothesis that holding constant the 
amount of improvement/deterioration, the faster the value improves (deteriorates), the 
more (less) attractive the sequence becomes.  
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6.4 Model comparisons 
Derived from LP (Eq.6.2) and TG (Eq.6.1a), the contrasts model (Eq.6.4) 
share with the other two models the assumption that the value of a sequence is an 
additive sum of two values, the true, inherent value of individual events (sequence) 
independent of other events in the same sequence and the value derived from the 
shape of the sequence. Nevertheless, the contrasts model differs from its two parent 
models conceptually and practically. As a start, I decompose the model expressions 
according to the type of value captured in the individual terms (Table 6.2): 
 
Table 6.2. A comparison of the contrasts model, TG and LP. 
 Events Improve-
ment 
Spread- 
ing 
Influential 
factors  
The contrasts model (6.4) ∑v(ei) ∑cvi ∑|cvi| R, I 
Tversky and Griffin (6.1b) ∑v(ei) ∑cvi n/a n/a 
Loewenstein and Prelec (6.2) ∑ui ∑di ∑|di| n/a 
n/a: not available 
As shown, the terms describing the global value of the “events” are identical 
in all three models, which is the additive sum of the values (or utility) of the 
individual sequence events. The models differ in how they represent the shape of a 
sequence. Firstly, in the contrasts model, as in Tversky and Griffin, the shape is 
captured by the value differences between events – the more positive/negative this 
difference, the larger the magnitude of improvement/deterioration, whereas the 
smaller this difference, positive or negative, the more constant the sequence. By 
contrast in LP, the shape results in different speeds in which the values accumulate 
over time. The slower the accumulation, the more positive the deviation index di, the 
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more “improving” the sequence is and vice versa, whereas the closer the speed is to a 
constant, the smaller the |di|s, and the more “spread” the outcomes are. The contrasts 
model further hypothesizes that the shape matters more when the outcomes are more 
related or have a shorter interval. No such assumptions are made in TG or LP.  
 In practice, these conceptual differences are translated into differences in 
predictions and applications. Firstly, the contrasts model and LP, but not TG, are 
capable of describing preference for spreading. Neither can TG, in its original form, 
deal with sequences containing more than two events. Secondly, the contrasts model, 
but not TG and LP, are applicable to sequences that contain events with different 
intervals or different levels of relatedness. However, the predictions made by the 
contrasts model and LP may vary even for the same sequence due to their differences 
in the approach of describing modal sequence preferences, in particular preference for 
spreading.  
To illustrate, imagine Alice is making plans for the two upcoming weekends. 
Her options, valued at 3, 2, 1 and 0 respectively on an interval scale, are having Dim 
Sum at her favourite Chinese restaurant, visiting a friend she misses, dining at a local 
Indian restaurant and cleaning her flat. Suppose Alice prefers to do just one thing a 
day. What kind of arrangements would maximize her global satisfaction?  
Since the events are fixed, our task is to select the best ordering of the events 
from 24 (=4!) possible permutations, all having the same total nominal value. First of 
all, both the contrasts model and LP would predict (0,1,2,3) to be the most 
“improving” schedule. Any other ordering would result in faster value accumulation 
and negative between-event contrasts. The same prediction would also be made by 
TG were it applicable to four-event sequences. The contrasts model and LP however 
diverge in their judgments of how constant sequences are. As shown in Table 6.3a, 
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(2,1,0,3) deviates less from the uniform sequence than (0,1,2,3) (∑|di|=2 versus 5) 
whereas as shown in Table 6.3b, (0,1,2,3) not only maximizes improvement but also 
minimises between-event contrasts (∑|cvi|=3).  
 
Table 6.3a. Computation details of (0,1,2,3) and (2,1,3,0): LP. 
 
 
Table 6.3b. Computation details of (0,1,2,3) and (2,1,3,0): the contrasts model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  t1 t2 t3 t4 Sum 
The constant sequence 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 6 
∑ui 1.5 3 4.5 6  
      
Schedule 0 1 2 3 6 
∑ui 0 1 3 6  
di 1.5 2 1.5 0 5 
|di| 1.5 2 1.5 0 5 
      
Schedule 2 1 0 3 6 
∑ui 2 3 3 6  
di -0.5 0 1.5 0 1 
|di| 0.5 0 1.5 0 2 
  t1 t2 t3 t4 Sum 
Schedule 0 1 2 3 6 
cvi  1 1 1 3 
|cvi|  1 1 1 3 
      
Schedule 2 1 0 3 6 
cvi  -1 -1 3 1 
|cvi|  1 1 3 5 
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Which approach is better, deviation from the uniform sequence or contrasts 
between the events? It might seem easier to imagine why (0,1,2,3) is predicted to be 
more constant than  (2,1,0,3) (as predicted by the contrasts model) rather than less 
constant (as predicted by LP); but again this would depend on one‟s decision 
perspective. Decision makers depicted in the contrasts model focus on just two 
outcomes at a time. By contrast, decision makers depicted in LP make global 
assessments of past and future utility. Read et al‟s work on choice bracketing supports 
the narrow focus, which supports the approach adopted by the contrasts model.  
The simplicity of using between-event contrasts to model improvement 
however comes at a cost, i.e. the capacity of the contrasts model to capture complex 
patterns. Under the assumption of a linear value function, the sum of the between-
event contrast values is reduced to the difference between the values of the last and 
the first events (∑cv=v(en)-v(e1)). In other words, preference for sequences with the 
same total nominal value, and the same first and last events, e.g. (1,2,0,4) and 
(1,0,2,4), would rely entirely on spreading
6
.  
The contrasts model compensates this drawback by accommodating other 
types of complexity in sequence assessments. For instance, the events in Alice‟s 
scheduling decision are not evenly distributed – four events take place over the two 
weekends, hence having a one-week interval in between two one-day intervals. The 
contrasts model captures this by positing that the global assessment relies more 
heavily on the within-weekend contrasts than on the between-weekend contrast. It 
follows that (1,2,0,3), despite not strictly improving, might be just as desirable as 
(0,1,2,3), as the large improvement (from 0 to 3) in the second week may more than 
                                                 
6
 LP has similar problems when describing spreading. For instance consider (2,1,3,1) and (2,3,1,1). 
Based on the contrasts model, the two sequences are equally improving but (2,1,3,1) is worse in 
spreading. By contrast, LP would predict (2,1,3,1) to be better in both improvement and in spreading. 
While the prediction of improvement made by LP makes sense, the one of spreading is not. The 
possibility of combining the better predictors of the two models is discussed later in the chapter. 
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compensate for the negative contrast between the two weeks (from 2 to 0). 
Furthermore, the events may even have different levels of relatedness – the Chinese 
Dim Sum might be perceived as more related to the Indian dinner than to the cleaning. 
The contrasts model handling these by adjusting up or down decision weights 
assigned to various contrasts. 
Built from between-event contrast, the contrasts model can also be easily 
applied when sequence partitioning occurs. By contrasts, deviation indices have to be 
re-constructed for each segment based on the new hypothetical uniform sequences. 
Ariely and Zauberman‟s (2000) find that sub-sequences (segments) are assessed 
similarly as is the “super-sequence”, to which preference for improvement applies 
(see Chapter 2). Segmentation however causes the global assessment to rely less on 
the global pattern while more on the intensity of the segments. Once an experience is 
over, its representation no longer contains the shape of the experiences' pattern but 
only an overall summary measure. In practice, this implies a step-wise approach of 
sequence assessment. Consider (1,2,3,1,2,3), which might be assessed as ((1,2,3), 
(1,2,3)). If this happens, each sub-sequence is first assessed on its own before the 
outcomes are assessed as if they constituted a new sequence, as in (SV(1,2,3), 
SV(1,2,3)).  
6.4.1 A validation of the contrasts model  
How valid is the contrast model as a descriptive account of sequence 
preferences? To provide some preliminary evidence, I apply the contrasts model to 
the sequences reported in Study 1, Loewenstein and Prelec (1993).  
The task was to rate thirty weekend schedules, among which were the 
aforementioned two schedules, A and B. All sequences are permutations of five 
weekend activities, including one highly enjoyable event with utility of 2, two 
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mediocre events with utility of 1, and two boring events with utility of 0. Participants 
were not given specific events but asked to imagine from their own experiences 
events that might fit these utility levels.  
Table 6.4 presents the computation details of the contrasts model for Schedule 
A and B. Since the outcomes are all weekend activities and evenly spaced, 
relatedness-interval ratio is constant and Eq.6.4 is applicable. As LP, the model 
assumes a linear value function and no discounting. 
 
Table 6.4.  Computations of the contrasts model (Eq.6.4) 
 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 Sum 
Schedule A 1 0 2 0 1 4 
cvi  -1 2 -2 1 0 
|cvi|  1 2 2 1 6 
Schedule B 2 1 1 0 0 4 
cvi  -1 0 -1 0 -2 
|cvi|  1 0 1 0 2 
 
As shown in Table 6.4, the two sequences have the same endowment value 
(EV=4). Schedule A has a more positive contrast value than Schedule B (0 versus -2), 
consistent with the observation that A performs better than B in terms of improvement. 
A also scores higher than B in terms of |CV| (6 versus 2). Thus, to reflect the 
observation that A is in fact more constant than B, the spreading parameter ’ needs 
to be positive, different from the spreading parameter  in LP. This echoes the 
difference in the approach adopted in the two models discussed earlier. The contrasts 
model captures spreading by the value difference between the events such that the 
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smaller this difference the more constant the sequence. Thus, a positive rather than 
negative spreading parameter ’ would indicate preference for spreading.  
To make predictions using the contrasts model, I adopt the mean parameter 
values reported in Loewenstein and Prelec (1993), but reverse the valence of the 
spreading parameter. Using =.28 and ’=.13, the contrasts model predict estimated 
subjective values for the 30 sequences.  As shown in Appendix A, the contrasts model 
has a smaller mean squared error than LP 7  (0.99 versus 3.0) and similar overall 
validity as LP (Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.840 versus 0.835, Table 6.5).  
 
Table 6.5. Performance of LP and the contrasts model (Eq.6.4) 
 LP The contrasts model 
Improvement predictor 0.808** 0.730** 
Spreading predictor -0.241      0.440* 
The model 0.835** 0.840** 
* significant at .05 level; ** significant at .01 level 
 
Consistent with this discussion, the correlation between the spreading 
predictor and the mean ratings is positive for the contrasts model but negative for LP. 
In other words, the larger the size of the contrast effects, the more the value spreads 
across over time and vice versa. However, the performance of the individual terms in 
the two models diverges. LP outperforms the contrasts model in terms of 
improvement (R=0.808 versus 0.73); the contrasts model outperforms LP in terms of 
spreading (R= -0.241 versus 0.44). Combining the superior predictor in each model 
                                                 
7
 Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) reported slightly different results. The reason is that they made 
predictions using parameter values fitted for individual participants. Since such data were not available, 
for the sake of comparison reasons, I made predictions for both the contrasts model and LP using the 
mean estimates of  and  (’).  
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creates a “hybrid” model that has the improvement predictor of LP ((∑d), the 
spreading predictor of the contrasts model (∑|cv|) and the common expression of EV. 
This model achieves the highest predictive validity (R=0.87). 
This investigation also reveals a common weakness shared by LP and the 
contrasts model. Neither model accurately predicts the sequence that participants 
found the most attractive, i.e. (1,0,1,0,2). The choice of the contrast model is 
(0,1,0,1,2), whereas the choice of LP is (0,0,1,1,2). It is easy to see why. Compared to 
these two, (1,0,1,0,2) arranges a mediocre experience to take place before a boring 
one. Its preference implies impatience, or positive time preference, which incurs 
penalties in both models. To provide a remedy for the contrasts model, I incorporate 
discounting in Eq.6.1, as we see next. 
6.4.2 Incorporating time discounting 
First of all, discounting is fostered by time delay. As a non-relational variable, 
delay affects EV but not CV or |CV|. Bounded between zero and 1, the discount 
parameter δi captures the proportion of value remained of for event ei as a result of its 
time delay
8
. The discount parameter embodies the idea of positive time preference for 
isolated outcomes. It is 1 for the immediate outcomes with a delay of 0; it is less than 
1 but greater than 0 if the outcomes are removed from the present. We revise Eq.6.4 
as 
 
--- (6.5) 
 
                                                 
8
 The discount parameter in the contrasts model differs from the one in DU. In the contrasts model, 
each discount parameter can only describe the value decay of the event to which it is attached. By 
contrasts, the discount parameter in DU is used to determine the value decay of any future outcome by 
means of some fixed expression, such as the one for computing NPV (see Chapter 2). 
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At this stage, it is important to distinguish between endowment value (EV) 
and nominal value (NV) – EV is the discounting-adjusted NV.  In other words, these 
two are only identical if we do not consider time discounting. 
To see how Eq. 6.5 works, consider (1,0,1,0,2), the most attractive schedule in 
Study 1. Assume δ to be 1 for the first week and 0.8 for all the rest, which means 
outcomes that take place in the future weeks are valued 80% of their original worth. 
Table 6.6 shows the computation details of the model (Eq.6.5). As shown, Schedule 
(1,0,1,0,2) now has a slightly higher EV than either (0,1,0,1,2) or (0,0,1,1,2) (3.4 
versus 3.2). This EV, combined with CV and |CV|, along with parameter =.28 and 
’=.13, predicts a preference for (1,0,1,0,2) over the other two schedules (4.33 versus 
4.28 and 4.02).  
 
Table 6.6.  Computations of the discounting-adjusted contrasts model (Eq.6.5) 
  t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 EV SV 
 δi  1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8   
(1,0,1,0,2) 1 0 1 0 2   
discounted 1 0 0.8 0 1.6 3.4 4.33 
cvi  -1 1 -1 2 1  
|cvi|  1 1 1 2 5  
(0,1,0,1,2) 0 1 0 1 2   
discounted 0 0.8 0 0.8 1.6 3.2 4.28 
  1 -1 1 1 2  
  1 1 1 1 4  
(0,0,1,1,2) 0 0 1 1 2   
discounted 0 0 0.8 0.8 1.6 3.2 4.02 
  0 1 0 1 2  
    0 1 0 1 2   
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Since the contrasts model does not place constraints on how a sequence 
outcome should be discounted, it can make divergent predictions in terms of how 
sequence preferences might change with delay. To illustrate, consider two two-event 
sequences (0, 2) and (2, 0), when they are either “near” or “distant” in the following 
three scenarios: A, B and C (the bottom part of Table 6.7).  
 
Table 6.7. Influences of delay on preference for improvement 
 δ1 δ2 EV δ1 δ2 EV δ1 δ2 EV δ1 δ2 EV 
  1 1  1 0.9  0.9 0.8  0.9 0.85  
(2,0) 2 0 2 2 0 2 1.8 0 1.8 1.8 0 1.8 
(0,2) 0 2 2 0 1.8 1.8 0 1.6 1.6 0 1.7 1.7 
A Near  Distant        
B    Near  Distant     
C    Near     Distant  
 
Scenario A, B and C have different combinations of discount parameters, δ1 
for the first outcome and δ2 for the second outcome. δ1 is at least as large as δ2, 
indicating a positive time preference, that is, longer delays result in greater 
discounting. As can be seen in the bottom half of Table 6.7, the discount parameters 
for the first and second outcomes in Scenario A are both 1 in the near condition, but 1 
and 0.9 in the distant condition. In other words, delay exacerbates the discounting of 
the more distant outcome. In Scenario B, δ1 and δ2 are 1 and 0.9 when the outcomes 
are near, but 0.9 and 0.8 (or approximately 0.9*0.9) when distant. That is, delay has 
roughly the same impact on the two outcomes. In Scenario C, δ1 and δ2 are 1 and 0.9, 
and 0.9 and 0.85 in the near and distant conditions, indicating that delay has a larger 
impact on the first outcome than on the second
9
.  
                                                 
9
 The pattern of discounting in Scenario B and Scenario C exemplifies classic exponential discounting 
and hyperbolic discounting respectively. 
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Regardless of how distant the sequences are, the degree of improvement 
remains the same (the signed value difference is either 2 or -2). Therefore the contrast 
model predicts that the preference between (0,2) and (2,0) is determined by their 
respective endowment values (EV), which in this case depends on how the outcomes 
are delayed. Scenario A B and C represent three cases in which delay might reduce, 
have no impact on and actually enhance preference for improvement. In Scenario A, 
The EV difference is larger in the distant condition than in the near condition (0=2-2 
versus 0.2=2-1.8), making (2,0) more attractive relative to (0,2) when the sequences 
are delayed. In Scenario B, this difference remains the same over time (0.2 in both). 
In Scenario C, this difference is however smaller in the distant condition (0.2 versus 
0.1=1.8-1.7), making (0,2) even more attractive. In summary, for sequence (time) 
preferences as simple as the ones we postulate here, delay weakens/enhances/has no 
impact on preference for improvement if the later outcome suffers from a larger/a 
smaller/the same amount of value decay compared to the earlier outcome. 
 
6.5 Looking ahead 
The remaining chapters of this thesis (Chapter 7, 8, 9, 10) report experiments 
that test the validity of the contrasts model. The following things are worth noting: 
 
Two-event sequences  I employ two-event sequences to investigate influences 
of delay, interval and relatedness. This is to maximize the salience and therefore the 
impact of relatedness and interval, which is the focus of this investigation.  
 
Constant parameter  I assume that the improvement and spreading 
parameters,  and ’, as well as the discount paramter δ, all remain constant in a 
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given experiment. This essentially means that people‟s sequence (time) preferences 
remain stable in a given decision context.  
 
Linear value function I adopt a linear value function for simplicity. This is a 
reasonable assumption as most often the experiments investigate only small range of 
values. When such assumption is questionable, their consequences are discussed.  
 
No interactions between delay, interval and relatedness I consider only first-order 
effects in the contrasts model. That is, delay does not influence perceived interval or 
relatedness. In other words, I do no consider more complex effects such as time 
contraction, which implies that delay can affect perceptions of interval, and thereby 
contrast effects and discounting of the later outcomes.  
 
 The main prediction of the contrasts model is that sequence preferences 
depend on both the endowment and the contrast effects. Endowment effects in turn 
depend on the nominal values of the individual outcomes and their respective time 
delays; contrast effects depend on the signed value difference between the adjacent 
outcomes, their interval and relatedness. Under the assumption of the modal sequence 
preferences, a larger relatedness-interval ratio makes increasing sequences more 
attractive and decreasing sequences less attractive. That is, preference for 
improvement is enhanced. An overview of the experiments is shown in Table 6.8:  
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Table 6.8. Overview of the experiments. 
 
Task To provide evidence for the hypothesis that 
The ranking task (Chapter 7) The trend (signed value difference) matters 
The sequence judgment task 
(Chapter 8) 
Interval (I) and relatedness (R) affect trend 
preferences 
The interpersonal (social) 
judgment (Chapter 9) 
Interpersonal and intrapersonal contrasts are similar 
The scheduling task (Chapter 9) Delay and interval can affect sequence preferences 
simultaneously 
The happiness task (Chapter 10) Endowment (EV) and contrast effects (CV) coexist 
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Chapter 7  THE RANKING TASK 
7.0 Introduction 
The contrasts model posits that the value of a sequence consists of the 
endowment value and the contrast value. The endowment value is a function of the 
nominal value and delay; the contrast value depends on the signed value difference, 
interval and relatedness. As a start, this chapter investigates influences of the signed 
value difference between outcomes, that is, when the outcomes are embedded in two-
outcome sequences. Positive, zero and negative value differences correspond to 
increasing, constant and decreasing sequences. Existing research shows that 
preference for improvement (i.e. positive β) holds for sequences containing only two 
outcomes. For instance, a preference for “happy endings” (Ross & Simonson, 1991) 
refers to the finding that participants strongly preferred those sequences ended with a 
gain to those ended with a loss, despite the same total nominal value (NV). 
Lowenstein and Prelec (1993) reported similar results. Under the assumption of 
positive β, I hypothesize:  
H1.1 Effects of positive contrast value 
The more positive the signed value difference, the more attractive the 
sequence is perceived and vice versa. 
I test H1.1 using a ranking task of two-event monetary sequences. 
7.1 The ranking task 
Methods 
Subjects. Fifty-six students studying at the London School of Economics were 
randomly approached on the campus. They were unpaid.  
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Methods. Each sequence consisted of two unexpected monetary outcomes that 
occurred over a period of two days, i.e. one event on each day. Two groups of 
sequences were created. The “positive” group consisted of five sequences, each 
composed of two gains with a constant nominal value of £500. As an example, the 
positive sequence (250, 250) was described as:  
 
One day, you experience an unexpected gain of £250.  
The next day, you experience another unexpected gain of £250. 
 
The “mixed” group consisted of six sequences, each composed of one gain and one 
loss, with a constant nominal value of zero, e.g. (-200, 200). Table 7.1 lists all the 
sequences in the two groups, in the order they were presented to the participants
10
 and 
also the signed value difference of each sequence. 
 
Table 7.1. Stimulus sequences in the ranking task 
Positive v(e2-e1)  Mixed v(e2-e1) 
(100, 400) 300  (-200, 200) 400 
(400, 100) -300  (200, -200) -400 
(200, 300) 100  (-100, 100) 200 
(300, 200) -100  (100, -100) -200 
(250, 250) 0  (-250, 250) 500 
   (250, -250) -500 
 
                                                 
10
 The fixed presentation order could result in an order effect, as we see later. 
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Each participant was given a two-page questionnaire, one group of sequences 
on each page. Half of the participants encountered the positive sequences first and the 
other half the mixed sequences first. They were instructed to rank the desirability of 
these sequences by assigning “1” to the sequence they perceived as the most attractive, 
“2” to the sequence as the second most attractive, and so on. I attach the questionnaire 
as Appendix B. 
Results 
All fifty-six participants completed the rankings for the positive sequences 
(n=56); all but three participants completed the rankings for the mixed sequences 
(n=53). Tie ranks appeared only twice in all the responses and were subsequently 
included in the analyses.  
The hypothesized positive contrasts (Table 7.1) predict a preference for 
improvement or negative time preference. In terms of the rank order of the events, this 
leads to a preference for (-250,250), (-200, 200), (-100,100), (100, -100), (200, -200), 
(250, -250) in the mixed sequences, and (100, 400), (200, 300), (250, 250), (300, 200), 
(400, 100) in the positive sequences. The exact opposite (the reversed rank-orders) 
would indicate a positive time preference.  
Table 7.2a and 7.2b present the number of participants who assign the row 
rankings to the column sequences within each group. As shown, out of 53 participants 
who complete the rankings of the mixed sequence, twenty-six rank (-250, 250) as the 
most attractive, whereas nine rank the sequence as the least attractive. The modal 
ranking of each sequence is underscored. In both the mixed and positive conditions, 
the modal rankings match the predictions of negative time preferences. At the global 
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level, this preference predicts 28% (or 15 out of 53) of all the rankings observed in the 
mixed condition and 32% (or 18 out of 56) of those in the positive condition. 
Table 7.2a. Rankings of the “mixed” group (n=53) 
Rankings (-250, 250) (-200, 200) (-100, 100) (100, -100) (200, -200) (250, -250) 
1 26 6 4 4 5 13 
2 5 24 5 4 11 4 
3 5 3 24 14 5 2 
4 4 4 15 24 2 4 
5 4 8 3 2 28 6 
6 9 8 2 5 2 24 
 
Table 7.2b. Rankings of the “positive” group (n=56) 
Rankings (100, 400) (200, 300) (250, 250) (300, 200) (400, 100) 
1 29 4 5 4 14 
2 5 29 1 14 8 
3 4 12 30 7 3 
4 1 10 9 29 6 
5 17 1 11 2 25 
 
Despite the support for the hypothesis, there is a large number of inconsistent 
rankings. As can shown in Table 7.2, the second most popular ranking reflects 
positive time preferences, i.e. the opposite of preference for improvement, which 
predicts 15% and 13% of all the observed rankings respectively in the mixed and 
positive conditions. Assuming a participant is equally likely to have positive, negative 
and neither positive nor negative time preferences, a chi-square test reveals 
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significance, χ2(3) = 29.77, p<.000111 . Figure 7.1 presents the distribution of the 
rankings. 
 
0%
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30%
40%
50%
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Preference for
improvement
Positive time
preference
neither
Mixed sequences
Positive sequences
 
Figure 7.1. Distribution of the observed rank-orders in the ranking task. 
 
In fact, over half of the rankings (57% of the mixed group and 55% of the 
positive group) fall in the category of “neither positive nor negative time preferences”. 
A closer look reveals that these rankings, collectively known as the “irregular”, 
exhibited no distinct patterns. For the mixed group, 30 participants produce 26 
different rankings and for the positive group, 31 participants produce 22 different 
rankings. In other words, each irregular ranking is produced by no more than two 
participants.  
To see whether the irregular rankings were in part driven by positive and 
negative time preferences, I correlate each of these rankings with the ones predicted 
by positive time preference. A more positive/negative Pearson correlation coefficient 
is taken as indicating a higher likelihood this ranking is driven by positive/negative 
time preferences. The mean correlation coefficients are -0.23 and -0.07 respectively 
                                                 
11
 Unless otherwise stated, all statistical analyses reported in this thesis are two-tailed. 
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for the mixed and positive sequences, suggesting a general preference for 
improvement, which is more pronounced when sequences contain gains as well as 
losses. In fact, the modal rankings of the mixed sequences still conform to a 
preference for improvement, i.e. the same as in Table 7.2a. The one in the positive 
group is however (100, 400), (400,100), (200,300), (300, 200), (250, 250), from the 
best to the worst. 
This procedure also allows us to gain insights into rankings at the individual-
level. Having correlated all the rankings with the predictions of positive time 
preferences for the mixed and positive sequences, I then compute the absolute 
difference between the two correlation coefficients for all the individuals who have 
ranked both types of sequences and produced no tie ranks. The idea is that the smaller 
this difference, as indicated by the length of bar in Figure 7.2, the more the rankings 
in the two conditions are driven by the same factors, and vice versa.  
 
 
Figure 7.2. Individual differences in ranking the mixed and positive sequences. 
Each bar indicates the difference in the rankings of the positive and mixed sequences 
for an individual participant. The longer the bar, the more different the rankings are. 
Bars with maximum length (2 or -2) indicate that rankings are motivated by opposing 
time preferences. Bars with zero length indicate that the rankings are motivated by the 
same preference.  
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As shown in Figure 7.2, there are large discrepancies (long bars) within the 
same individual (x-axis). Consistent with this, the overall Pearson correlation of the 
correlation coefficients for each of the two conditions is low, R=0.29. Only 10 out of 
53 participants are consistent in the two tasks (bar length=0), while three display 
opposing preferences (bar length =2).  
Discussion 
H1.1 receives support from the results. The signed value difference 
(preference for improvement) predicts the most frequently observed rankings in 
sequences that contain only gains as well as in those that contain a gain and a loss. 
However, a large proportion of participants also exhibit positive time preference. 
Positive and negative time preferences together predict nearly half of all the observed 
rankings (43%=28%+15% for the mixed sequences and 45%=32%+13% for the 
positive sequences). This means that the larger the value difference between the 
outcomes, the more extreme one‟s preferences become. 
Several things are worth noting. First, preference for improvement seems more 
pronounced in the mixed group than in the positive group. Participants are also not 
inclined to rank the two different types of sequences similarly. Although the 
proportions of participants exhibit preference for improvement are similar (32% in the 
positive group versus 28% in the mixed group), only in the mixed group does the 
modal rankings of the “irregular” group conform to the preference for improvement. 
By contrast, the modal responses to the positive group coincide with the presentation 
order of the sequences (Table 7.1), signalling lack of any preference. One explanation 
might be that the magnitude of contrast effects is larger in the mixed group than in the 
positive group. This magnitude effect could even be exacerbated by loss-aversion 
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(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) that the contrast between a gain and a loss (e.g. 200 and 
-200) could be more pronounced than one between two gains (e.g. 400 and 0).  
Second, positive time preference receives support, implying “discounting by 
interval” (Read, 2001b; Read & Roelofsma, 2003) with the earlier outcome in the 
sequence. This is unexpected (but see (Frederick & Loewenstein, 2008)), especially 
when compared to previous investigations of similar sequences, e.g. Ross and 
Simonson (1991). This is made even more surprising by the fact that the interval 
between the outcomes is one day, making value decay hard to justify. Further, the 
timing of the outcomes is ambiguous – participants may interpret it as outcomes 
occurring in the past or in the future. If outcomes have occurred, then the second, later 
outcome is actually closer to the present than the first, earlier outcome, in which case 
the improvement is predicted by both contrast effects and positive time preference and 
should therefore received stronger support than it does now. Since the support is 
actually weaker than expected, most participants seem to believe that the outcomes 
occur in the future.  
Compared to preference for improvement, preference for spreading receives 
little support. The constant sequence (250,250) was ranked the highest by 9% of the 
participants (or 5); the mixed sequences with the smallest contrast value, i.e. (-100, 
100) and (100, -100), were ranked at the top by 8% of the participants (or 4) each. 
Given the design of the experiment, this is hardly surprising. For two outcomes 
distributed over a period of two days, the “convenience” achieved by spreading the 
outcomes is minimal (see Chapter 2). 
7.2 Summary 
The ranking task provides evidence for preference for improvement when the 
sequences contain just two outcomes. Other things being equal, the more positive this 
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difference, the more attractive the sequence becomes. This holds for sequences 
containing only gains as well as a mixture of gains and losses. There is no evidence 
for preference for spreading.  
It is worth noting that due to the control on the total nominal value (NV), the 
signed value difference has a perfect positive correlation with the value of the second 
outcome in the sequence. I attribute the observed preference for improvement to the 
value difference and therefore the contrast effect but it is possible that this preference 
in fact comes from the desire to have the later outcome as desirable as possible. To 
assume no contrasts, we would have to assume that participants ignore the control on 
the total nominal value such that an increase in the value of the later outcome is 
always accompanied by a decrease in the value of the earlier outcome. This is 
problematic not only because such ignorance seems highly unlikely but also because 
even if this were indeed the case, participants would have exhibited a positive time 
preference, that is, a desire to have the earlier rather than the later outcome as 
desirable as possible, inconsistent with the dominant finding.  
The flaw in the design of the experiment however needs to be remedied. In 
Chapter 8, I seek to prove that the global assessment indeed depends on interactions 
between the outcomes by testing influences of the relatedness and interval, in addition 
to the signed value difference (i.e. the trend). 
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Chapter 8   INTRA- AND INTER-PERSONAL CONTRASTS 
8.0 Introduction 
The contrasts model predicts that two relational variables hypothesized in the 
model, namely relatedness (R) and interval (I), affect sequence preferences via 
exerting influences on contrast effects. One aim of this chapter is to test this claim. 
Another aim is to examine a postulate made in Chapter 4 that context effects between 
two outcomes occurring to the same person (i.e. intrapersonal, intertemporal or 
sequential outcomes) parallel context effects between two outcomes occurring to two 
different persons (i.e. interpersonal or social outcomes).  For these reasons, I report in 
this chapter two studies: one sequence judgment task that investigates influences of 
relatedness and interval, and one social judgment task that adopts an almost identical 
design to allow for a comparison between context effects in the two different types of 
judgment tasks.  
8.1 General methods 
The outcomes are monetary gains – an intertemporal task that solicits 
sequence preferences and an interpersonal task that solicits preferences for 
interpersonal experiences. I manipulate three independent variables, which are (1) the 
valence of the contrast effect (positive, null, negative), (2) the domain relatedness of 
the gains (two related working bonuses, unrelated working bonus and lottery win) 
and (3) the interval between the gains (received on the same day or half-day interval, 
one-day interval, or one-week interval).  
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In the sequence assessment task, participants assess the satisfaction of a 
hypothetical decision maker, Mr A, who has just received a fixed total amount 
(nominal value) over two days that are either related or unrelated, segregated by either 
one of the three intervals. In this context, a positive, null or negative contrast 
corresponds to a sequence of gains either increasing in magnitude, remaining constant 
or decreasing.  The design of the experiment is 3 Trend x 2 Domain x 3 Interval 
within-subjects. 
In the interpersonal judgment task, participants assess the satisfaction of Mr A, 
who has just received a gain when his colleague, Mr B, also has received a gain either 
related or unrelated to the gain received by Mr A, either on the same day or has a one 
week interval. In this context, a positive, null or negative contrast indicates that Mr 
B‟s gain is smaller than, the same as, or larger than Mr A‟s gain. The design of this 
experiment is 3 Amount x 2 Domain x 2 Interval within-subjects. 
These arrangements give rise to a total number of 18 (=3x2x3) sequences of 
gains received by Mr A in the intertemporal task and 12 (=3x2x2) isolated gains 
received by Mr B in the interpersonal task. In both cases, the same participant 
assesses either all the sequences or all the individual gains. Such a design can entail a 
large number of comparisons both within and between the three independent variables. 
To facilitate these comparisons, I group the gains that have the same valence together 
and present them in a matrix. So the intertemporal gains are grouped based on their 
trend, i.e. either increasing, constant or decreasing and the intertemporal gains are 
grouped based on their level of amount, i.e. either positive, null, or negative. Within 
each matrix, the relatedness and interval between the gains are presented in the first 
two columns; and the last column is left blank so participants can fill in satisfaction 
ratings. I use a 9-point scale, with “1” indicating the least happiness and “9” 
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indicating the most happiness. Sample matrices are presented below. I counterbalance 
the presentation order of the matrices, columns and rows within each matrix. 
The contrast model predict for both the intra- and inter-personal judgments (1) 
the contrast effect or the effect of the signed value difference and (2) the moderating 
effect of relatedness and interval on the contrast effect. In what follows, I discuss each 
study in turn, starting with the sequence judgment task. 
8.2 The sequence judgment task 
The contrasts model makes the following predictions for the sequence 
judgment task:  
H2.1 The contrast effect 
The more positive (negative) the signed value difference, the more 
pronounced the contrast effects, the more (less) desirable the sequences 
are, and vice versa.  
 
H2.2 The relatedness effect on trend 
The more related the outcomes, the more pronounced the contrast effects 
are, and vice versa. 
 
H2.3a  The interval effect on trend 
The shorter the interval, the more pronounced the contrast effects are, and 
vice versa. 
 
Since the contrast value is a function of the relatedness-interval ratio (R/I), interval 
can only influence contrasts if the outcomes are related:  
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H2.3b  Relatedness moderates the interval effect 
The interval effect (H2.3a) is more pronounced for related events than for 
unrelated events. 
Methods 
Subjects. A total number of 138 undergraduates, 47 (35%) females, studying at a 
large university in Shanghai, China took part in this study. They received and returned 
the questionnaires (written in Microsoft Word®) to the experimenter by email. They 
were between 19 and 24 year-old and were unpaid.  
 
Methods. The design was 3 Trend (increase, constant, decrease) x 2 Domain 
(related, unrelated) x 3 Interval (half-day, one day, one week) within-subjects. 
Participants rated the satisfaction of Mr A who has received two gains worth in total 
4,000RMB
12
 (approx. £266) on two separate occasions: either 1,500 on Day 1 and 
2,500 on Day 2 (the increasing trend), or 2,000 on both days (the constant trend), or 
2,500 on Day 1 and 1,500 on Day 2 (the decreasing trend). Table 8.1 shows the 
sample matrix that was used to solicit the ratings of six increasing sequences. 
In addition to the within-subjects factors, I tested a between-factor called 
scenario “ownership”13. Sixty-eight participants were randomly allocated to the “high-
ownership” condition and judged “How you would feel” about the gains by imagining 
they were Mr A. The rest of the participants, seventy in total, were allocated to the 
“low-ownership” group and judged “How Mr. A would feel”. The ownership 
condition was included to test the impact of two common but different ways of 
                                                 
12
 This was roughly the average monthly salary a Chinese undergraduate expected to earn in Shanghai 
when the study was conducted in 2005 when the study was done. 
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soliciting sequence preferences. I translated the questionnaire to English and 
attached it as Appendix C. 
 
Table 8.1. The assessment of the increasing sequences  
Source of Income 
(Domain) 
Received 
(Interval) 
Increasing Incomes 
1500 and 2500 
Two bonuses On the same day  
Two bonuses Over two days  
Two bonuses Over a week  
One bonus & One lottery win On the same day  
One bonus & One lottery win Over two days  
One bonus & One lottery win Over a week  
 
Results 
The within-effects I analyze the ratings using a repeated measure Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) model. Table 8.2a and 8.2b present the results. I employ the 
rating difference between the increasing and decreasing sequences as a measurement 
of preference for improvement and the rating difference between the increasing 
(decreasing) sequence and the constant sequence (with a constant contrast value of 0) 
as a measurement of positive (negative) contrast effects. 
Main effects  Consistent with the contrast effect hypothesized in H2.1, the 
mean rating is the highest for the increasing trend (7.47), followed by the constant 
trend (7.13), and then by the decreasing trend (6.40), F(2,272)=66.726, p<.0001, 
η
2=.327. The negative contrast effect (-0.73=6.40-7.13) is more than twice the size of 
the positive contrast effect (0.34=7.47-7.13). 
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Table 8.2a. Mean Ratings and standard deviations (N=138) 
Domain Interval Increase Constant Decrease Means 
(1500, 2500) (2000, 2000) (2500, 1500)  
  Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.  
Same Same day 7.65 1.32 7.22 1.46 5.89 2.31 6.92 
Same Day 7.37 1.24 7.02 1.32 6.07 1.7 6.82 
Same Week 6.92 1.17 6.60 1.28 5.94 1.56 6.49 
Means  7.31  6.95  5.97  6.74 
Different Same day 7.92 1.31 7.61 1.45 6.89 1.92 7.47 
Different Day 7.64 1.23 7.39 1.32 6.83 1.74 7.29 
Different Week 7.33 1.25 6.95 1.41 6.76 1.62 7.01 
Means  7.63  7.32  6.83  7.26 
 Same day 7.79  7.42  6.39  7.20 
 Day 7.51  7.21  6.45  7.05 
 Week 7.13  6.78  6.35  6.75 
Overall  7.47  7.13  6.40  7.00 
 
Table 8.2b. ANOVA model results (within-subjects) 
Source df F Sig. η2 Hypothesis 
Trend 2, 272 66.726 0.000 .327 H2.1 
Domain 1, 136 80.089 0.000 .370 N.H. 
Interval 2, 272 38.983 0.000 .222 N.H. 
Trend × Domain 2, 272 26.247 0.000 .161 H2.2 
Trend × Interval 4, 544 16.4 0.000 .108 H2.3a 
Trend × Domain × Interval 4, 544 2.616 0.034 .019 H2.3b 
N.H. Not Hypothesized 
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Interactions  The significant three-way interaction (Trend×Domain×Interval) 
and two-way interactions (Trend×Domain and Trend×Interval) provide evidence for 
the hypothesized relatedness and interval effect on trend, i.e. H2.3a, H2.2, and H2.3b. 
The interactions are depicted in Figure 8.1, Panel A (the related condition) and Panel 
B (the unrelated condition). I discuss each in turn.  
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Figure 8.1.  Domain × Interval × Trend 
 
First, the interaction between the interval and the trend (F(4,544)=16.4, 
p<.0001, η2 =.108) provides evidence for the hypothesized interval effect (H2.3a) that 
the rating difference between the increasing and decreasing sequences, which 
indicates the magnitude of a preference for improvement, is larger when the gains are 
temporally near (1.40=7.79-6.39 for the half-day interval) than when the gains are 
temporally distant (.78=7.13-6.35 for the one week interval), t(137)=4.43, p<.001. 
This interval effect also holds for the related gains (1.76=7.65-5.89 versus .98=6.92-
5.94) as well as for the unrelated ones (1.03=7.92-6.89 versus .57=7.33-6.76). 
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Second, the interaction between the domain and the trend (F(4,544)=26.247, 
p<.0001, η2 =.161) provides evidence for the hypothesized relatedness effect (H2.2) 
that the rating difference is larger between the related gains (1.34=7.31-5.97) than 
between the unrelated gains (0.8=7.63-6.83), t(137)=5.717, p<.001. 
Third, the three-way interaction between Trend, Domain and Relatedness, 
F(4,544)= 2.16, p<.04, η2 =.019 provides support for H2.3b that the interval effect 
depends on relatedness. That is, the rating difference between the increasing and 
decreasing sequences decreases more with interval when the gains are related 
(0.78=1.76-0.98) than when they are unrelated (0.46=1.03-0.57). 
In addition to these, I also observe two unexpected main effects. First, 
receiving two working bonuses are judged to be less attractive than receiving one 
working bonus and one lottery win (6.74 versus 7.26) at all levels of interval and 
trend, F(1,136)=80.089, p<.0001, η2=.370. Second, receiving gains that are 
temporally near is more desirable than those temporally distant. The mean ratings are 
respectively 7.20, 7.05 and 6.75 when the intervals are half-day, one day and one 
week, F(2,272)=38.983, p<.0001. However, a closer look at the ratings reveals that 
this interval effect holds for the increasing gains (0.66=7.79-7.13, t(137)=7.556, 
p<.001) as well as for the constant gains (0.64=7.42-6.78, t(137)=7.556, p<.001), but 
not for the decreasing gains (0.04=6.39-6.35, t(137)=.1.508, p=.134). 
 
The between-effects  The experiment manipulates the “situation ownership” 
(Table 8.3 & Fig.8.2). Those who imagine receiving the gains themselves (the high-
ownership condition) derive higher satisfaction than those who imagine Mr A 
receiving the gains (the low-ownership condition), mean ratings 7.25 versus 6.76, 
F(1,136) = 6.395, p<.02. However, As shown in Figure 8.2, the “ownership effect” 
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holds for the decreasing sequences (6.06 versus 6.75, t(136)=2.6, p<.05), as well as 
the increasing sequences (7.26 versus 7.69, t(136)=2.36, p<.05), but not for the 
constant sequences (6.96 versus 7. 30, n.s.).  
 
Table 8.3. The ownership effect in the sequence judgment task 
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Figure 8.2. The ownership effect in the sequence judgment task 
 
Discussion 
The results provide support for backward contrast effects on sequence 
assessments. As in the ranking task, increasing sequences that have positive contrast 
values are preferred to decreasing sequences that have negative contrast values (H2.1). 
Evidence that such preference is driven by comparisons between the outcomes rather 
  Low High 
Increase 7.26 7.69 
constant 6.96 7.30 
decrease 6.06 6.75 
Means 6.76 7.25 
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than purely by preferences for individual outcomes come from influences exerted by 
the two relational variables that depict outcome relationships, i.e. their domain 
relatedness and temporal interval. The results show that the trend effect is more 
pronounced, that is, the value gap between the increasing and decreasing sequences is 
larger, when the outcomes are of the same than different kinds (H2.2) as well as when 
the interval between the outcomes is short than long (H2.3a). This interval effect is 
also more pronounced for the related gains than for the unrelated outcomes (H2.3b). 
Note that the interval effect persists even when the gains are “unrelated” (Fig.8.1), 
indicating that some level of outcome integrity is retained between working bonuses 
and lottery wins. This happens presumably because the gains, despite differing in 
terms of the source, are both money received by the same individual. 
Evidence of loss-aversion emerges (Kahneman & Tversky, 1976). The 
negative contrast between a larger earlier gain and a smaller later gain has a much 
larger and detrimental impact on the global assessment than the positive contrast of 
the same nominal value, using the ratings assigned to the constant sequences as the 
benchmark (Fig.8.1).  
Loss-aversion might even interfere with the ownership effect. When 
participants imagine that they were Mr A and receive the gains themselves, their 
satisfaction improves in all three trends, especially in the decreasing sequences. Since 
the value gap between the increasing and decreasing sequences comes only from their 
differences in the contrast values, one explanation is that imagining one‟s own gains 
has a similar impact as a long time delay – they both enhance outcome integrity and 
foster the integrated model of assessments (Chapter 3). As a result, the inherent worth 
of the gains (i.e. the endowment) becomes more important in the global assessments 
relative to the comparison between the individual gains (i.e. the contrast or the trend 
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effect). An alternative account is that the high-ownership condition enhances the 
vividness of the gains. This results in time discounting (Mischel, Shoda, et al., 1989), 
making the decreasing trend more attractive. Since the timing of the gains is actually 
ambiguous, this account suggests the delay of the second outcome is assessed based 
on that of the first, implying “discounting by interval” (Read, 2001b; Read & 
Roelofsma, 2003). Further, if the vividness does increase as a result of the ownership, 
imagining one‟s own losses should have a symmetric effect, exerting a detrimental 
effect on one‟s satisfaction compared to imagining losses of some irrelevant 
individuals. Future investigation can test these hypotheses. 
This investigation also demonstrates influences exerted by relatedness and 
interval on their own, in addition to their interactions with the contrast (the trend). 
Sequences are more attractive if they consist one working bonus and one lottery win 
rather than two working bonuses. One explanation is that lottery wins carry an 
element of luck, making people happier compared to working bonuses of the same 
amount
14
. An alternative account comes from Linville and Fischer‟s (1991a) notion of 
limited coping capacities that for large gains, people prefer to distribute them across 
time, which is however weaker for the gains from different domains. In other words, 
spreading could take place both on time or in terms of the kind (see Chapter 2).  
However, while this “preference for spreading” explains the main effect of 
relatedness, it contradicts the main effect of interval. Participants prefer temporally 
near gains to those distant, as long as the gains are increasing or constant but not 
when the gains come in a decreasing trend as in (2500, 1500). This could result from 
several “conflicting motives” associated with interval. First, longer intervals protect 
participants with limited coping capacities from being overwhelmed by the gains. 
                                                 
14
 I thank Peter Ayton and Nick Chater for pointing this out. 
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Second, longer intervals decrease the magnitude of the contrasts (H2.3a). Third, due 
to “discounting by interval”, longer intervals mean the first gain is discounted more 
and therefore have a detrimental effect on the endowment of the first gain. For 
increasing and constant sequences of gains, only the first account predicts a 
preference for longer intervals, whereas for the decreasing sequences, both the first 
and the second accounts predict a preference for longer intervals.  
8.3 The social judgment task 
This experiment examines contrast effects when people assess an isolated gain 
received by one person (Mr A) in the context of a gain received by another person 
(Mr B). The same four hypotheses hold: 
 
H3.1  The contrast effects in social judgments 
The more positive (negative) the target experience compared to the 
contextual experience, the more (less) attractive the target is. 
 
H3.2  Relatedness moderates the contrast effects 
The more/less related the target and contextual experiences, the more/less 
pronounced the contrast effects are.  
 
H3.3a  Interval moderates the contrast effects 
The shorter (longer) the interval between the target and contextual 
experiences, the more (less) pronounced the contrast effects are. 
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H3.3b  Relatedness moderates the interval effect 
The interval effect (H3.3a) is more pronounced if the target and contextual 
experiences are related rather than unrelated.  
 
Methods 
Subjects. Twenty-seven Chinese undergraduates, 12 (45%) females, studying at 
a large technological university in China participated in this study. They received and 
returned the questionnaires (written in Microsoft Word®) to the experimenter by 
email. They were between 19 and 22 years and were unpaid.   
 
Table 8.4. A sample matrix of the interpersonal judgment task 
         If Mr B receives on the same day… 
Source of Income 
(Domain) 
Worth 
(RMB) 
How happy is Mr. A? 
 
A Bonus 2500  
A Bonus 2000  
A Bonus 1500  
A Lottery win 2500  
A Lottery win 2000  
A Lottery win 1500  
 
Methods. I employed a 3 Amount (more, less, the same) x 2 Domain (related, 
unrelated) x 2 Interval (half-day, one week) within-subject design. Participants rated 
the happiness of Mr A after receiving a working bonus of 2,000 RMB (approx. £123), 
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when Mr B, his officemate, received either a working bonus or a lottery win, either on 
the same day or in the same week, that was either at a higher amount (2,500 RMB), 
the same (1,500 RMB) or lower (2,000 RMB). Table 8.3 shows a sample matrix. I 
translated the questionnaire from Chinese to English and attached it as Appendix D. 
Results 
Table 8.5a and 8.5b present respectively the mean ratings and results of a 
repeated measure ANOVA model.  
 
Table 8.5a. Mean Ratings and standard deviations (n=27) 
Interval Mr B‟s Related gains Unrelated gains Means 
  Amount mean s.d. mean s.d.  
Day Higher 4.52 2.17 5.52 2.08 5.02 
Day Same 6.15 1.38 5.93 1.59 6.04 
Day Lower 6.93 1.82 6.04 1.72 6.49 
Means    5.87   5.83   5.85 
Week Higher 5.19 1.94 5.59 1.78 5.39 
Week Same 6.56 1.48 5.93 1.47 6.25 
Week Lower  6.93 1.86 5.96 1.68 6.45 
Means  6.23  5.83  6.03 
  Higher 4.86  5.56  5.20 
 Same 6.36  5.93  6.14 
 Lower 6.93  6.00  6.46 
Overall  6.05  5.83  5.94 
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Table 8.5b. ANOVA model results 
Source df F Sig. η2 Hypothesis 
Amount 2, 52 6.89 .010 .209 H3.1 
Domain × Amount 2, 52 16.718 .000 .391 H3.2 
Interval ×Amount 2, 52 7.455 .004 .223 H3.3a 
Interval × Domain × Amount 2, 52 2.448 .096 .086 H3.3b 
Interval × Domain 1, 26 5.477 .027 .174 N.H. 
N.H.: not hypothesized 
 
Consistent with H3.1, the more positive the contrast, the more attractive the 
gains are, F(2,52)=6.89, p=.01, η2=.209; the mean ratings of Mr A‟s satisfaction are 
respectively 6.46, 6.14 and 5.20, when Mr B receives a lower, the same and a higher 
amount. The negative contrast value, as measured by the rating difference between the 
“higher” and the “same” conditions (0.94=6.14-5.20) almost triples the size of the 
positive contrast value, as measured by the rating difference between the “lower” and 
“same” conditions (0.32=6.46-6.14). 
Three significant two-way interactions provide support for H3.2, H3.3a and 
H3.3b. These interactions are presented in Panel A and Panel B, Fig.8.3. First, as  
depicted in Panel A, the interaction between Domain and Amount (F(2,52)=16.718, 
p<.0001, η2=.391) is consistent with the hypothesized relatedness effect (H3.2) that 
the contrasts are more pronounced when the two interpersonal gains are two working 
bonuses (“same”) than one working bonus and one lottery win (“different”). That is, 
the value gap between the “higher” and the “lower” gains is significantly larger when 
the gains are related than when the gains are unrelated, Wilcoxon z=3.755, p<.001.  
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Figure 8.3.  The two-way interactions 
 
Second, as shown in Panel B, the interaction between Interval and Amount 
(F(2,52) = 7.455, p<.0005, η2=.223) provides support for the hypothesized interval 
effect (H3.3a) that the contrast effects are more pronounced when Mr A and B‟s gains 
are temporally near (“day”) than distant (“week”), expressed as the larger value gap 
associated with the shorter interval, Wilcoxon z=2.691, p<.001. 
H3.3b hypothesizes that the interval effect (H3.3a) depends on the domain 
relationship between the gains. This explains the marginally significant three-way 
interaction between Interval, Amount and Domain, F(2,52)=2.488, p<.10. The effects 
are shown in Fig. 8.4, Panel A (the related condition) and Panel B (the unrelated 
condition). As can be seen, the lines that correspond to the three levels of the amount 
of the gains are almost horizontal in Panel B but exhibit a converging trend in Panel A. 
This provides evidence for the hypothesis that the interval effect is only applicable 
when the gains received by Mr A and Mr B come from the same source, 
F(2,52)=7.367, p<.002, but not when they come from two different sources, 
F(2,52)=.0536, p>.5.  
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Figure 8.4.  
The three-way interaction: Interval × Amount × Trend 
 
Finally, the lines in Panel A of Fig. 8.4 all exhibit an upward slope. This 
provides evidence for a simple effect of interval (Interval × Amount) that is not 
hypothesized, F(1,26) = 5.477, p<.03. Participants judge Mr A to be more satisfied 
with his working bonus if the interval with Mr B‟s working bonus is one-week than 
one-day. The one-week interval is preferred both when Mr B receives the same 
amount as Mr A (Wilcoxon z=-1.862, p<.05, one-tailed) and when B receives a higher 
amount (Wilcoxon z=2.719, p<.01), but not when B receives a lower amount 
(Wilcoxon z=0, n.s.), in which case the contrast would be positive.  
However, no such effect is observed if Mr B‟s gain comes from a lottery win. 
In fact, when the interpersonal gains are unrelated, the only effect is a negative impact 
exerted by the higher amount Mr B receives, which lowers the satisfaction of Mr A 
significantly, both when the interval is one day (Wilcoxon z=2.484, p<.05) and when 
it is one week (z=2.530, p<.05). The magnitude of this effect is however much smaller 
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compared to the one in the related condition, as can be seen by the much narrower gap 
between the lines that correspond respectively to the “same” and “higher” conditions 
in Panel B compared to Panel A in Fig.8.4. 
Discussion 
The results provide support for H3.1, H3.2, H3.3a&b. Positive contrasts with 
Mr B enhance Mr A‟s satisfaction whereas negative contrasts undermine it, both 
compared to the control condition where Mr B receives the same amount as Mr A and 
hence null contrast. Contrast effects are more pronounced when Mr A and B receive 
the same kind of gains, i.e. two working bonuses, or when their gains are intervened 
by a long rather than short interval. The domain relatedness is the more influential 
factor – the interval effect on contrasts virtually disappears when Mr A and Mr B‟s 
gains come from two different sources. 
Evidence of loss-aversion emerges. The negative contrast with B decreases 
A‟s satisfaction more than the positive contrast enhances it, comparing to when the 
two receive the same amount. The negative contrast persists even when the gains are 
one working bonus and one lottery win, that is, unrelated.  
Unexpected for the related gains, a simple effect of interval emerges. 
Participants prefer the long interval (one-week) to exist between the gains received by 
Mr A and Mr B to the short one (half-day), as long as Mr B‟s gain does not constitute 
a positive contrast with Mr A‟s. As in the sequence judgment task, this could reflect 
several underlying motives. Participants use the timing of Mr A‟s gain as the 
benchmark to assess Mr B‟s gain such that the longer the interval, the more 
discounted Mr B‟s gain is, which would in turn enhance A‟s satisfaction. That this 
preference is not observed when Mr B receives a working bonus of a smaller size 
suggests people intuitively apply the interval effect on contrasts (H3.3a).  
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It is worth noting that due to a flaw in the design of the sequence judgment 
task, one explanation offered for the main effect of domain is that lottery gains are 
generally preferred to working bonuses of the same amount. If this account holds, we 
should observe a main effect of domain in the social judgment task, this time lowering 
the satisfaction of Mr A when Mr B receives a lottery win instead of a working bonus, 
i.e. Mr A‟s gain is more satisfactory if Mr B‟s gain is a working bonus rather than a 
lottery win. However, no such effect is observed, t(26)=.709, n.s., suggesting other 
factors at play that lead to the preference for having two unrelated gains to two related 
ones of the same total amount. 
8.4 General discussion 
The results obtained in the sequence and the social judgment tasks provide 
support for the influences of the signed value difference (H2.1, H3.1), the moderating 
effect of relatedness (H2.2, H3.2) and that of interval (H2.2a, H2.3b, H3.2a, H3.3b). 
That is, decision makers‟ satisfaction increases/decreases with positive/negative 
contrasts with his own earlier experiences and with experiences of another (related) 
person. The contrast effects are more pronounced when the inter- and intra-personal 
experiences come from the same source (i.e. related) than different (i.e. unrelated), as 
well as when the interval between the experiences is short than long. The parallel 
between the inter- and intra-personal contrasts indicate that preference for 
improvement is a special case of preference for positive contrasts. Evidence that the 
preference is driven by comparisons between the outcomes rather than by the values 
of the individual outcomes comes from both the influences of the two relational 
variables, i.e. relatedness and interval, as well as from loss aversion
15
. That is, in both 
                                                 
15
 I thank Peter Ayton for suggesting this. 
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settings, negative contrasts have a larger, more detrimental impact on satisfaction than 
does the beneficial impact of positive contrasts of the same amount.  
Differences between the two kinds of judgments emerge, and among them, the 
influences of domain and interval. For sequences, unrelated gains are preferred to 
related gains, and gains received over a short period are preferred to those received 
over a long period, as long as the gains are not decreasing. In comparison, the main 
effect of relatedness is not observed in the social judgment task and participants prefer 
to segregate Mr A and Mr B‟s gains by a long rather than short interval, as long as the 
gains are not increasing. In both cases, the effects can be explained by joint influences 
of limited coping capacities, time discounting (by interval), and an awareness of the 
interval effect on contrasts.  
It is worth noting that relatedness exerts a far larger impact on contrast effects 
in the social judgment task than in the sequence judgment task (effect size η2 =.391 
versus .161). This is the case despite that the signed value difference between two 
interpersonal gains is half the size of the difference between two intrapersonal gains 
(ranging from -500 to 500 versus from -1000 to 1000). One reason is that relatedness 
judgment is context-dependent – working bonuses and lottery wins are related as 
money for the same individual but unrelated as source of income for different 
individuals. Domain relatedness is also more crucial in social judgments – it endows 
interpersonal comparisons with diagnostic values to one‟s decisions, e.g. to assess 
one‟s work-related performances (Festinger, 1954). Without this, such comparisons 
would be meaningless.  
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8.5 Summary 
The results obtained in Chapter 8 provide support for the contrast effects 
hypothesized in the contrasts model. Results from the sequence judgment task and the 
social judgment show that positive contrasts are preferred to negative contrasts and 
that this preference is enhanced by high relatedness between the gains and short 
intervals. Loss-aversion means negative contrasts exert a far larger impact than 
positive contrasts of the same amount. Sequences of gains are also more desirable if 
the gains are of different kinds and temporally near. When the contrasts are with 
another individual, people however prefer a long interval to exist between the 
interpersonal outcomes. In both cases, however, the simple effect of interval is 
observed only for the related gains and when it does not contradict the predictions 
made by the interval effect on contrasts. Evidence of discounting emerges, mainly in 
the form of discounting by interval rather than the normative discounting by time 
delay. Chapter 9 reports a scheduling task that directly tests discounting, by 
manipulating delay and interval at the same time. 
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Chapter 9  THE SCHEDULING TASK 
9.0 Introduction 
The ranking task (Chapter 7) and sequence judgment task (Chapter 8) provide 
evidence for positive time preferences in the assessments of two-event sequences. In 
the ranking task, this is expressed as a large proportion of participants who rank the 
decreasing sequences as more attractive than constant and increasing sequences; in 
the intertemporal judgment task, this is expressed as the high ratings assigned to the 
gains that are temporally near rather than distant.   
How does delay change preference for improvement? Example 2.3 
(Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993) shows that 7% fewer participants preferred (Aunt, 
Friends) to (Friends, Aunt) when the schedules were delayed from this weekend till 
six months later. In other words, delay undermines preference for improvement. As 
we see in Chapter 6, the contrasts model places no constraints how value decays, and 
in so doing, predicts that delay reduces, enhances or has no impact on preference for 
improvement if the value decay of the earlier outcomes compared to the later ones is 
less/more/the same. In this chapter, I replicate Example 2.3, the abrasive aunt 
experiment to explore how delay and interval together influence sequence preferences. 
 
9.1 The scheduling task 
I define the delay of a sequence as the delay of the first sequence event, 
assuming all events taking place either in the present or in the future. In the 
scheduling task, the schedules consist of two visits. The delay of the second visit is 
therefore the sum of the delay of the schedule and the interval between the visits. This 
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interval is sometimes called the spread (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993). For the reasons 
that will become clear shortly, I run the study twice, referred to as Scheduling task I 
and II.  
 
9.1.1 Scheduling task I 
Methods 
Subjects. Twenty-seven participants, fifteen (54%) females, were randomly 
approached on the campus of the London School of Economics (LSE). They were 
between twenty and thirty-nine years old (mean age = 26). They were unpaid. 
 
Methods. As in Loewenstein and Prelec (1993), participants were told they were 
travelling to another city and were planning to pay two visits during the time: one to a 
group of friends, whom they liked a lot and the other to an abrasive aunt, who was a 
horrendous cook. Visiting the friends was pleasant whereas visiting the aunt was 
unpleasant. The first visit was to take place either this weekend (i.e. a delay of one 
week) or twenty-six weeks later (or a delay of six-month); the interval between the two 
visits was either one, four or twenty-six week(s). This arrangement gave rise to a 2 
Delay x 3 Interval within-subjects design and six pairs of schedules. For simplicity, I 
refer to a condition (question) by its corresponding level of delay and interval.  
 For example, “d0i4” refers to the choice between two schedules that are both 
“immediate” with a short spread:  
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Suppose one outing will take place this weekend, the other 4 weeks later. 
Schedule This weekend 4 weeks from now 
A Friends Abrasive aunt 
B Abrasive aunt Friends 
 
Participants were asked to first make a choice between the two schedules, and 
then indicate the strength of their preference by assigning a number on a 7-point scale, 
from a very weak preference (1) to a very strong preference (7). The order of the 
questions was counterbalanced. The questionnaire is attached as Appendix E. 
Hypotheses 
The contrasts model predicts H.4.0 and H4.1: 
H4.0 Preference for improvement 
The increasing schedule (Aunt, Friends) is more attractive than the 
decreasing schedule (Friends, Aunt). 
H4.1 The interval effect 
Longer intervals undermine preference for improvement. 
 
Although the contrasts model does not prescribe how delay changes sequence 
preferences, Loewenstein and Prelec‟s results suggest H4.2:  
H4.2 The delay effect 
Longer delays undermine preference for improvement. 
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Results 
In order for the ratings to reflect the valence of one‟s time preferences, the 
ratings from those participants preferring (Friends, Aunt) and (Aunt, Friends) are 
reported as positive and negative respectively, to be consistent with the implied 
positive and negative time preferences. In both cases, the larger the rating, the more 
pronounced one‟s time preference is and vice versa.  The results are shown in Table 
9.1 and Figure 9.1. I discuss each hypothesis in turn.  
Preference for improvement 
Preference for improvement is not supported. The reverse is – the decreasing 
schedule (Friends, Aunt) is preferred by a majority of the respondents in all six 
conditions (Fig.9.1a). Combined choice across all the six conditions show that this 
pattern is not random, χ²(1)=13.06, p<.001. In other words, positive time preference 
dominates the responses. This preference is also more pronounced when the interval 
is long – percentages preferring (Friends, Aunt) are 54%, 66% and 75% respectively 
when the interval is one, four and twenty-six weeks (Panel A, Figure 9.1), Friedman 
χ²(2)=12.133, p<.01. Delay has little impact on this preference – only 6% fewer 
participants choosing (Friends, Aunt) when the schedules are delayed.  
Similar patterns results are observed in the mean ratings. As shown in Fig. 
9.1b, the ratings are more positive for those sequences that are closer to the present 
(1.25 for d0 and 0.52 for d26) or have a long spread (-0.19, 0.74 and 2.09 for i1, i4 
and i26). 
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Table 9.1. 
Choice percentages and mean ratings in Scheduling Task I (N=27) 
 
 
% choosing  
(Friends, Aunt) 
 Mean ratings 
s.d. 
 d0 d26 Means  d0 d26 Means 
i1 54% 54% 54% i1 -0.11 -0.26 -0.19 
     4.67 4.68  
i4 69% 62% 66% i4 1 0.48 0.74 
     4.86 4.14  
i26 81% 69% 75% i26 2.85 1.33 2.09 
      4.2 4.62  
Means 68% 62% 66% Means 1.25 0.52  
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Figure 9.1. Results of Scheduling Task I 
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The interval effect  
H4.1 hypothesizes an interval effect that long intervals undermine preference 
for improvement. We do not find preference for improvement. However a consistent 
result is that long intervals enhance positive time preference. As can be seen from 
Panel B, Fig.9.1, the mean ratings at three levels of interval, i.e. short (one week), 
medium (4 weeks) and long (26 weeks or 6 months), are respectively -0.19, 0.74 and 
2.09, F(2,52) = 7.603, p<.01, η2= .226.  
 
The delay effect 
H4.2 hypothesizes that delay undermines preference for improvement and 
enhances positive time preference. Contrary to the hypothesis, 6% more participants 
prefer the increasing schedule when the schedules are delayed (32% versus 38%). 
Likewise, the mean ratings are also less positive in the distant condition than in the 
immediate condition (0.52 versus 1.25), F(1,26)=4.18, p=.051, η2= .138.  Fig.9.1b 
shows that the pattern is more pronounced when the interval is long than short, 
evidenced by the steeper slopes of the lines associated with the longer intervals. The 
interaction between delay and interval is however non- significant, F(2,52) = 1.23, n.s. 
Discussion 
The schedules consist of the same events, i.e. a pleasant visit to one‟s friends 
and an unpleasant visit to one‟s abrasive aunt. It follows that the sequences have the 
same nominal value (NV) and relatedness (R). The contrasts model predicts that 
preferences between the increasing (Aunt, Friends) and decreasing (Friends, Aunt) 
depend on two value differences – one between the endowment values of the two 
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schedules and one between their contrast values. While (Aunt, Friends) has a more 
attractive contrast value, (Friends, Aunt) has a more attractive endowment value.  
Interval exerts dual influences. A long interval not only entails a long delay to 
the second, later visit and therefore enhances the advantage in endowment of the 
decreasing (Friends, Aunt), it also weakens the contrast effect, and therefore 
undermines the advantage of the increasing (Aunt, Friends). In any case, longer 
intervals are detrimental to preference for improvement. This corresponds to the 
finding of the interval effect (H4.1), despite that the hypothesis assumes preference 
for improvement would dominate the responses. 
A closer look at the results however reveals little evidence for contrast effects. 
Among all six conditions, the only mean rating that is significantly different from 0 
happens when the first visit takes place this weekend whereas the second visit 26 
weeks later, i.e. d0i26, one sample t-test, t(26)=3.525, p<.01. The contrasts model 
predicts that a long interval like this would have diminished the contrast value to close 
to zero. Therefore the preference is driven by discounting rather than by contrasts. 
The response pattern that delay seems to reduce positive time preference can also be 
accounted entirely by discounting. That is, as a result of delay, the difference in the 
endowment value between the two schedules is now smaller, thus weakening the 
attractiveness of (Friends, Aunt) relative to (Aunt, Friends). Without contrast effects 
as a motive for preference for improvement, it is hardly surprising that the decreasing 
schedule (Friends, Aunt) is chosen by a majority of the participants in all six 
conditions.  
The results of Task I constitutes a sharp contrast with the original finding that 
adopts the same design. For the three identical conditions, i.e. d0i1, d26i1 and d0i26, 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) reported a preference for (Friends, Aunt) by 7%, 13% 
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and 48% of the participants, while this study found 54%, 54% and 83%. Why did I 
fail to find any preference for improvement? There may be several reasons for this. 
The respondents were recruited from a college with heavy emphasis on economic and 
financial courses. They may be familiar with the notion of discounting as well as its 
implications for the net present value of a sequence of outcomes. However, since the 
sequences consist of non-monetary outcomes, it is doubtful to what extent the 
disciplinary factor affects the results.  
Another possible reason is the way in which the schedules were presented – 
the tabulated format of presentation vertically aligns the visits according to their 
respective time delays. An easy way of “constructing” one‟s preferences (Lichtenstein 
& Slovic, 2006) is therefore to determine what one prefers to do at a given time, e.g. 
whether to visit one‟s aunt or friends this weekend, rather than what one prefers to do 
over time. Such judgment mode requires no comparisons between the events within 
the same sequence and prevents trend, which depends on such comparisons, from 
being important. With these in mind, I revised the design and run the study for the 
second time, reported below as Scheduling task II.  
 
9.1.2 Scheduling task II 
Methods 
Subjects. Thirty-two students, twelve (38%) females, studying at the University 
College London were randomly approached on the campus. They were between 
eighteen and thirty years old, with a mean of twenty-two. They were unpaid. 
 
Methods. I adopted the same 2 Delay (this weekend, 26 weeks from now) x 3 
Interval (one, four and 26 weeks) within-subject design. To make the trend salient, I 
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presented the schedules in “time-line graphs” (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993). An 
example is shown in Fig. 9.2 for the increasing schedule “d0i4”. To simplify the task, 
I also combine the choice and the rating into one. Instead of making a choice first and 
then indicating one‟s strength of preference, participants were asked to assign a single 
rating on an 11-point scale ranging from -5 “strongly prefer (Aunt, Friends)” to 5 
“strongly prefer (Friends, Aunts)”, with 0 indicating “indifference between the two 
schedules”.16 I counterbalanced the order of the questions. I attach the questionnaire 
as Appendix F. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.2. A time-line graph representation of the increasing (Aunt, Friends)  
 
Results 
Task II tests the same three hypotheses, namely preference for improvement 
(H4.0), the interval effect (H4.1) and the delay effect (H4.2). As in Task I, negative 
and positive ratings indicate respectively negative and positive time preferences. 
Different from Study I, this study allows for indifference, i.e. no trend preference, 
indicated by a rating of zero. In what follows, I first report within-subjects effects, 
which include time preferences and influences of delay and interval, and then the 
between-effects attributable to the sex (gender) of the participants.  
 
                                                 
16
 Similar inclusion of the “indifference” option was adopted by Thaler (1985) 
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Within-effects 
Fig.9.3 presents the proportion of participants who assign positive, zero and 
negative ratings, and thereby express a preference for (Friends, Aunt) (Panel A), 
indifference (Panel B), for (Aunt, Friends) (Panel C). I discuss each in turn. 
 
Table 9.2. Choice percentages in Scheduling Task II. 
 % (Friends, Aunt) % Indifferent % (Aunt, Friends) 
 d0 d26 means d0 d26 means d0 d26 means 
i1 28% 16% 22% 9% 19% 14% 63% 66% 65% 
i4 41% 31% 36% 9% 22% 16% 50% 47% 49% 
i26 34% 44% 39% 13% 31% 22% 53% 25% 39% 
means 34% 30% 32% 10% 24% 17% 55% 46% 51% 
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Figure 9.3. % Participants show different time preferences in Scheduling Task II. 
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Indifference 
As shown in Panel B, Fig.9.3, more participants become indifferent between 
(Aunt, Friends) and (Friends, Aunt), as implied by a rating of zero, when the 
schedules are distant (d26) than near (d0), as well as when the interval is long (i26) 
than short (i4 or i1). When the schedules are both distant and have a 26-week interval 
(d26i26), nearly one-third of the participants (31%) are indifferent, compared to 9% 
when the schedules are immediate and have either a short or a medium interval (d0i1, 
d014). Indifference seems to depend more heavily on delay than on interval – a delay 
of 26 weeks increases the indifference percentage significantly by a range between 
10% and 18%, Wilcoxon z=2.98, p<.01, whereas an interval of the same duration 
increases it by a range between 4% and 12%, Friedman χ²(2)=2.1, n.s.. 
 
 Negative and positive time preferences 
As shown in Panel A and C in Fig.9.3, with the exception of the condition in 
which the schedules are both distant and long (d26i26), more participants prefer (Aunt, 
Friends) to (Friends, Aunt), Wilcoxon z=2.141, p<.05. This provides support for a 
preference for improvement (H4.0), which is  however weak – the largest proportion 
preferring (Aunt, Friends) is 66%, observed when the schedules are distant and short 
(d26i1).  
 
Influences of interval  
The mean ratings are presented in Table 9.3 and depicted in Figure 9.4. As can 
be seen, longer intervals decreases the attractiveness of (Aunt, Friends) relative to 
(Friends, Aunt) – the mean ratings are -1.17, -0.44 and 0.34 respectively when the 
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interval is one, four and twenty-six week(s). This provides support for the interval 
effect hypothesized in H4.1, F(2,62) = 4.784, p<.02.  
The response pattern observed in the long-spread condition (i26) is worth 
noting. Firstly, inconsistent with the contrasts model, 19% more participants preferred 
the increasing (Aunt, Friends) to the decreasing (Friends, Aunt) (53% versus 34%) for 
sequences with such a long spread. Secondly, inconsistent with the immediacy effect 
(Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991) in time discounting that decision makers tend to 
amplify the significance of the immediate (relative to delayed) experiences, (Friends, 
Aunt) becomes more preferred when the schedules are delayed till 26 weeks later.  
Table 9.3. Mean ratings in Scheduling Task II.  
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Figure 9.4. Means and sds observed in Scheduling Task II. 
  d0 d26 means 
i1 -0.78 -1.56 -1.17 
 3.79 3.11  
i4 -0.25 -0.63 -0.44 
 3.51 3.03  
i26 -0.13 0.81 0.34 
  4.01 3.32   
means -0.39 -0.46 -0.42 
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Influences of delay  
According to Loewenstein and Prelec‟s results, H4.3 hypothesizes that delay 
undermines preference for improvement. This would lead to a higher proportion of 
participants choosing (Friends, Aunt) and more positive (less negative) ratings in the 
distant condition. Neither of these two is observed. Fig.9.3 shows the percentages 
choosing the two schedules have no distinct pattern. Table 9.3 shows that the mean 
rating was slightly more rather than less negative in the distant condition than in the 
near condition: -0.46 versus -0.39. 
Recall that delay enhances indifference, which implies a rating of 0. Why do 
ratings in Fig.9.4 diverge rather than converge to zero? A closer look at Fig.9.3 
reveals that delay exerts differential influences on the attractiveness of the two 
schedules – more detrimental on (Friends, Aunt) than on (Aunt, Friends) when the 
spread is short and medium (i1 and i4) but the opposite is true when the spread is long 
(i26) (Table 9.4).  
Table 9.4. Impact of delay on sequence preferences in Scheduling Task II 
 i1 i4 i26 
(Friends, Aunt) -12% -10% +10% 
(Aunt, Friends) 3% -3% -28% 
 
 
Between-effects  
Table 9.5a and 9.5b present the percentages of male and female participants 
who exhibit positive, null and negative time preferences. Fig.9.5 contrast the ratings 
of males (Panel A) and females (Panel B). 
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Table 9.5a. Males’ time preferences in Scheduling Task II 
preferring d0i1 d0i4 d0i26 d26i1 d26i4 d26i26 
(Friends, Aunt) 45% 50% 40% 25% 50% 35% 
Indifferent 10% 15% 15% 15% 20% 45% 
(Aunt, Friends) 45% 35% 45% 60% 30% 20% 
Mean ratings 0.33 0.41 0.23 -1.1 0.35 1.25 
 
Table 9.5b. Females’ time preferences in Scheduling Task II 
preferring d0i1 d0i4 d0i26 d26i1 d26i4 d26i26 
(Friends, Aunt) 8% 33% 33% 8% 8% 50% 
Indifferent 8% 0% 8% 25% 25% 8% 
(Aunt, Friends) 83% 67% 58% 67% 67% 42% 
Mean ratings -2.58 -1.33 -0.67 -2.33 -2.25 0.08 
 
Panel A: Male Panel B: Female 
  
Figure 9.5. The gender effect in Scheduling Task II. 
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First, a main effect of sex emerges, F(1,30) = 4.21, p<.05, η2=.123. As can be 
seen in Fig.9.5, while the ratings are mostly positive for males, they are mostly 
negative for females. That is, while males discount more heavily than females, 
females have a more pronounced preference for improvement than males. The only 
condition where male exhibit a preference for improvement is d26i1, where 60% of 
males prefer (Aunt, Friends), compared to 25% who prefer (Friends, Aunt). There is 
however no evidence for interactions between sex and interval or sex and delay.  
Second, delay enhances indifference for both genders. In general, females are 
less likely to become indifferent between the increasing and decreasing trends 
compared to males. This is especially the case when the schedules are distant and long 
(d26i26), in which case 45% of the males are indifferent compared to only 8% of the 
females. 
Third, the interval effect (H4.2) is only significant for females, F(2,22) = 
4.319, p<.03, but not for males, F(2,38) = 1.605, n.s. That is, longer intervals diminish 
females‟ preference for (Aunt, Friends); they however do not enhance males‟ 
preference for (Friends, Aunt). Fig.9.5 shows that this is mainly because males have 
the same mean ratings in the immediate condition (d0) regardless of the length of 
interval.  
Fourth, delay has divergent influences on time preferences of male and female 
participants. As shown in Table 9.5, delaying the short increasing schedule (Aunt, 
Friends) leads to 15% more males preferring the schedule (60%-45%) but 16% fewer 
females (67%-83%) doing so. 
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Discussion 
The second run of the scheduling task provides evidence for a negative time 
preference, i.e. a preference for improvement – the increasing sequence (Aunt, 
Friends) is most attractive in the distant short condition (d26i1) when chosen by a 
majority of 66% of the participants. Compared to the original findings where 93%, 
52% and 87% were obtained in d0i1, d0i26 and d26i1 (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993), 
the preference is weak. One reason is that the rating scale in this study includes a 
neutral point (0) to indicate indifference, which was not allowed in the original 
investigation. If we assume that the indifferent participants were equally likely to 
prefer (Aunt, Friends) and (Friends, Aunt), the proportions choosing (Aunt, Friends) 
become 68%, 60% and 76%. The gap is now much smaller but persists, especially in 
the immediate short condition (d0i1). Sex is another contributing factor. Male 
participants turn out to be far more impatient than female. The percentages of females 
choosing (Aunt, Friends) are 83%, 58% and 67% in d0i1, d0i26 and d26i1, which 
become 87%, 58% and 80% when including half of the indifference proportions. 
The sex difference in Task II is striking. While the response pattern of females 
conforms largely to the predictions of the contrasts model, including preference for 
improvement and the interval effect, that of males does not. Males have a complex 
response pattern. For instance, 15% more males preferred the short (Aunt, Friends) in 
the delay condition than in the immediate condition. As in Scheduling Task I, this can 
be attributed to discounting that as a result of delay, the value difference in the 
endowment between the two schedules is now smaller. However, discounting cannot 
explain why 10% more males preferring (Aunt, Friends) when visiting aunt happens 
this weekend, but visiting Friends is delayed from 4 weeks from now till 6 months 
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later (d0i4, d0i26). Actually neither can backward contrast effects because the 26-
week interval is detrimental to integrity. The pattern is however consistent with 
influences of anticipatory savouring and dread (Loewenstein, 1988).  A longer 
interval implies a longer delay to the second visit in the sequence, thus greater 
anticipatory effects. Delaying desirable outcomes enhances savouring whereas having 
undesirable outcomes as soon as possible minimizes dread. Thus, contrary to the 
interval effect predicted by the contrasts model, savouring and dread together predict 
a stronger preference for (Aunt, Friends) over (Friends, Aunt) when the interval is 
longer. That this pattern is only observed in the immediate condition but not in the 
delayed condition is consistent with the notion that anticipatory effects are more 
profound when the hedonic experiences are closer in time (Loewenstein & Elster, 
1992).  
9.2 General discussion 
While Task I finds evidence for a positive time preference, Task II finds 
evidence for a preference for improvement.  The main difference of these two studies 
lies in the way the sequences are presented. Task I presents the schedules in a 
tabulated format; Task II adopt the time-line graph (Fig.9.2) to focus attention on the 
value difference between the positive experience of visiting one‟s friends and the 
negative experience of visiting the abrasive aunt. Consistent with the idea that 
contrast effects thrive on comparisons, preference for improvement is observed in 
Task II but not in Task I.  This result reveals how sensitive sequence preferences are 
to presentation effects. 
Despite the identical material, the two experiments agree with each other only 
in terms of the interval effect. That is, longer intervals between the visits make the 
increasing schedule less attractive while the decreasing one more. Note that we only 
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obtain evidence for contrast effects in Task II but not in Task I. The observation of the 
interval effect in both tasks is consistent with the fact that this effect can be attributed 
to either discounting or backward contrast effects.  This provides support for the 
notion of the dual influences of interval, when it functions as part of delay to the later 
outcomes in the sequence and as an indicator of the temporal relationship between the 
sequence outcomes.  
Compared to interval, the impact of delay on sequence preferences is far from 
straightforward. The contrasts model posits that depending on how the outcomes are 
discounted, delay can have differential impact on sequence preferences. Although this 
claim is not tested directly, the findings of Task II show that delay indeed enhances as 
well as undermines preference for improvement for males and females, expressed by 
the positive and negative slopes of the lines in Figure. 9.5. Perhaps the only non-
ambiguous effect of delay observed in Task II is that delay obscures one‟s time 
preferences by fostering indifference in both male and female participants, and 
perhaps more so in males.  
The sex difference obtained in Task II is worth noting. Preference for 
improvement is more pronounced for females than for males.  This is consistent with 
the assumption of the contrasts model that such preference is driven by a focus on the 
relationship between the outcomes, which characterizes how females think but how 
way males do (Chapman, 1975). That males focus more on individual events is 
however consistent with their preference for the decreasing (Friends, Aunt). It is also 
consistent with the notion of savouring and dread, which is the only mechanism that 
can predict an enhanced preference for the increasing (Aunt, Friends), that is, when 
the interval increases from 4 weeks to 26 weeks.  
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9.3 Summary 
The results obtained in Chapter 9 demonstrate that sequence preferences can 
be affected by delay, interval, as well as presentation format. The only effect 
consistently observed in the two scheduling tasks is the interval effect that long 
intervals undermine negative time preferences or enhance positive time preferences. 
This provides support for the dual influences of interval, when it functions as part of 
delay to the later sequence outcomes or as indicating relationship between the 
outcomes. Delay, apart from fostering indifference towards the trend, does not have a 
distinct impact on sequence preferences. A gender effect emerges. That preference for 
improvement is observed only in females but not in males is consistent with the 
notion that females are relationship-focused whereas males are individual-event-
focused. Note that the contrasts model attributes preference for improvement to 
contrast effects. Thus to predict such preferences when they are motivated by non-
relational effects, e.g. savouring and dread, the model has to rely on endowment 
effects, by allowing the discount parameter to be negative rather than positive as 
assumed. 
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Chapter 10  THE HAPPINESS TASK 
10.0 Introduction 
The experiments reported in Chapter 9 provide support for the dual influences 
of interval. That is, interval affects the endowment value by changing the time delay 
to the later outcomes; interval also affects the contrast value by changing the contrasts 
between the outcomes. This chapter explores two questions. First, do interval effects 
persist when the total nominal value of the outcomes is not controlled for? Second, 
are the dual influences, as found with interval, unique to time? Positive answers to 
both questions would provide support for the approach of modelling sequence 
preferences as a function of two kinds of values, namely the relational and the non-
relational. I answer these questions by the so-called happiness task, as reported next. 
 
10.1 The happiness task 
The design is inspired by Tversky and Griffin‟s (1991) study, which I 
discussed in Chapter 4. Each sequence consists of one past event and one present 
event. The past event is either positive, i.e. “receiving an excellent mark” (EX) or 
negative, i.e., “receiving a poor mark” (PR); and the present event is either related to 
the first event, i.e. “receiving an acceptable mark” (OK) or unrelated, i.e. “cleaning 
one‟s flat” (CL). In addition to the quality of the first event and the domain 
relatedness between the two events, I also manipulate the interval to be either one 
week (WK) or one month (MT). This arrangement gives rise to a 2 Quality (negative, 
positive) x 2 Relatedness (related, unrelated) x 2 Interval (one week, one month) 
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within-subject design and a total number of eight sequences. Table 10.1 presents the 
design of the experiment, along with the short names of the outcomes and sequences.  
 
Table 10.1 The design of the happiness task 
Sequence Quality (Trend) Relatedness (Content) Interval (Delay) 
 EX PR OK CL WK MT 
EXOKWK       
EXCLWK       
EXOKMT       
EXCLMT       
PROKWK       
PRCLWK       
PROKMT       
PRCLMT       
EX: excellent mark; PR: poor mark; OK: average mark; CL: cleaning; WK: week; MT: Month 
Note that the manipulation on Quality, Relatedness and Interval influences 
both the endowment value and the contrast value. That is, each independent variable 
has a “confounder”, as shown in the “()s” in the first row in Table 10.1 such that 
while quality, relatedness and interval exert direct influences on EV or CV, their 
confounders, i.e. trend, content and delay, exert direct influences on CV or EV. I 
explain what this means.  
First, the manipulation on the quality of the first outcome changes not only 
makes it more or less attractive but also changes its relationship with the second 
present outcome. Since the value of the second outcome is always neutral, a positive 
first event implies a decreasing trend whereas a negative one implies an increasing 
trend. While the quality affects the nominal value and thereby the endowment, the 
trend affects the signed value difference and thereby the contrast. Second, the 
manipulation on outcome relatedness is achieved by changing the content of the 
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second outcome. While the relatedness affects the contrast value, the content affects 
the endowment value. Third, the interval between the two outcomes is also the time 
distance of the first event from the present, i.e. the “delay”. Thus, the longer this 
interval, the weaker the contrast value but also the more the value decay of the first 
outcome will be, which in turn affects the endowment value of the sequence.  
Methods 
Participants.  Forty-one students attending a short-term management course 
at the London School of Economics participated in the study. The questionnaires were 
completed at the end of a lecture. They were unpaid. 
 
Methods. The experiment consisted of three separate tasks, referred to as Task 1, 
2 and 3. I discuss each in turn. 
In Task 1, participants assessed the happiness of a hypothetical decision maker 
after he or she experienced a sequence of events. The name of the hypothetical 
decision maker varied for each question (condition). For example, the question that 
solicited preference for EXOKWK (Table 10.1) read:  
A week ago, Alice received an excellent mark in a quiz, much better than 
she expected. 
Today, she received an acceptable mark in another quiz. This was the 
mark she expected. 
 
Task 2 is similar to Task 1 except that I solicited time preferences for isolated 
outcomes. For example, the question for EXWK read:  
A week ago, Alex received an excellent mark in a quiz, much better than 
she expected.  
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In both Task 1 and 2, participants were asked to assess “How happy do you think 
Alice (Alex) is today?” by assigning a rating on an 11-point scale, ranging from “the 
least amount of happiness” (0) to “the most amount of happiness” (10).  
Different from the previous two tasks, Task 3 presented a choice. Participants 
had to decide which of the two intervals, one week or one month, they would like to 
segregate between four different pairs of events, which were combinations of the two 
levels of relatedness (related, unrelated) and the two levels of quality of the first event 
(positive, negative). For example, the choice presenting the positive first event (EX) 
and the related second event (OK) read: 
First event:  You receive an excellent mark in a quiz, much better than 
you expected.  
Second event:  You receive an acceptable mark in another quiz. This 
was the mark you expected. 
I would rather have  
___   the first event occur a month earlier than the second event. 
___   the first event occur a week earlier than the second event 
 
The order of the questions in all three tasks was counterbalanced. I attach the 
questionnaire as Appendix F. 
Results & discussion 
Each participant completed two tasks. All forty-one participants received and 
completed Task 1. Among these, eighteen of twenty participants who were randomly 
assigned Task 2 completed the questionnaire; the remaining twenty-one participants 
received and completed Task 3.  
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Since Task 2 serves as a manipulation check, I discuss the results in the order 
of Task 2, 1 and 3. For simplicity, I sometime refer to the events based on their shared 
independent variable(s). For instance, the positive condition consists of EXOKWK, 
EXOKMT, EXCLWK and EXCLMT. The positive related condition consists of 
EXOKWK and EXOKMT.  
Task 2 results 
Table 10.2 shows the mean and standard deviation of the ratings assigned to 
the six component events. 
Table 10.2. Results of Task 2 (n=18) 
 Description Mean s.d. 
EXWK Receiving an excellent mark a week ago 7.17 1.82 
EXMT Receiving an excellent mark a month ago 6.94 1.80 
PRWK Receiving a poor mark a week ago 4.00 2.00 
PRMT Receiving a poor mark a month ago 4.67 1.28 
OK Receiving an average mark today 6.06 1.70 
CL Cleaning one‟s flat today 5.11 2.27 
 
First, the manipulation on Quality and Trend is successful. The two positive 
first events, EXWK and EXMT, are rated higher than the two present neutral events, 
OK and CL, F(1,17)=19.372, p<.0001, which are rated higher than the two negative 
first events, PRWK and PRMT, F(1,17)=8.152, p<.02. This finding implies that the 
positive pairs have a decreasing trend whereas the negative pairs have an increasing 
trend. 
Second, the mean ratings provide evidence for positive time preference. 
Receiving an excellent mark (EX) is more attractive if it takes place a week ago 
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(EXWK=7.17) than a month ago (EXMT=6.94). The reverse is true for the negative 
experience, which is less attractive if it takes place a week ago (PRWK=4.00) than a 
month ago (PRMT= 4.67). Thus, delay leads to value decay for both positive and 
negative events. 
Third, the results are consistent with the content effect. That is, receiving an 
average mark (OK=6.06) is considered more attractive than cleaning one‟s flat 
(CL=5.11). The difference is however non-significant, t(17)=1.165, p>.13, one-tailed.  
The results observed in Task 2 of the happiness task allow us to make 
predictions of sequence preferences in Task 1, which I present in Table 10.3.  
Table 10.3. The dual influences in the happiness task.  
Independent 
variables 
Influence 
on 
Predictions of the contrasts model 
Quality  (Trend)   
Quality EV Better quality preferred 
(first event) 
EX>PR 
Trend CV Increasing trend preferred 
 
EXOKWK(MT) < PROKWK(MT)  
Relatedness (Content)   
Relatedness CV Relatedness enhances the 
trend effect 
EXOKWK(MT) < EXCLWK(MT) 
PROKWK(MT) > PRCLWK(MT) 
Content EV Better quality preferred 
(second event) 
OK > CL 
Interval (Delay)   
Interval CV Interval undermines the 
trend effect 
EXOKWK < EXOKMT  
PROKWK > PROKMT 
Discounting EV Delay fosters value decay EXWK > EXMT 
PRWK < PRMT 
>: preferred to; <: less preferred to; EV=endowment value; CV=contrast value 
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The table shows that preferences between the sequences are uncertain as they 
depend on a balance between conflicting forces. Consider EXOKWK(MT) and 
PROKWK(MT) for example. While the positive sequences are better in terms of the 
endowment value due to Quality (EX>PR), they are worse in terms of the contrast 
value due to the decreasing trend (EXOKWK(MT)< PROKWK(MT)). The preference 
between the two is therefore a function of the importance as well as the magnitude of 
the endowment value relative to the contrast value. 
 
Task 1 results 
I discuss the results within the framework of the contrasts model. I express the 
value of a sequence as the sum of the endowment value and the value derived from 
improvement, i.e. SV=EV+CV. I omit the spreading predictor in the contrasts model, 
i.e. the term incorporating |CV|. This is done for two reasons. First, the original 
experiment of Tversky and Griffin (1991) found no evidence for spreading; neither 
are the experiments reported so far in this thesis. Second, the sequences under 
investigation are either increasing or decreasing, the preferences for which are 
supposedly predicted by preference for improvement, i.e. CV. 
In this simplified formulation of sequence preferences, EV is expressed as the 
sum of two values, one for each of the two events. As Tversky and Griffin, I assume 
CV is zero when the events are unrelated; i.e., when their relatedness index (R) is 0. 
Since the contrast values depend on both the valence of the signed value difference 
and the interval, I denote the contrast value as C(valence, interval). Table 10.4 and 
Fig.10.1 show the results along with the predictions of the contrast model.  
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Table 10.4. The results of Task 1 and the predictions of the contrasts model. 
  Mean rating (s.d.) SV=EV+CV 
EXOKWK 6.2 (2.37) EXWK+OK+C(+,WK) 
EXCLWK 6.3 (1.89) EXWK+CL 
EXOKMT 6.1 (1.88) EXMT+OK+C(+,MT) 
EXCLMT 5.5 (1.86) EXMT+CL 
PROKWK 5.5 (2.27) PRWK+OK+C(-,WK) 
PRCLWK 3.1 (2.40) PRWK+CL 
PROKMT 5.5 (2.09) PRMT+OK+C(-,MT) 
PRCLMT 3.6 (2.13) PRMT+CL 
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Figure 10.1. Mean ratings of the sequences (n=41) 
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Quality 
As shown in Fig.10.1, the four ratings assigned to the positive sequences 
(Panel A) are all higher than the ones assigned to the negative sequences (Panel B). 
This indicates a main effect of quality, F(1, 40)= 15.878, p< .0001, η2 = .284.  
 
Relatedness and interval 
To unveil the influences of relatedness and interval on contrasts, I employ two 
step-wise comparisons. A summary of this analysis is presented in Table 10.5a for the 
positive (decreasing) sequences and Table 10.5b for the negative (increasing) 
sequences. 
 
Table 10.5a.  The impact of relatedness and interval for the positive pairs. 
 Rating diff. Expressed as  t(40) 
EXOKWK – EXCLWK -0.12 OK-CL+C(+, WK) -.289, n.s. 
EXOKMT – EXCLMT 0.59 OK-CL+C(+, MT) 1.493, n.s. 
Difference - 0.71 C(+, WK) – C(+, MT)  
n.s. not significant 
 
Table 10.5b.  The impact of relatedness and interval for the negative pairs. 
 Rating diff. Expressed as  t(40) 
PROKWK - PRCLWK 2.32 OK-CL+C(-, WK) 5.680*** 
PROKMT - PRCLMT 1.83 OK-CL+C(-, MT) 6.357*** 
Difference 0.49 C(-, WK) - C(-, MT)   
Paired-samples t-test, two-tailed; *: p<.05, **: p<.01, ***: p<.001 
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First, for the positive and negative sequences, I compare the ratings assigned 
to the related and unrelated conditions, holding constant the interval and the trend. In 
so doing, I obtain two pairs of rating differences within each level of quality, i.e. one 
between EXOKWK(MT) and EXCLWK(MT), and one between PROKWK(MT) and 
PRCLWK(MT).  Each of these rating differences is the sum of the content effect (i.e. 
the value difference between OK and CL) and the contrast effect (i.e. the value of C(+, 
WK/MT) and C(-, WK/MT)).  
Second, for each level of quality, I again obtain the difference between the 
pair of rating differences obtained in Step 1. Since these rating differences share the 
same content effect, the remaining difference is therefore the difference between the 
two contrast effects as a function of interval, i.e. between C(+/-, WK) and C(+/-, MT).  
For the positive condition, the content effect predicts that the related pairs 
(EXOKWK, EXOKMT) are more attractive than the unrelated pairs (EXCLWK, 
EXCLMT) because “receiving an average mark” (OK) is more attractive than 
“cleaning one‟s flat” (CL). The contrast effect however predicts the opposite, because 
the related pairs are decreasing and therefore have negative contrast values; and the 
shorter the interval, the more negative the contrast values become. By contrast, the 
content and the contrast effects make consistent predictions for the negative pairs. 
That is, the related pairs (PROKWK, PROKMT) is more attractive than the unrelated 
pairs (PRCLWK, PRCLMT), because the related pairs performs better in terms of 
both the content and the trend.  
Consistent with these predictions, Table 10.5a shows that when the pairs are 
positive and decreasing, the rating difference between the related and unrelated pairs 
is small and non-significant, -.12 and .59, n.s.. By contrast, Table 10.5b shows that 
when the pairs are negative and increasing, the rating difference between the related 
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and the unrelated pairs is both large and statistically significant, 2.32 and 1.83, p<.001. 
The significant versus non-significant difference is consistent with the prediction of 
the contrasts model and provides evidence for the relatedness effect on contrasts.  
The interval effect on contrasts is embodied in the magnitude of these rating 
differences within each level of quality, i.e. C(-,WK) versus C(-,MT) and C(+,WK) 
versus C(+,MT).  When the pairs are positive and the contrast values are negative, the 
rating difference is more negative for the one-week interval than for the one-month 
interval (-.12 versus .59). By contrast, when the pairs are negative and the contrast 
values are positive, the rating difference is more positive for the one-week interval 
than for the one-month interval (2.32 versus 1.83). Since the only other effect to 
which these rating differences are attributed to remains constant (i.e. OK-CL), these 
results are consistent with the prediction that shorter intervals enhance contrasts, 
making positive contrasts more positive and negative contrasts more negative.  
 
Time discounting 
Positive time preference receives support from the results obtained in Task 2. 
That is, receiving an excellent mark (EX) is more attractive if it is near (EXWK) than 
distant (EXMT) but receiving a poor mark is more attractive (less aversive) if it is 
distant (PRMT) than near (PRWK). For sequences, this delay is simultaneously the 
interval. The hypothesized dual influences of time posit that delay (interval) affects 
not only the endowment but also the contrast. To isolate discounting, I compute the 
rating differences between those pairs with the same component events but different 
intervals (delays), and do so only for the unrelated pairs in order to control for the 
interval effect on contrasts. The result is shown in Table 10.5c. As predicted, the 
valences of the rating differences are always consistent with the predictions of 
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positive time preference. It is positive for positive experiences and negative for 
negative experiences. In both cases, the rating differences reach statistical significance. 
 
Table 10.5c.  The impact of discounting. 
 Rating diff. Effects t(40) 
EXCLWK - EXCLMT 0.80 EXWK-EXMT 3.680** 
PRCLWK - PRCLMT -0.49 PRWK-PRMT -2.427* 
Paired-samples t-test, two-tailed; *: p<.05, **: p<.01, ***: p<.001 
 
   
Overall 
I employ regression analysis to examine how the contrasts model performs as 
a whole. The dependent variables are the collapsed ratings of all the sequences. The 
predictors are three dummy variables, one for each independent variable: Quality 
(1=positive; 0=negative), Relatedness (1=related; 0=unrelated), and Interval 
(1=week; 0=month). The model reaches significance, Pearson correlation coefficient 
R= .417, F(3,324) = 22.677, p< .0001.  
 A hierarchical multiple regression analysis provides support for the notion that 
the contrast effects and the endowment effects make separate and independent 
contributions to global satisfaction. The predictors in this case are the mean ratings of 
the six individual events obtained in Task 2, the signed value difference computed 
from these ratings, and the levels of the three independent variable as captured by the 
dummy variables. No evidence of multicollinearity is found. Pearson correlation 
coefficient R increases from 0.384 to 0.454 when the signed value difference is 
included as a predictor. The adjusted model that includes contrasts as a predictor 
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accounts for significantly more variances in the observed ratings, F(1, 136)= 10.013, 
p= .002.  
Task 3 results 
Task 3 employs a choice task to test the dual influences of time. There are two 
predictions. First, effects of delay, i.e. discounting, and effects of interval, i.e. 
contrasts, always make contradictory predictions for the preference for 
EXOKWK/MT, as well as for PROKWK/MT. Second, since contrasts do not exist for 
the unrelated pairs EXCLWK/MT and PRCLWK/MT, the choice for these pairs 
depends on discounting alone. The results are summarized in Table 10.6 and Fig.10.2. 
 
Table 10.6. Results of the happiness task III (n=21) 
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Figure 10.2.    Choice percentages observed in the happiness task III 
 % choosing 
week 
% choosing 
month 
EXOK  60% 40% 
EXCL 75% 25% 
PROK  80% 20% 
PRCL 40% 60% 
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Consistent with discounting, a majority of the participants prefer “week” in 
EXCL (75%), binomial test p<.04,  but “month” in PRCL (60%), n.s. Consistent with 
an interval effect on contrasts that works against the time discounting, the pattern is 
diminished or even reversed for the related pairs. The percentage preferring “week” to 
“month” decreases by 15% to 60% for EXOK whereas the percentage preferring 
“month" to “week” is halved to 40% for PROK, Wilcoxon z=2.53, p<.05.  
A disparity in preferences for positive and negative pairs of events emerges. 
For the positive pair EXOK and EXCL, discounting dominates the preferences – 
“week”, the option favoured by discounting, is chosen by a majority in both the 
related and unrelated conditions. For the negative pair PROK and PRCL, however, 
the dominant force is discounting for the unrelated pairs but contrast for the related 
pairs. Put differently, discounting is more salient for the positive event than for the 
negative event, consistent with the notion of the sign effect of discounting 
(Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992).  
Comparing the response pattern in Task 3 to the sequence ratings observed in 
Task 1 (Table 10.7) reveals that the preferences are by and large consistent, except for 
PROKWK and PROKMT.  
 
Table 10.7. Mean ratings of the sequences observed in Task 1. 
 Week Month 
EXOK 6.2 6.1  
EXCL 6.3  5.5 
PROK 5.5 5.5 
PRCL 3.1 3.6  
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An overwhelming majority of the participants (80%) prefer the one-week 
interval between receiving a poor mark and receiving an average mark, whereas the 
ratings assigned to PROKWK and PROKMK are the same (5.5). Why does this 
happen? Since choice tasks do not enhance preference for improvement, additional 
motives other than the interval effect on contrasts must have motivated the preference 
for the short interval (Frederick & Loewenstein, 2008). One explanation is that shorter 
intervals foster the integrated mode of assessments (Chapter 3), allowing the positive 
experience to serve as a cushion for the negative experience.  Since the integrated 
mode is only applicable to related events, this explains why significantly more 
participants preferring “week” in PROK than in PRCL. 
 
Model fit 
I examine how well the contrasts model fits globally by a logistic regression 
analysis
17
 using Relatedness (1=related, 0=unrelated), Quality (1=positive, 
0=negative) and their interaction (1= related & positive, 0= all the rest of the 
combinations) as the predictors and Interval (1= week, 0= month) as the dependent 
variable. Table 10.8 displays the results. The model achieves statistical significance, 
χ2(3) = 8.424, p= .038. Since more participants prefer Week to Month, the model is 
correct 41.4% of the time when Month is chosen but 84.3% of the time when Week is 
chosen. In total the model makes correct predictions 68.8% of the time. 
 
                                                 
17
 The logistic regression predicts the log-odds of choosing week based on the dummy variables. 
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Table 10.8. Results of the logistic regression for Task 3 results 
Variable B Wald Odds 95.0% C.I. odds ratio 
   Ratio
18
 Lower Upper 
Relatedness 1.792 6.164* 6.000 1.458 24.685 
Quality 1.504 4.763* 4.500 1.166 17.372 
Relatedness x Quality -2.485 6.200* .083 .012 .589 
Constant -.405 .789 .667   
*: p<.05 
Individual-level analysis 
 Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) argued for the benefit of performing analysis 
at the individual level to detect time preferences that might be masked by data 
aggregation. Following this advice, I apply Solver®, a built-in procedure of Excel®, 
to the ratings observed in Task 1. The aim is to estimate the values of the four 
individual events (EXMT, OK, CL, PRCL) and the relatedness-interval ratios for the 
four related pairs, based on the eight sequence ratings produced by each individual. I 
make the following assumptions. First, the value of β, i.e. the improvement parameter, 
is constant across the eight sequences for each participant. The value of σ, i.e. the 
spreading parameter, is zero. Second, the values of the individual events are bounded 
between 0 and 4. EXWK is the most attractive event and has a fixed value of 4; 
PRWK is the least attractive event and has a fixed value of 0
19
. Third, the relatedness-
interval ratio (R/I) is bounded between -1 and 1 for the related sequences, but fixed at 
0 for the unrelated pairs.  
 
                                                 
18
 Odds ratios indicate the ratios of the odds of choosing week over month. For instance, relatedness 
has an odds ratio of 6. This means that the odds of choosing week (prob(week)/prob(month)) when the 
pairs are related are 6 times the odds when the pairs are unrelated. 
19
 This assumes that the model conforms to an interval scale. Thus, the degree of correlation between 
observation and model prediction will not be affected by such a transformation. 
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Table 10.9. Results of the Solver analysis 
Events 
Mean estimates of  
event value   Sequence 
Mean estimates of 
R/I 
EXMT 2.78  EXOKWK 0.67 
OK 3.06  EXOKMT 0.23 
CL 2.52  PROKWK 0.69 
PRMT 1.40  PROKMT 0.15 
 
The Solver procedure produces estimates that minimize the proportion of the 
squared errors between the observed ratings and the predictions, which are based on 
the contrasts model. Table 10.9 presents the results, which are largely consistent with 
the observed mean ratings assigned to individual events in Task 2. Receiving an 
average mark (OK) is more attractive than cleaning one‟s flat (CL). The mean 
estimates for the two are 3.06 versus 2.52. This pattern is observed in 61% of the 41 
participants. The estimates of individual outcome values are bounded between 0 and 4. 
However, consistent with discounting, the mean estimate for EXMT is much less than 
4 and the mean estimate for PRMT is much higher than 0, suggesting that while 
EXMT is less attractive than EXWK, PRMT is more attractive than PRWK.  
The estimated relatedness-interval ratios are consistent with the hypothesized 
impact of relatedness and interval effect on contrasts. First, the ratios are always 
positive. This means that the value of a sequence always changes in the direction as 
dictated by the valence of the signed value difference. In other words, positive 
(negative) signed value differences enhance (undermine) attractiveness, implying 
preference for improvement. Second, all the four ratios have values that are notably 
beyond 0, thus supporting the contrast effects in the related pairs. Third, the ratios are 
larger when the interval is one week than when the interval is one month, consistent 
with the interval effect on contrasts. This is true for both the positive and decreasing 
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sequences and the negative and increasing sequences. At individual level, this pattern 
is observed in 63% of the participants for EXOKWK and EXOKMT, and 66% for 
PROKWK and PROKMT.  
Somehow surprisingly, the estimated value of OK is higher than that of 
EXMT (3.06 versus 2.78). This contradicts the result of Task 2, which, if true, would 
invalidate the manipulation on trend. A close look reveals that the reason lies in the 
Solver procedure itself. As many as 41.5% of the participants assign a higher rating to 
the negative increasing sequence PROKWK than to the positive decreasing sequence 
EXOKWK. Based on the contrasts model, the value difference between these two 
sequences can be decomposed into two parts, the endowment value and the contrast 
value. The difference in endowment is however fixed at 4, or the value difference 
between EXWK and PROK. Therefore the attractiveness of PROKWK can only be 
attributed to its more positive contrast value – either because this sequence has a large 
signed value difference between PRWK and OK, or because it has a high relatedness-
interval ratio. Since the latter is bounded between 1 and -1, and the value of PRWK is 
fixed at 0, Solver can only overestimate the value of OK to explain the attractiveness 
of PROKWK. However, the fact that more than 40% of the participants judged 
PROKWK to more attractive than EXOKWK is itself evidence for the contrast effect 
on sequence preferences. 
If we employ individual-level estimates (values for individual outcomes and 
relatedness-interval ratio) to predict sequence ratings, the contrasts model achieves 
Pearson correlation coefficients ranging from -.004 to 1. This coefficient exceeds 0.80 
for 82.9% of the participants. 
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Model comparison 
I compare the performance of the contrasts model to two other models: 
Loewenstein and Prelec‟s (1993) (LP) and a truncated contrasts model with only the 
first term, i.e. EV. The parameters are assumed to be: (1) β = 1, (2) R =1 for related 
events, 0 for unrelated sequences; (3) I=1 for one-week interval and 2 for one-month 
interval. The value of the individual outcomes, which is needed to compute the 
contrast values and the endowment values are based on the mean ratings obtained in 
Task 2
20
. Table 10.10 shows the results. 
 
Table 10.10. A comparison of model predictions: LP (Loewenstein & Prelec, 
1993), Contrasts (the contrasts model) and Endowment value only 
 Reported LP MSE Contrasts MSE Endowment MSE 
EXOKWK 6.20 5.89 .09 5.19 1.00 6.60 0.16 
EXCLWK 6.32 4.11 4.89 5.40 .83 5.40 0.84 
EXOKMT 6.10 5.75 .12 5.75 .12 6.32 0.05 
EXCLMT 5.51 3.96 2.39 5.12 .15 5.12 0.15 
PROKWK 5.46 3.89 2.46 5.19 .07 2.60 8.20 
PRCLWK 3.15 2.11 1.08 1.40 3.04 1.40 3.05 
PROKMT 5.46 4.32 1.32 4.32 1.32 3.44 4.09 
PRCLMT 3.63 2.53 1.23 2.25 1.93 2.25 1.92 
  r =.880 1.698 r = .972 1.058 r = .857 2.308 
MSE: mean squared error; r: Pearson correlation coefficient, all significant at .01 level 
 
                                                 
20
 The ratings are rescaled to 0-4, to reflect the fact that the sequence has a higher endowment value 
than each of its component outcomes. 
 170 
The contrasts model achieves the highest correlation with the observations, r 
=.972, p< .0001, followed by LP, r=.879, and then the Endowment, r=.857
21
. It is 
worth noting that in this case, the contrasts model and the Endowment only model 
make different predictions for only half of the total eight pairs of events, i.e. the four 
related pairs, i.e. EXOKWK, EXOKMT, PROKWK, PROKMT.  
 
10.2 Summary 
The happiness task reported in Chapter 10 provides evidence for the contrast 
effects, time discounting, interval and relatedness effects on contrasts. The judgment 
task (Task 1) and the choice task (Task3) both provide support for the dual influences 
of time that delay fosters discounting whereas interval moderates contrast effects, 
even when delay and interval are in fact the same period of time.  The results obtained 
in Task I provide general support for the notion of dual influences when a variable 
simultaneously influences the value of individual outcomes and the relationship 
between the outcomes. Decision makers are capable of distinguishing between the 
relational and non-relational effects both when their predictions coincide and when 
they conflict. This provides support for the approach of modelling sequence 
preferences as a function of relational and non-relational values.  
 
                                                 
21
  The differences in the correlation coefficients are non-significant. 
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Chapter 11  FINAL REMARKS 
11.1 Introduction 
The contrasts model proposed in this thesis distinguishes between influences 
of interval and delay; it also describes influences of relatedness. The model 
accomplishes these by assuming that people derive satisfaction from two divergent 
sources of values, known as non-relational and relational. The non-relational value, 
as embodied in the endowment effect, is a function of nominal value and delay. The 
relational value, as embodied in the contrast effect, is a function of signed value 
difference, interval and relatedness.  
As depicted in the model, sequence preferences reflect the interplay of two 
conflicting forces, i.e. the desire to have more attractive experiences as soon as 
possible (positive time preference) versus the desire to experience positive contrasts 
with the earlier outcomes (negative time preference or preference for improvement), 
accomplished by delaying more attractive outcomes. The interval effect arises 
because, unlike delay, a long interval not only signals a long delay to the later 
outcomes but also a weaker contrast between the outcomes. As a result, increasing 
sequences become less attractive not only because of a smaller contrast but also a 
smaller endowment (discounted nominal value). The impact of delay on preference 
for improvement is much less straightforward. Depending on how the decision maker 
discounts the component outcomes, delay can enhance or reduce preference for 
improvement, or it may have no impact at all.  
The dual-influence approach is the most important feature of the contrasts 
model and distinguishes it from Loewenstein and Prelec (1993). Their model (LP) 
makes no such assumptions. As such, many hypotheses investigated in this thesis are 
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not applicable to LP, including time discounting as well as influences of relatedness 
and interval on the shape of a sequence as captured in the relational value (contrasts). 
When LP does apply, its predictions coincide with the ones made by the contrasts 
model. This is perhaps not surprising as both models aim at providing a descriptive 
account of sequence preferences and their main differences, the difference in 
describing spreading, is not an issue when sequences contain just two events.  
Table 11.1 presents a summary of the main findings of this thesis. Both the 
contrasts model and LP predict preference for improvement (“Trend”) and the more 
attractive the individual outcomes, the more attractive the sequence becomes (“NV”). 
The contrasts model also predicts, uniquely, that the improvement (deterioration) is 
more (less) desirable when its magnitude is larger, when the events are more related 
(“RxTrend”) and when their intervals are shorter (“IxTrend”).  
Table 11.1. Summary of main findings. 
  Non-relational  Relational  
Chapter Task NV Delay Trend R x Trend I x Trend 
7 The Ranking task   
 
  
8 Sequence judgment   
   
8 Social judgment   
   
9 Scheduling I (table)  
 X 
 
 
9 Scheduling II (graph)  
X  
 
 
10 Happiness (judgment)  
    
10 Happiness (choice)  
 
 
  
: the hypothesis about the column variable received support from a task; X: the hypothesis was not 
supported; R: relatedness; I: interval; NV: nominal value; Shaded cells indicate hypotheses that are not 
tested. 
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11.2 Positive, null and negative time preferences 
Positive, null and negative time preferences predict preferences for increasing, 
constant and decreasing sequences, which have negative, null and positive signed 
value differences and therefore contrast values of the same valences. Preference for 
improvement receives the most support, from the results obtained in the ranking task 
(Chapter 7), the sequence judgment task (Chapter 8), the second run of the scheduling 
task for the female participants (Chapter 9) and the happiness task (Chapter 10).  
These experiments show that when facing two monetary outcomes (either two gains 
or one gain and one loss) or non-monetary outcomes (e.g. visits, academic 
experiences, cleaning), participants prefer their values to improve over time rather 
than remain constant or even deteriorate. The more positive the later outcome 
compared to the earlier one, the larger the degree of improvement, the more attractive 
the sequences are and vice versa.  
Preference for improvement seems to be a specific case of a general 
preference for positive contrasts. The finding in the social judgment task (Chapter 8) 
shows that participants believe that the target individual (Mr A) derive higher 
satisfaction from a given income if A receives more than his colleague, Mr B 
(positive contrasts), but lower satisfaction if A receives less than B (negative 
contrasts).  
Preference for improvement is however less pronounced than expected. In the 
ranking task, a sizeable proportion of participants exhibit positive time preference by 
preferring to receive a larger gain before a smaller one or a gain before a loss. This 
holds even when the second outcome occurs one day after the first outcome. In the 
sequence judgment task, participants prefer to receive gains over a short rather than a 
long period. Positive time preference also dominates the responses in the first run of 
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the scheduling task, where most participants prefer the decreasing schedule (Friends, 
Aunt) to the increasing (Aunt, Friends) across all six conditions, with the intervals 
ranging from one week to 26 weeks. By adopting the time-line graphs that foster 
attention on the trend, I obtain evidence of preference for improvement in the second 
run of the study, though only for female participants. The male-female difference is 
consistent with the notion that positive time preference discounting follows from 
focusing on individual outcomes when making assessments, typical for males, 
whereas negative time preference follows from focusing on the relationship between 
the outcomes, typical for females. Consistent with this, males‟ response patterns seem 
in part motivated by savouring and dread, an individual event driven preference for 
improvement. However, the fact that no gender difference emerges in other studies 
suggests the possibility that the gender difference mainly hinges on how each 
responds to manipulation on delay, which could be exacerbated by a pictorial display 
of the outcome (the time-line graph). Future investigation can explore these.  
The happiness task provides evidence for the simultaneous influences of 
positive and negative time preferences. Participants prefer to receive a past gain 
nearer to the present, but a past loss more distant from the present. Such preferences 
are however mitigated or even reversed when the gains and losses are embedded in 
sequences, in which case the delay coincides with the interval and the interval effect 
contradicts discounting in terms of their implications for the global attractiveness. 
Preference for spreading is not salient on its own in any of these experiments. 
11.3 Interval and relatedness 
Interval and relatedness, the two relational variables hypothesized in the 
contrasts model, exert influences at two different levels, i.e. on their own (as main 
effects) and via contrast effects (as interactions with the signed value difference). This 
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is evident in the sequence judgment task. The contrast effects are more pronounced, 
and therefore the value discrepancy between the increasing and decreasing sequences 
of gains is larger, when the gains are related (two working bonuses) than unrelated 
(one working bonus and one lottery win) or when the interval is short (half a day or 
one day) than long (one week). In the happiness task, the contrast effect under a one-
week interval is about three times the size of the one under a one-month interval. 
There is also evidence that unrelated gains are preferred to related gains of the 
same magnitude. A possible account is Linville and Fischer‟s (1991) notion of limited 
coping capacities. This is testable, by asking two groups of participants to assess 
sequences, one under cognitive load (the experimental group) and the other not (the 
control group). If limited coping capacities play a role, then we expect the 
experimental group to favour unrelated gains even more than does the control group.  
On the other hand, limited coping capacities cannot explain why concentrated 
gains are preferred to distributed gains. The interval effect is however reversed in the 
interpersonal judgment task, in which case participants believe they are better-off 
receiving gains that are temporally more distant from the ones received by their 
colleague. The seemingly contradicting results actually provide support for the notion 
of contrast effects. This is because the shorter interval is only preferred in the 
sequence judgment task when the trend is increasing (i.e. positive contrasts) and the 
longer interval is only preferred in the social judgment task when the colleague 
receives a larger amount than oneself (i.e. negative contrasts). In both cases, the 
direction of the interval effect is consistent with the notion that shorter intervals 
enhance contrast effects, which leads to a larger influence on the global judgment.  
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11.4 Delay 
Delay rather than interval leads to time discounting. However, when the 
timing of the present is ambiguous, as in the ranking task, the sequence judgment task 
and the social judgment task, results show that participants discount the second 
outcomes based on their interval with the first “earlier” outcomes. This is consistent 
with the notion of discounting by interval (Read, 2001). The happiness task obtains 
evidence of discounting for gains and losses both when they are assessed in isolation 
(Task 2), and when they are embedded in sequences (Task 1, Solver estimates). 
What happens when the entire sequence is delayed? One clear impact of delay, 
which emerged from Scheduling Task II, is that it obscures time preferences, that is, 
the more distant the schedules, the more participants who become indifferent between 
the increasing and decreasing trends. The contrast model posits that delay has 
divergent influences on preference for improvement depending on how the decision 
maker discounts within a target sequence. The result of the scheduling tasks shows 
that delay can result in fewer, about the same, or more participants preferring the 
decreasing schedule (Friends, Aunt). I did not investigate this in this thesis, which 
should be the topic of future studies. Although the pattern of the results in the 
scheduling task suggests interactions between delay and interval, the results are 
statistically unreliable.  That is, second-order effects due to an impact of delay on 
interval, or vice versa, do not exert significant influences. 
11.5 Dual influences 
Tversky and Griffin (1991) employ the term dual influences to refer to an 
endowment effect and a contrast effect exerted by a past event on one‟s present well-
beings. In this thesis, I use the term more broadly to capture non-relational and 
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relational effects exerted by the same variable, as exemplified by the endowment and 
the contrast. The happiness task provides evidence for the dual influences. The delay 
of the first event coincides with the interval between the events. The quality of the 
first event determines the trend; the content of the second event determines the 
relatedness between the events. The results show that participants are capable of 
separating the two kinds of effects even when they have opposing implications for 
time preferences. 
Note that in the happiness task the first event takes place in the “past”. Delay 
describes its distance to the present. Unlike future events, past events have occurred. 
This removes uncertainty as one motive underlying discounting. By comparing 
discounting of past and future events, future research can provide insights into 
different motives underlying time preferences. 
11.6 Other findings 
Evidence of loss-aversion emerges. This explains why the negative impact of a 
decreasing trend is twice the size of the positive impact of an increasing trend of the 
same magnitude in the sequence judgment task, using constant sequences as the 
control condition. In the social judgment task, loss-aversion provides an account for 
the only influence exerted by the unrelated interpersonal gains. That is, Mr A‟s 
satisfaction from a working bonus is lowered by the lottery win received by Mr B of a 
larger size.  
An “ownership effect” means participants derive higher satisfaction simply by 
imagining they own the gains. Self-other discrepancies may interact with loss-
aversion. The ownership effect is the most pronounced when the gains have a 
decreasing trend. This suggests the possibility that people focus more on the total 
amount and less on the individual gains when making the assessment. Future 
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investigation can explore two things: whether vividness fosters a large hedonic impact 
and whether vividness influences assessment mode. If the first hypothesis holds, 
imagining losses should entail a larger negative effect on one‟s satisfaction. 
One weakness of this investigation is that the stimuli sequences these 
investigations contain just two events, and hence are not representative of most real-
life sequences. This manipulation maximizes the salience and therefore the impact of 
relatedness and interval but provides only limited support for the model. Chapter 6 
obtains preliminary evidence that the contrasts model works for assessing sequences 
containing multiple periods as well. This should be the focus of my future research.  
Finally, in all experiments, the participants were presented with imaginary 
experiences that are mainly positive, e.g. receiving a bonus or having an excellent 
mark. And in all but the happiness task, the participants were asked to predict their 
experiences. To test the external validity of the model, future investigation should 
consider using real-world settings, such as playing sequences of computer games that 
may result in real monetary gains and losses (e.g. Tversky and Griffin (1991)).  
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APPENDIX A Results of the model comparison (Chapter 6) 
 
 
Sequences 
 
 
Mean 
Reported 
rating 
The 
Contrasts 
model* 
LP** LP fitted*** 
1 0 0 1 1 2 6.11 4.82 4.75 6.14 
2 0 0 1 2 1 5.74 4.67 4.60 6.11 
3 0 0 2 1 1 5.57 4.67 4.45 6.08 
4 0 1 0 1 2 6.81 5.08 4.60 6.11 
5 0 1 0 2 1 6.32 4.93 4.45 6.08 
6 0 1 1 0 2 6.08 5.08 4.45 6.08 
7 0 1 1 2 0 5.36 4.52 3.94 5.63 
8 0 1 2 0 1 5.68 4.93 3.99 5.73 
9 0 1 2 1 0 5.58 4.52 3.64 5.31 
10 0 2 0 1 1 5.36 4.93 4.04 5.83 
11 0 2 1 0 1 5.72 4.93 3.74 5.50 
12 0 2 1 1 0 5.55 4.52 3.38 5.08 
13 1 0 0 1 2 5.60 4.67 4.40 5.99 
14 1 0 0 2 1 5.36 4.52 4.25 5.96 
15 1 0 1 0 2 7.32 4.93 4.25 5.96 
16 1 0 1 2 0 5.51 4.37 3.74 5.50 
17 1 0 2 0 1 6.34 4.78 3.79 5.60 
18 1 0 2 1 0 5.32 4.37 3.43 5.18 
19 1 1 0 0 2 5.34 4.67 3.99 5.73 
20 1 1 0 2 0 5.06 4.37 3.49 5.28 
21 1 1 2 0 0 3.55 4.11 2.77 4.43 
22 1 2 0 0 1 4.26 4.52 3.13 4.85 
23 1 2 0 1 0 4.85 4.37 2.77 4.43 
24 1 2 1 0 0 3.62 4.11 2.36 3.91 
25 2 0 0 1 1 4.62 4.11 3.43 5.18 
26 2 0 1 0 1 5.13 4.37 3.13 4.85 
27 2 0 1 1 0 4.98 3.96 2.77 4.43 
28 2 1 0 0 1 4.11 4.11 2.72 4.33 
29 2 1 0 1 0 4.43 3.96 2.36 3.91 
30 2 1 1 0 0 3.32 3.70 1.95 3.38 
 
Mean squared error (MSE)   .99 3.0 .23 
*     Parameter values used in the contrasts model:   = .28 and 

'= .13  
**   Parameter values used in LP:   = .28,  =-.13 
*** LP fitted makes predictions using parameter values derived from ratings of 
each individual participant 
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APPENDIX B Questionnaire of the ranking task 
 
For each of the following pairs of events, please try to imagine how you would feel if 
they happened to you. Using the boxes provided beside each letter, please rank order 
the events according to how good you would feel after they occurred.  Use „1‟ for the 
event that would be best, „2‟ for the next best, and so on.  
 
Question 1 
 
 A One day, you experience an unexpected loss of £200.  
The next day, you experience an unexpected gain of £200.   
 
 B One day, you experience an unexpected gain of £200.  
The next day, you experience an unexpected loss of £200.   
 
 C One day, you experience an unexpected loss of £100.  
The next day, you experience an unexpected gain of £100.   
 
 D One day, you experience an unexpected gain of £100.  
The next day, you experience an unexpected loss of £100.   
 
 E One day, you experience an unexpected loss of £250.  
The next day, you experience an unexpected gain of £250.   
 
 F One day, you experience an unexpected gain of £250.  
The next day, you experience an unexpected loss of £250.   
 
 
Question 2 
 
 
 A One day, you experience an unexpected gain of £100.  
The next day, you experience an unexpected gain of £400.   
 
 B One day, you experience an unexpected gain of £400.  
The next day, you experience an unexpected gain of £100.   
 
 C One day, you experience an unexpected gain of £200.  
The next day, you experience an unexpected gain of £300.   
 
 D One day, you experience an unexpected gain of £300. 
The next day, you experience an unexpected gain of £200. 
 
 E One day, you experience an unexpected gain of £250.  
The next day, you experience an unexpected gain of £250.   
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APPENDIX C Questionnaire of the sequence judgment task 
 
  
Translated from Chinese 
 
Imagine that you (Mr A) have just received 4000 RMB on two separate occasions, the 
details of which are presented in the three tables shown below. In each table, the trend 
in which you receive these two incomes differs, which is either increasing (1500, 
2500), constant (2000, 2000) or decreasing (2500, 1500). Given trend, the incomes 
differ in terms of their source (either two working bonuses or one working bonus and 
one lottery win) or time interval (either received on the same day, over a period of 
two days or one week).   
 
Your task is to assign a rating to each scenario that represents one combination of 
sources of income and intervals (i.e. each row in each of the three tables below). 
These ratings should reflect your personal perception in terms of how happy you (Mr 
A) would be after these experiences. There are no right or wrong answers.  
 
First, read through the list of scenarios presented in all the tables. Next, assign a rating 
of 9 to the pair that would lead to the most happiness and assign a rating of 0 to the 
pair that would lead to the least happiness. Now rate all of the other pairs relative to 
these.  
 
 
Interval Source of income 
An increasing sequence: 
1500, 2500 
One week Two working bonuses  
One day Two working bonuses  
Half day Two working bonuses  
One week One working bonus and one lottery win  
One day One working bonus and one lottery win  
Half day One working bonus and one lottery win  
 
 
Interval Source of income 
A decreasing sequence:  
2500, 1500 
One week Two working bonuses  
One day Two working bonuses  
Half day Two working bonuses  
One week One working bonus and one lottery win  
One day One working bonus and one lottery win  
Half day One working bonus and one lottery win  
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Interval Source of income 
A constant sequence:  
2000, 2000 
One week Two working bonuses  
One day Two working bonuses  
Half day Two working bonuses  
One week One working bonus and one lottery win  
One day One working bonus and one lottery win  
Half day One working bonus and one lottery win  
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APPENDIX D Questionnaire of the Interpersonal Judgment 
Task 
 
 
Translated from Chinese 
 
Suppose Mr A has just received a working bonus worth 2000RMB. His colleague Mr 
B has also received an income, but its time, amount and source vary, as specified in 
the following tables.  
 
Your task is to assign a rating to each scenario that indicate how happy you believe 
Mr A will be given Mr B‟s income. These ratings should reflect your personal 
perception in terms of how happy the person would be after these experiences. There 
are no right or wrong answers.  
 
First, read through the list of scenarios presented in all the three matrices. Next, assign 
a rating of 9 to the pair that would lead to the most happiness and assign a rating of 0 
to the pair that would lead to the least happiness. Now rate all of the other pairs 
relative to these.  
 
Suppose with an interval of half a day, Mr B receives: 
Source of income Worth (RMB) How happy is Mr B? 
A working bonus 2500  
A working bonus 2000  
A working bonus 1500  
A lottery win 2500  
A lottery win 2000  
A lottery win 1500  
 
Suppose with an interval of one week, Mr B receives: 
Source of income Worth (RMB) How happy is Mr B? 
A working bonus 2500  
A working bonus 2000  
A working bonus 1500  
A lottery win 2500  
A lottery win 2000  
A lottery win 1500  
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APPENDIX E Questionnaire of the Scheduling Task I 
 
 
Imagine you must schedule two weekend outings to a city where you once lived. You 
do not plan on visiting the city after these two outings. You must spend one of these 
weekends with an irritating, abrasive aunt who is a horrendous cook. The other 
weekend will be spent visiting former work associates whom you like a lot.  
 
 
On the next few pages, you will be asked about your preferences between pairs of 
schedules. In each question, your task is (1) to make choice for a schedule that you 
believe will lead to more happiness and (2) to indicate the degree of your preference 
by assigning a rating on a 1 to 7 scale. A rating of „1‟ represents a very weak 
preference, and a rating of „7‟ represents a very strong preference (the higher the 
rating, the stronger the preference).  
 
 
Please provide your demographic information. 
 
Your gender:  ______   (F/M) 
Your age:       ______    years 
 
 
 
1. Suppose one outing will take place this coming weekend, the other the 
weekend after. 
 
 This weekend Next weekend 
A Friends  Abrasive aunt 
B Abrasive aunt Friends 
 
 
Which schedule do you prefer (circle one)?  A  B 
  
How much do you prefer this schedule to the other (circle one)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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2. Suppose one outing will take place in 4 weeks, the other the weekend after (5 
weeks).  
 
 4 weeks from now 5 weeks from now 
A Friends  Abrasive aunt 
B Abrasive aunt Friends 
 
 
Which schedule do you prefer (circle one)?  A  B 
  
How much do you prefer this schedule to the other (circle one)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
3. Suppose one outing will take place in 6 months (26 weeks), the other the 
weekend after (27 weeks from now). 
 
 26 weeks from now 27 weeks from now 
A Friends  Abrasive aunt 
B Abrasive aunt Friends 
 
Which schedule do you prefer (circle one)?  A  B 
  
How much do you prefer this schedule to the other (circle one)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
4. Suppose one outing will take place this coming weekend, the other in 4 weeks. 
 
 
This weekend 4 weeks from now 
A Friends  Abrasive aunt 
B Abrasive aunt Friends 
 
 
Which schedule do you prefer (circle one)?  A  B 
  
How much do you prefer this schedule to the other (circle one)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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5. Suppose one outing will take place in 4 weeks, the other 4 weeks after (8 
weeks from now). 
 
 
4 weeks from now 8 weeks from now 
A Friends  Abrasive aunt 
B Abrasive aunt Friends 
 
 
Which schedule do you prefer (circle one)?  A  B 
  
How much do you prefer this schedule to the other (circle one)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
6. Suppose one outing will take place in 6 months (26 weeks from now), the 
other 4 weeks after (30 weeks from now). 
 
 
26 weeks from now 30 weeks from now 
A Friends  Abrasive aunt 
B Abrasive aunt Friends 
 
 
Which schedule do you prefer (circle one)?  A  B 
  
How much do you prefer this schedule to the other (circle one)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
7. Suppose one outing will take place this coming weekend, the other in 6 
months (26 weeks). 
 
 This weekend 26 weeks from now 
A Friends Abrasive aunt 
B Abrasive aunt Friends 
 
 
Which schedule do you prefer (circle one)?  A  B 
  
How much do you prefer this schedule to the other (circle one)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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8. Suppose one outing will take place in 4 weeks, the other 6 months after (30 
weeks from now). 
 
 
4 weeks from now 30 weeks from now 
A Friends Abrasive aunt 
B Abrasive aunt Friends 
 
 
Which schedule do you prefer (circle one)?  A  B 
  
How much do you prefer this schedule to the other (circle one)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
9. Suppose one outing will take place in 6 months (26 weeks), the other 6 months 
after (one year or 52 weeks from now). 
 
 
26 weeks from now 52 weeks from now 
A Friends Abrasive aunt 
B Abrasive aunt Friends 
 
 
Which schedule do you prefer (circle one)?  A  B 
  
How much do you prefer this schedule to the other (circle one)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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APPENDIX F Questionnaire of the Scheduling Task II 
 
 
Imagine you must schedule two weekend outings to a city where you once lived. You 
must spend one of these weekends with an irritating aunt who is a horrendous cook. 
The other weekend will be spent visiting former work associates whom you like a lot.  
 
In each of the following questions, you will be presented with two schedules, 
Schedule X and Schedule Y. Following Schedule X, you will visit the aunt before 
visiting the friends. Following Schedule Y, you will visit the friends before visiting 
the aunt. The time of these two schedules varies from question to question. One 
possibility is described in the following “time line” diagram. 
 
wk              26 27 
                
X:                             F 
              A  
                
Y:                           F   
               A 
 
The diagram describes a situation where the first visit will take place on the weekend 
26 weeks (6 months) from now and the second visit one week after (27 weeks from 
now). Since visiting the friends (denoted by letter F) is more pleasant than visiting the 
aunt (denoted by letter A), F is marked above the time line whereas A is marked 
below.  
 
In each question, your task is to indicate your relative preference between Schedule X 
and Y by assigning a rating on a -5 to 5 scale. The more positive your rating, the 
stronger is your preference for Schedule Y (visiting the friends before visiting the 
aunt, i.e., 
)(
A
F ), whereas the more negative your rating, the stronger is your 
preference for Schedule X, (visiting the aunt before visiting the friends, i.e., )(
F
A
). A 
rating of 0 indicates you are indifferent between these two schedules.  
 
Please bear in mind that once the choice is made, the two visits must be paid at the 
time you chose. There will be neither interruptions to the plan, nor any future chance 
of altering it. 
 
Please provide your demographic information. 
 
Your gender:  ______   (F/M) 
Your age:       ______    years 
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1. One outing will take place this coming weekend, the other the weekend after. 
 
wk 1 2 
   
X:   F 
 A  
   
Y:  F  
  A 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
prefer X     
No 
Difference     
Strongly 
prefer Y 
 
 
 
2. One outing will take place this coming weekend, the other in 4 weeks. 
 
wk 1  4 
    
X:    F  
 A   
    
Y:  F    
   A 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
prefer X     
No 
Difference     
Strongly 
prefer Y 
 
 
 
3. One outing will take place this coming weekend, the other in 6 months (26 
weeks) 
 
wk 1             26 
               
X:                            F 
 A              
               
Y:  F                           
              A 
  
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
prefer X     
No 
Difference     
Strongly 
prefer Y 
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4. One outing will take place in 6 months (26 weeks), the other the weekend after 
(27 weeks from now). 
wk            26 27 
               
X:                            F 
             A  
               
Y:                          F   
              A 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
prefer X     
No 
Difference     
Strongly 
prefer Y 
 
 
 
5. One outing will take place in 6 months (26 weeks), the other 4 weeks after (30 
weeks from now). 
 
.wk            26   30 
                 
X:                                F 
             A    
                 
Y:                          F       
                A 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
prefer X     
No 
Difference     
Strongly 
prefer Y 
 
 
 
6. One outing will take place in 6 months (26 weeks), the other 6 months after 
(52 weeks or one year from now). 
wk            26             52 
                           
X:                                                    F 
             A              
                           
Y:                          F                           
                          A 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
prefer X     
No 
Difference     
Strongly 
prefer Y 
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Please tell us what kinds of things affected your preferences. We are especially 
interested in the effect of how far the two visits were from the present, how far they 
were from one another, and whether the visit to the aunt came before or after the visit 
to your friends. 
 
1__________________________________________________________ 
 
  __________________________________________________________ 
 
2__________________________________________________________ 
 
  __________________________________________________________ 
 
3__________________________________________________________ 
 
  __________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX G Questionnaire of the happiness task 
 
 
Part I 
 
 
On the next few pages you will find 8 pairs of life events experienced by university 
students. Each pair of events contains two experiences. The first event occurred either 
a week ago or a month ago, and the second event always occurred today. 
 
Your task will be to assign a rating to each pair of events. These ratings should reflect 
your personal perception in terms of how happy the person would be after these 
experiences. There are no right or wrong answers.  
 
First, read through the list of 8 pair of events on the next few pages and assign a rating 
of 10 to the pair that would lead to the most happiness. Next, assign a rating of 0 to 
the pair that would lead to the least happiness. Now rate all of the other pairs relative 
to these.  
 
Please make your ratings by circling the appropriate rating on the scale below each 
pair of events.  
 
 
1. A week ago, Alice received an excellent mark in a quiz, much better than she 
expected.  Today, she received an acceptable mark in another quiz. This was 
the mark she expected. 
 How happy do you think Alice is today?  
 
 
2. A week ago, Betty received an excellent mark in a quiz, much better than she 
expected. Today, she spent most of the day tidying up her flat.  
 How happy do you think Betty is today?  
 
 
3. A month ago, Eva received an excellent mark in a quiz, much better than she 
expected. Today, she received an acceptable mark in another quiz. This was 
the mark she expected. 
How happy do you think Eva is today?  
 
 
4. A month ago, Fiona received an excellent mark in a quiz, much better than she 
expected. 
Today, she spent most of the day tidying up her flat.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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 How happy do you think Fiona is today?  
 
5. A week ago, Celia received a poor mark in a quiz, much worse than she 
expected. Today, she received an acceptable mark in another quiz. This was 
the mark she expected.  
 How happy do you think Celia is today?  
 
 
6. A week ago, Donna received a poor mark in a quiz, much worse than she 
expected. Today, she spent most of the day tidying up her flat.   
 How happy do you think Donna is today?  
 
 
7. A month ago, Gill received a poor mark in a quiz, much worse than she 
expected. Today, she received an acceptable mark in another quiz. This was 
the mark she expected. 
 How happy do you think Gill is today?  
 
 
8. A month ago, Helen received a poor mark, much worse than she expected. 
Today, she spent most of the day tidying up her flat.   
 How happy do you think Helen is today?  
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Part II 
 
On the next two pages you will find 6 individual events experienced by university 
students. These events occurred independently to each student. Your task will be to 
assign ratings to these events. These ratings should reflect your personal perception in 
terms of how happy the person would be today after experiencing these events either 
a month ago, a week ago or today. There are no right or wrong answers.  
 
First, read through the list 6 events on the next two pages and assign a rating of 10 to 
the event that will lead to most happiness. Next, assign a rating of 0 to the event that 
will lead to least happiness. Now rate all of the other events relative to these. Please 
make your ratings by circling the appropriate rating on the scale below each event.  
 
 
1. A week ago, Alec received an excellent mark in a quiz, much better than he 
expected.  
 How happy do you think Alec is today?  
 
2. A month ago, Ed received an excellent mark in a quiz, much better than he 
expected. 
 How happy do you think Ed is today?  
 
3. Today, Bill received an acceptable mark in a quiz. This was the mark he 
expected. 
 How happy do you think Bill is today?  
 
 
4. A week ago, Carl received a poor mark in a quiz, much worse than he 
expected. 
 How happy do you think Carl is today?  
 
5. A month ago, Franc received a poor mark in a quiz, much worse than he 
expected. 
 How happy do you think Franc is today?  
 
6. Today, Donald spent most of the day tidying up his flat.  
 How happy do you think Donald is today?  
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Part III 
 
On the next two pages you will find 4 questions. In each question that you will 
respond to, two events will be described.  Assume that the first event will occur either 
a week earlier or a month earlier than the second event. Your task will be to decide 
when you would prefer to have the first event occur. Please indicate your choice by 
ticking the option that you consider as more desirable (or less undesirable).  
 
Q1 
First event:  You receive an excellent mark in a quiz, much better than you 
expected.  
Second event:  You receive an acceptable mark in another quiz. This was the 
mark you expected. 
 
I would rather have  
___   the first event occur a month earlier than the second event. 
___   the first event occur a week earlier than the second event. 
 
Q2 
First event:  You receive a poor mark in a quiz, much worse than you 
expected.  
Second event:  You receive an acceptable mark in another quiz. This was the 
mark you expected. 
 
I would rather have  
___   the first event occur a month earlier than the second event. 
___   the first event occur a week earlier than the second event. 
 
Q3 
First event:  You receive an excellent mark in a quiz, much better than you 
expected.  
Second event:  You spend most of the day tidying up your flat. 
 
I would rather have  
___   the first event occur a month earlier than the second event. 
___   the first event occur a week earlier than the second event. 
 
Q4 
First event:  You receive a poor mark in a quiz, much worse than you 
expected.  
Second event:  You spend most of the day tidying up your flat. 
 
I would rather have  
___   the first event occur a month earlier than the second event. 
___   the first event occur a week earlier than the second event. 
 
 
